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Abstract  
The expansion of Protected Areas (PAs) has been considered as the main strategy to 
contain deforestation and forest degradation in Developing Countries (DCs), and secure 
most of the vulnerable and endangered species, including the large carnivores and 
herbivores of African Savannas. Mozambique is one of DC which has also embarked in this 
expansion of PAs, with a current network of PAs covering 25% of the natural forest. In most 
of Mozambican PAs, there is also an unprecedented growth of human population, whose 
livelihoods depends on harvesting natural resources. Illegal or unregulated harvesting of 
natural resources imposes a huge threat to biodiversity conservation, which needs to be 
urgently addressed through policies aimed at changing people’s behaviors to conserve 
biodiversity the country’s PAs.  
The Niassa National Reserve (NNR) is the largest PA in the country encompasses 
5.3% of all-natural forest and 45% of the overall land under PA in the country. Using the 
NNR as a case study, we aim to explore policy ways to improve the conservation status of 
PAs in Mozambique and DCs in general, through identifying and analyzing the role of the 
drivers for local people engagement in activities that threat biodiversity conservation. We 
explore possible incentive measures that PA residents may be willing to accept to 
collaborate with park authorities and other relevant stakeholders operating in the reserve. 
This main objective was addressed by surveying conservation experts spread through the 
country and local households in the NNR. As regards the expert survey, Cluster Analysis 
was applied to identify the different experts’ views about to the main practices that threaten 
biodiversity conservation in the NNR, the underlining drivers for local people involvement 
with such practices, the main responsible for each practice and the effectiveness of the new 
proposed compensation measures. A cluster procedure was also used to identify the different 
Livelihood and Farming Systems (LFS) prevailing in the reserve, based on data from the 
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household survey.  A Multinomial Logistic Model (MLM) was also estimated to understand 
the drivers of household choice of LFS.  
The results showed that outsider conduct most of the illegal activities that strongly 
threat biodiversity conservation in the reserve (poaching, illegal logging and mining). At 
the same time, local people tend to engage in illegal activities that they need to carry out to 
cope with their daily needs. Most of the new in-kind incentives explored in the surveys, 
showed a greater acceptance from local people compared to those currently applied in the 
reserve. Moreover, livelihood systems were mainly driven by socio-economic factors, while 
FS were mostly driven by biophysical conditions. Finally, households who were employed 
and had diversified farming and off-farming activities, were better off, more resilient to 
climate change and crop raiding animals and held more conservation friendly attitudes.  
Keywords: Conservation-threatening practices; illegal natural resource harvesting; Livelihood 
                   and farming system, socio-economic and biophysical drivers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Contents  
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii 
List of tables ....................................................................................................................... ix 
List of figures ..................................................................................................................... xi 
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1 
General introduction and conceptual approach .............................................................. 1 
1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 2 
1.2. General objectives and research questions of the thesis ............................................ 5 
1.3. Theoretical background and conceptual approach ..................................................... 9 
1.4. Conservation threatening practices and their drivers: the need to understand the 
views of key conservation actors to draw consistent conservation guidelines ............... 10 
1.5. Costs and benefits of living around or inside protected areas in developing countries
 ........................................................................................................................................ 13 
1.6. The role of incentives in promoting conservation-friendly behavior in the NNR: 
money or in-kind payments? ........................................................................................... 15 
1.7. References ................................................................................................................ 17 
Chapter 2 ........................................................................................................................... 27 
An expert-based approach to assess the potential for local people engagement in 
nature conservation: The case study of the Niassa National Reserve in Mozambique
 ............................................................................................................................................ 27 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 28 
2.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 29 
2.1.1. Literature review ............................................................................................... 31 
2.2. Methodology ............................................................................................................ 33 
2.2.1. Study area: the Niassa National Reserve .......................................................... 33 
2.2.2. Survey data ........................................................................................................ 34 
2.2.3. Data Analysis .................................................................................................... 35 
2.3. Results ...................................................................................................................... 37 
2.3.1. Respondents profiles ......................................................................................... 37 
2.3.2. Conservation-threatening practices in the NNR and the responsibility of 
different actors ............................................................................................................ 37 
2.3.3. Drivers of local people involvement in conservation-threatening practices ..... 41 
vi 
 
2.3.4. Effectiveness and limitations of ongoing compensation measures ................... 43 
2.3.5. New proposed compensation measures ............................................................ 45 
2.3.6. Relationships between experts’ views on different topics and their socio-
demographic profile .................................................................................................... 48 
4.4. Discussion ................................................................................................................ 51 
2.4.1.  Conservation problems, their importance and drivers ..................................... 51 
2.4.2. Compensation measures and their expected effectiveness ................................ 54 
2.4.3. Consistency on experts’ views across themes ................................................... 56 
2.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 58 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... 59 
2.6. References ................................................................................................................ 60 
Chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................... 71 
Dataset from 55 experts engaged in nature conservation in Mozambique ................. 71 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 72 
3.1. Specifications Table ................................................................................................. 74 
3.2. Value of the data ...................................................................................................... 74 
3.3. Data .......................................................................................................................... 75 
3.4. Experimental Design, Materials and Methods ......................................................... 76 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... 82 
3.5. References ................................................................................................................ 83 
Appendix A ..................................................................................................................... 86 
Chapter 4 ........................................................................................................................... 95 
A Livelihood and Farming System approach for effective conservation policies in 
Protected Areas of Developing Countries: The case study of the Niassa National 
Reserve in Mozambique ................................................................................................... 95 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 96 
4.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 98 
4.2. Methodology .......................................................................................................... 102 
4.2.1. Site location and characterization ................................................................... 102 
4.2.2. Data collection ................................................................................................ 104 
4.2.2.1. Household survey ................................................................................ 105 
4.2.3. Data Analysis .............................................................................................. 105 
4.2.3.1. Agriculture production and prices ....................................................... 105 
vii 
 
4.2.3.2. Typology of Livelihood Systems and Livelihood-System patterns of 
different villages .................................................................................................... 106 
4.2.3.3. Developing Farming System typology and patterns across villages ... 108 
4.2.3.4. Predictors and drivers of Livelihood and Farming Systems ............... 109 
4.2.3.4. Model of Livelihood and Farming Systems ........................................ 110 
4.2.3.5. Effect of rainfall and population in agriculture intensification ........... 110 
4.2.3.6. Losses from crop raiding and their patterns across villages and LFS . 111 
4.3. Results ................................................................................................................ 112 
4.3.1. Livelihood Systems and their village-level patterns ....................................... 112 
4.3.1.1. Predictors of Livelihood System choice ................................................... 114 
4.3.2. Farming systems and their village-level patterns ............................................ 115 
4.3.2.1. Predictors of Farming System choice ................................................. 117 
4.3.3. Population size, rainfall levels and agricultural intensity ........................... 118 
4.3.4. Proportion of agricultural output lost to crop raiding ................................. 119 
4.3.5. Patterns of losses for crop raiding across villages and its relation to LFS, 
potential damage, and protective measures ............................................................... 120 
4.4. Discussion .......................................................................................................... 122 
4.4.1. Drivers and Predictors of LFS choice and its effect on agriculture 
intensification ............................................................................................................ 123 
4.4.2. Crop raiding, diversification of LFS and its implication for food security and 
biodiversity conservation in the NNR ....................................................................... 124 
4.4.3. Livelihood and Farming System approach: implications for policy 
instruments to improve nature conservation and sustainable development in PAs of 
developing countries. ................................................................................................ 127 
4.5. Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 129 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 130 
4.6. References .......................................................................................................... 131 
Appendix B ................................................................................................................... 143 
Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................... 146 
Participation in illegal harvesting of natural resources and the perceived costs and 
benefits of living within a protected area ..................................................................... 146 
Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 147 
5.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 149 
5.2. Methodology .......................................................................................................... 153 
5.2.1. Site location and characterization ................................................................... 153 
viii 
 
5.2.2. Data collection ................................................................................................ 154 
5.2.2.1. Households survey .............................................................................. 155 
5.2.3. Data analysis ............................................................................................... 157 
5.2.3.1. Agriculture production and prices ....................................................... 158 
5.2.3.2. Accounting for benefits and losses incurred by NNR residents ......... 158 
5.2.3.3. Assessing the likelihood of participation in illegal harvesting and 
identifying the drivers for such participation ........................................................ 160 
5.2.3.4. Limitations of current incentives and the need for new proposed 
incentives as a pretext for involvement in illegal activities .................................. 162 
5.3. Results .................................................................................................................... 163 
5.3.1. Distribution of cumulative costs and benefits across villages ........................ 163 
5.3.2. Involvement of households in illegal harvesting of natural resources ............ 167 
5.3.3.  Main actor and its proportion of responsibility for each practice that threatens 
conservation .............................................................................................................. 171 
5.3.4. Limitations of the current incentives as a need for new proposed incentives. 172 
5.4. Discussion .......................................................................................................... 175 
5.4.1. Costs and benefits and its relation to conservation incentives and the 
likelihood of involvement in illegal harvesting ........................................................ 176 
5.4.2. Threats to conservation, the main responsible and illegal harvesting ........ 179 
5.5. Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 181 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 182 
5.6. References .......................................................................................................... 183 
Appendix C ................................................................................................................... 191 
Chapter 6 ......................................................................................................................... 198 
General considerations and management implications .............................................. 198 
6.1. General conclusions ............................................................................................... 199 
6.2. Management implications for PAs of developing countries .................................. 201 
6.3. Limitations for the present study and recommendations for further research ....... 204 
6.4. References .............................................................................................................. 206 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
List of tables  
 2.1 Degree of threat to conservation associated with each problem in the NNR …………. 
 
 38 
 2.2 Reasons for local people being involved in conservation-threatening practices in the 
NNR ……………………………………………………………………………………  42 
 2.3 Compensation measures that are currently placed in the NNR and its limitation …….  44 
 2.4 Compensation measures proposed to improve conservation in the NNR …………….  46 
 2.5. Improvement of environmental assets and human behaviour toward conservation, 
after the implementation of new measures …………………………………………….  48 
 2.6 Results from crosstabulation between different views of professionals who were 
clustered based on answers to four major themes ……………………………………...  49 
 2.7 Crosstabulation between clusters of respondents and socio-demographic 
characteristics of respondents …………………………………………………………. 
 
 51 
 3.1 Organizations from which the surveyed respondents were selected ………………......  75 
 3.2 Socio-demographic information of respondents ……………………………………….  77 
 3.3 Rating scale coded for the four major themes that experts were requested to answer   78 
 3.4 Post-hoc cellwise tests between clusters of the degree of threat that each of the 
existing problems in the NNR represents and reasons for local people engagement in 
threatening practices …………………………………………………………………...  79 
 3.5 Post-hoc cellwise tests between clusters of the degree of threat that each of the 
existing problems in the NNR represents and compensation measures currently in 
place at the reserve ……………………………………………………………………..  80 
 3.6  Post-hoc cellwise tests between clusters of the degree of threat that each of the 
existing problems in the NNR represents for conservation and level of improvement 
of different ecosystem services, after the implementation of new measures ………….  80 
 3.7 Post-hoc cellwise tests between clusters of reasons for local people being involved 
with practices that threaten conservation, and compensation measures currently in 
place at the reserve ……………………………………………………………………..  81 
 3.8 Post-hoc cellwise tests between compensation measures that are currently in place at 
the Reserve and level of improvement of different ecosystem services, after the 
implementation of new measures ……………………………………………………...  81 
3.9 Post-hoc cellwise tests between the level of education and cluster of level of 
improvement of different attributes, after the implementation of new measures ……...  82 
 4.1 Number of households sampled per village …………………………………………… 
 104 
 4.2 Predictors and drivers of Livelihood and Farming System in the NNR ……………….  110 
 4.3 Livelihood systems, their characteristics, and village-level patterns ………………….  113 
x 
 
 4.4 Multinomial logistic regression model of livelihood system choice ………………….  114 
 4.5 Farming systems (FS), their characteristics and village-level patterns ……………….  116 
 4.6 Multinomial logistic regression model of farming system choice …………………….  117 
 4.7 Proportion of perceived crop lost to crop raiding per crop and farming system ………  120 
 4.8 Patterns of losses for crop raiding across villages and its relation to LFS, potential and 
actual damage and Protective measures ……………………………………………….  121 
 4.B.2 Proportion (%) of total crop harvested that was sold (PCS) In each farming System in 
percentage (%) …………………………………………………………………………  145 
 5.1 Number of households sampled per village ……………………………………………  155 
 5.2 Village-level indicators of diverse types of benefits and costs reported by the 
surveyed households …………………………………………………………………...  164 
 5.3 Socioeconomic characteristics of the surveyed respondents ………………………….  166 
 5.4 Proportion of respondents who recognized different practices as threats to 
conservation; and percentage of respondents that agree that current incentives are 
important to engage local people in conservation …………………………………….  169 
 5.5 Share of responsibility of local people for each threat to conservation in the NNR 
according to respondents’ views ……………………………………………………….  174 
 5.C.1 Respondents´ answers concerning to the limitations of the current incentives under 
implementation and the effectiveness of the new incentives to engage local people 
with conservation in the NNR …………………………………………………………  194 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
List of figures  
 1.1 Research framework outlining the steps of the work ………………………………... 
 
 7 
 2.1  Dendrogram with thirteen data points, which represent the different conservation 
Problems ……………………………………………………………………………...  40 
 4.1 The location of the Niassa National Reserve and the surveyed villages …………….  103 
 4.2 Effect of population growth in agriculture intensification in the seven surveyed 
villages in Niassa National Reserve. Rainfall is the major limiting factor for 
intensification, especially for those villages where the predominant FS is specialized 
sorghum ………………………………………………………………………………  119 
 5.1 The location of the Niassa National Reserve and the surveyed villages …………….  153 
 5.2 Dendrogram with six data points, which represent threats to conservation in the 
NNR …….....................................................................................................................  171 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
General introduction and conceptual approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1.1. Introduction  
In the last three decades, the expansion of Protected Areas in Developing Countries 
(DCs) has been growing fast, as the principal strategy for conservation and sustainable 
management of natural resources (Vedeld et al., 2012). However, in most PAs in DCs, there 
is also a parallel growth of human population, which is quite dependent on natural resource 
harvesting to cope with their daily needs (MacKenzie et al., 2017a). Thus, the future success 
of PAs will rely upon on how conservation managers and decision-makers delivering policy 
or management decisions that enhance the living standard of poor and marginalized PA 
residents, whose depend on harvesting natural resources, while simultaneously reduce the 
impact of human-related pressure on biodiversity. This thus, requires designing 
conservation programs that are more attractive for PA residents, so that when they may 
choose between conservation-friendly versus unsustainable harvesting, they are by far more 
willing to adopt the pro-conservation option, hence cooperating with conservation agents in 
tackling conservation problems. For conservation managers to set realistic conservation 
objectives and specially to achieve them, they first need consistent guidelines, and realistic 
and effective payment or other incentive programs. In this regard, it is thus important to 
collect conservation expert knowledge, as well as to understand, from the local people’s 
point of view, what kind of incentives (money or in-kind) and related commitments will be 
more acceptable for PA residents and thus will more likely lead them to sign cooperation 
agreements with conservation agents.  
Mozambique is a developing country with an extensive PA network, which includes 
about 25% of the Nation’s forest land (Marzoli, 2007). The population in the country has 
been growing exponentially reaching out to 30 million in 2018, and it is expected to double 
by 2050 (Zinkina and Korotayev, 2014). Unfortunately, population growth is not an 
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economic endowment for the country, since the country is ranked in the bottom 10 poorest 
in the world (United Nations, 2019). With most of rural and urban population depending on 
agriculture and forest to meet their daily needs (Zorrilla-Miras et al., 2018), and the 
projected growth population, the pressure on natural resources will likely rise in the near 
future (Mbanze et al., 2019; Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., 2014).  The expansion of the PAs 
network is the country’s main strategy to hinder deforestation and forest degradation 
(Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA, 2014)). However, there is 
still a lack of basic information that is needed to improve conservation policies. In order to 
help to fulfill the existing information gap, we used the Niassa National Reserve (NNR) as 
a case study to inform and propose new policies to improve conservation in Mozambique. 
We selected the NNR because it is the largest conservation area in Mozambique, accounting 
for 45% of the total extent of PAs in the country, and is also the third largest conservation 
area in Africa (Mbanze et al., 2019; Prin et al., 2014; Zafra-Calvo et al., 2018); in particular, 
it is one of only seven remaining PAs in the world that protect more than 1000 African lions 
each (Panthera leo)(Riggio et al., 2013); it also has a substantial elephant (Loxodonta 
Africana) population; these two species are designated as vulnerable by the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The number of local residents inside the NNR, 
who is natural resources dependent has been dramatically increasing in the last 10 years 
(NCP, 2017), which also contributes to exacerbate illegal harvesting activities. 
This thesis aims at understanding what drives local people to engage or collaborate 
with illegal activities that threaten biodiversity conservation in the NNR and to explore 
possible incentive measures they are willing to accept to collaborate with park authorities 
and other relevant stakeholders to improve biodiversity conservation in the reserve. This 
overall objective was addressed through specific analyses and discussions that composes 
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the six chapters of this thesis. In this first introductory chapter, we provide the readers with 
a review of the relevant literature that is the backbone to understand what lays behind the 
all research. We start by contextualizing the importance of consensual (vs contradictory) of 
views between PA residents and conservation experts as regards a range of different 
conservation-related topics, including the identification of the most conservation-
threatening practices and the drivers for local people involvement in these (mostly illegal) 
practices. We then move forward by addressing the challenges for local people of living 
within a PA, the lack of incentives and the type of incentives needed incentives to promote 
conservation-friendly behavior in the future, as well as the analytical framework and the 
research questions of the thesis are also discussed in this introductory chapter.  
Since we had lack of basic and consistent information about e.g. major conservation 
threats, main actors related to each threat, policy options that should frame our dialogue 
with PA residents on the ground, we devoted the second and the third chapters of this thesis 
to discussed what we have found out, from conservation experts with deep knowledge about 
conservation policies under implementation in Mozambique, about expert’s views as 
regards the role of local people in major threats to conservation, the drivers for PA residents’ 
involvement in such threats, and appropriate policies to address these drivers. The 
information about expert’s views was useful to triangulate with the households opinions 
which are discussed in the fourth and the fifth chapters of this thesis. The aim of the fourth 
chapter was to assess the available management options for local households in the NNR 
which have been described as different livelihood and farming systems; the factors that drive 
these agents’ choice for livelihood and farming system are also analyzed in the fourth 
chapter, as a ground on which policymakers can build appropriate measures to improve 
conservation in the reserve through behavior change. In the fifth chapter, we use a spatial-
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based approach and the indirect questioning to local residents to understand how the 
perceived costs and benefits of living inside a PA can lead households to participate in 
illegal resource harvesting activities. In the last chapter, the general conclusions, including 
the management implication of our findings, are drawn.  
1.2. General objectives and research questions of the thesis 
This research aims to understand which current practices threaten biodiversity 
conservation in the NNR, the drivers for local people involvement in such practices and 
possible incentives and compensations that can be implemented to make local residents 
adopting of conservation-friendly behaviors by local residents. To comprehensively address 
this general objective, the following specific objectives were set:   
i) Understanding the role of local people in the major threats to conservation and 
the underlying drivers for their involvement in conservation-threatening 
practices;  
ii) Identifying the available management options for local households and 
describing them as different Livelihood and Farming Systems (LFS); identifying 
the factors that drive the agents’ choice among the available LFS options; use 
this knowledge about LFS drivers to discuss appropriate incentives for local 
people to cooperate in biodiversity conservation through their productive 
choices, and,   
iii) Understanding how the perceived costs and benefits of living inside a PA can 
lead people to participate in illegal resource harvesting, by using a spatially-
based (village level perceptions) approach that uses non-sensitive and indirect 
ways of questioning local residents about participation in illegal activities. 
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Each objective was addressed through a set of research questions, as follows:  
i.a) Is there a consensus or diverging views among conservation experts about 
the drivers for local people involvement in conservation-threatening practices 
and the different incentives needed to change local people´s behavior? 
 i.b) Are experts’ views more related to the conservation research literature and 
the specificities of NNR or to overall narratives about conservation in DCs in 
general? 
i.c) Can the different experts’ views be explained by the expert’s background 
and experience in conservation?  
ii.a) Which land management options among the exiting LFS options offer a 
higher potential for diversification and intensification strategies aimed at 
improving livelihoods and local food security, and which are the factors driving 
local agents to choose these options? 
 
ii.b) Are there any factors that contribute to agricultural intensification or land 
expansion in the NNR? What are the implications of agricultural intensification 
and expansion for local agents and biodiversity conservation?  
 
iii.a) Are there significant spatial associations between village-level perceived 
costs and benefits of living in a PA, opinions regarding conservation policies and 
incentives in the NNR, and the likelihood of participating in illegal resource 
harvesting? 
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 iii.b) Can local people’s undervaluation of the impact of illegal harvesting on 
conservation (when compared to experts’ views on the same subject) be used as 
an indirect indicator of their involvement in these illegal activities? 
The three specific objectives and research questions related to each of them are 
addressed in the next four chapters of the thesis. The conceptual framework of the research 
workplan in Figure 1 gives a broader overview of the steps followed to fulfill the overall 
and specific objectives of the thesis.  
 
Figure 1.1. Research framework outlining the steps of the work: 1) Experts´ views on the reasons for local 
                  People engagement in conservation-threatening practices and the effectiveness of the current  
                  and new proposed compensation measures to improve pro-conservation behavior;  
                 2) Analysis of LFS approach to improve pro-conservation behavior in the reserve;  
                 3) The role of perceived costs and benefits of living inside a PAs and its implications 
   for illegal Harvesting participation; 4) The goal of the research is to propose management 
  options and policies to improve conservation in the reserve, by engaging local people in pro- 
  conservation behavior Note:  The arrow colors indicate the type of driver and its size indicates 
   its intensity (low,  
                 Intermediate and high. 
 
Step 1 – Conservation threatening practices: this task aims to understand the role of 
local people in major threats to conservation, the drivers for their involvement in 
conservation-threatening practices and effectiveness of current and proposed new incentives 
to engage local people in conservation-friendly practices. This task was accomplished 
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through surveying 55 experts engaged in conservation in Mozambique and is covered by 
the second and third chapters of the thesis, which also generate two papers published in the 
Journal for Nature Conservation and Data in brief journal (An expert-based approach to 
assess the potential for local people engagement in nature conservation: The case study of 
the Niassa National Reserve in Mozambique and Dataset from 55 experts engaged in nature 
conservation in Mozambique). Results from these chapter were useful to draw the household 
survey that was used in the next steps.  
Step 2 – Livelihood and Farming systems: The typologies of LFS at household level, 
and their representation at the village (spatial) level, were based on a survey of 339 
households living in seven villages within NNR. Cluster analysis was used to identify the 
four livelihood types of gatherers, hunters, farmers and employees, based on the effort of 
harvesting different NTFPs in relation to farming; farming system types (specialized 
farming system of maize, rice and sorghum, and one mixed farming system) were identified 
based on agricultural inputs and outputs. A Multinomial Logistic Model (MLM), was also 
applied to understand the drivers of LFS choice. The methodology, results and discussion 
from this step, presented in chapter four; resulted in one paper intitled: A Livelihood and 
Farming System approach for effective conservation policies in Protected Areas of 
Developing Countries: The case study of the Niassa National Reserve in Mozambique. The 
paper was submitted to Land Use Policy Journal and a revised version is being developed 
to answer all the reviewers´ comments.  
Step 3 – Illegal harvesting: This step was accomplished by asking local households 
about their perceived impact of several activities on biodiversity conservation (illegal 
harvesting of natural resources). Other evidence was also used, such as the perceived costs 
and benefits of living within the PA, and their opinions about conservation measures under 
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implementation in the reserve. The information from the previous three chapters were also 
useful to complement this step. A Chi-squared and Kruskal-Wallis tests were applied to 
investigate statistical differences across villages, for each major theme related to the costs 
and benefits of living within PA, including the likelihood of involvement in illegal 
harvesting. The results from this step are presented and discussed in chapter 5, which also 
generated one paper intitled: “Participation in illegal harvesting of natural resources and 
the perceived costs and benefits of living within a protected area”, which is under review 
in Ecological Economics Journal.  
Step 4 – To improve conservation and policies in Mozambique and DCs: The results 
from the previous steps were used to generate broader conclusions and advice to 
conservation managers and decision-makers on how to improve conservation in PAs of 
developing countries. A general reflection about the present research and recommendations 
for future research are also discussed in this step, which is the last, conclusive chapter of the 
thesis.  
1.3. Theoretical background and conceptual approach 
The global consensus on the importance of biodiversity conservation and the need 
for sustainable management of natural resources has been built in numerous international 
and local agreements and strategies (e.g. 1990s Convention on Biological Diversity and 
2003 World Summit on Sustainable Development-WSSD); (CBD, 2003; Dungumaro, 
2013). Stopping species extinction and protecting a proportion of land area have been set as 
explicit targets (Vedeld et al., 2012). Yet, over-exploitation of environmental goods and 
services has increasingly threaten animal and plant species, due to increasing anthropogenic 
pressures and multiscale environmental disturbance (Sapkota et al., 2018). The failure to 
protect habitats from degradation and conversion, or species from decline and extinction, 
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has forced scientists and decision-makers to adopt an holistic approach, including the 
recognition and incorporation of local-people needs in management decision (Primmer et 
al., 2015). Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) and Payment for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) are increasingly recognized as effective incentive policies to 
improve community participation in sustainable natural- resources use and PA management 
programs. Although to some extent, there are reports of successful cases (Pokharel, 2012), 
there are also many stories of failure (Calfucura, 2018), as in many conservation areas in 
Mozambique (MICOA, 2014; Muarapaz, 2016). In this regard, it is thus important to 
understand what factors drive local people within PAs to engage in conservation-threatening 
behavior, their views about the policies under implementation and what costs and benefits 
they perceive as resulting from living inside a PA. This understanding is essential to assist 
decisions-makers to improve conservation outcomes by adopting policies that can be more 
easily accepted by local communities and that can enroll the participation of PA residents 
in the required conservation effort.  
1.4. Conservation threatening practices and their drivers: the need to 
understand the views of key conservation actors to draw consistent 
conservation guidelines 
Identifying conservation-related topics where there is consensus (or lack of it) 
among conservation experts and between them and local people in PAs of DCs is important, 
for several reasons: First, local people are the ones who face the daily challenges and 
restrictions that are imposed by conservation. Since the management of natural resources in 
most DCs is still implemented through a top-down command-and-control approach 
(Mapedza, 2007; Sapkota et al., 2018), natural-resource-dependent people are more often 
voiceless about the possible incentives and commitments they may be willing to accept to 
insure sustainability in natural resource use. Meanwhile, in recent years, several authors 
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have been advocates a CBNRM as a means to empower local natural-resource-dependent 
people in the management decision (bottom-up approach) (Stringer et al., 2012). Second, 
local economic agents who live inside PAs, in both developed and developing countries, are 
human beings who need to fulfil their daily needs. The main difference is that people in DCs 
are more led to engage in illegal practices to cope with their needs due to lack of alternative 
income sources and poor conservation payment schemes (Zafra-Calvo and Moreno-
Peñaranda, 2018). Third, despite the fact that expert opinion is key to  improve conservation 
decisions and to shape public opinion (Lute et al., 2018; Selge et al., 2011), most expert 
views are based on the general narrative about conservation in PAs of DCs,  coming from 
international organizations and environmental NGO´s, often not compatible to the local 
context and reuired solutions for a specific PA and people living within. Fourth, 
conservation decisions are often more dependent on expert advice than on direct 
consultation to local people or scientific research  (Lute et al., 2018; Moreto, 2019; Pasgaard 
et al., 2017). So, understanding the points of consensus (and lack of it) between local people 
and experts can serve as a starting point for both parts to grasp the need for deeper and cross-
check research to provide the grounds for consistent policy proposals that will more likely 
be accepted and/or adopted by PA residents.  
Local people in PAs of DCs are often directly or indirectly involved in practices that 
threaten conservation such as: poaching, hunting for bushmeat, illegal extraction of park 
resources,  human and wildlife conflict (HWC)(Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012; Moreto, 
2019) and shifting cultivation (Galvin et al., 2006). The reasons for such involvement 
include: i) retaliation from restrictions that are imposed by the park agents; ii) retaliatory 
killing of crop and livestock raiding animals (Baral and Heinen, 2007); iii) lack of 
involvement in park management and, iv) lack of alternative and decent livelihoods 
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(Shepherd and Magnus, 2004).  To date, most of these drivers are poorly understood for 
many PA of DC, in particular in Mozambique and within the NNR. However, its believed 
that these drivers act combined in a multifaceted and complex manner (Campbell-Smith et 
al., 2010; Campbell et al., 2000; Dickman, 2010; Moreto, 2019; Travers et al., 2019), with 
its own peculiarities, depending on space and time (Galvin et al., 2006). Thus, achieving 
long-lasting conflict resolution in the NNR will rely upon policy-makers and conservation 
experts to embrace in a much broader and holistic approach, which in turn requires more in-
depth knowledge on the role of those drivers, to propose conservation policies that address 
them. In fact, each one of these drivers of conservation-threatening practices needs to be 
addressed through specific policies that promote the required behavior changes.  
Most policies and incentives for changing local people behavior and actions towards 
a conservation-friendly direction have already been spotted in the scientific literature review 
and particular cases studies. They generally relate to  (i) sharing the benefits of conservation 
with local people who bear most of the conservation costs (Adams and Hutton, 2007; 
Campbell et al., 2000; Galvin et al., 2006); (ii) providing  local people with alternative 
sources of income, especially when their crops and livestock are systematically raided 
(Mackenzie, 2012; Moreto, 2019; Shepherd and Magnus, 2004); (iii) improving and 
assisting local people with mitigation measures to alleviate negative externalities of crop 
and livestock raiding (Travers et al., 2019) and (iv) promoting environmental education to 
raise awareness of local people regarding the importance of  intangible benefits of 
conservation (Dickman, 2010; NCP, 2017).  
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1.5. Costs and benefits of living around or inside protected areas in developing 
countries  
Social support is one of the key factors that determine the success of PAs. The 
balance between the costs and benefits that people perceive as related to the existence of 
established PA influence their support for conservation activities (Zorondo-Rodríguez et al., 
2019). Thus, the benefits of nature conservation must be balanced with socioeconomic 
activities and opportunities developed in the same areas (Adams et al., 2010; Chen, 2019). 
In this regard, the selection of priority areas for nature conservation must strike the right 
balance between the costs and benefits of conserving biodiversity, protecting Ecosystem 
Services (ES), and allowing for human activities including natural resource use. PAs 
characterized by lower population densities, with low opportunity costs of conservation, 
have potential to decrease the overall use of natural resources and improve the cost 
efficiency of biodiversity conservation effort (Manhães et al., 2018). 
Many ecosystem services in the NNR are mostly used as open access (common pool) 
resources. Open access resources are fast depleted, since one can’t prevent others from 
using the same resource (non-excludable), which could lead to overexploitation, leaving less 
and less to others (because the resource is rival). This is the typical case of most provisioning 
services (Fisher et al., 2009). However, conservation programs aim to promote sustainable 
use of ES, by: i) identifying alternatives that can generate long term and sustainable benefits 
for local communities (e.g. employment); and, ii) other environmental friendly  uses, such 
as ecotourism or sustainable intensification of agriculture practices, which in turn may 
depend up on interaction and feedback among actors.  
People living around and inside the PA can earn many direct and indirect benefits. 
These benefits may include: i) infrastructures, opportunity for business and employment, 
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benefit-sharing schemes, and sustainable extraction of park resources (MacKenzie et al., 
2017a, 2017b); ii) revenues from tourism and recreation services (Heagney et al., 2019; 
Karanth and Nepal, 2012);  iii) enjoyment of cultural ecosystem services (Martinez-Harms 
et al., 2018; Palomo et al., 2013); iv) direct use of provisioning services (water supply, 
fodder, and genetic resources); v) regulating services (water purification, carbon storage, 
and control of erosion) (Manhães et al., 2018; Palomo et al., 2013) and  vi) supporting 
services (water balance, net primary productivity, and soil fertility); (Manhães et al., 2018).  
But, local PA residents can also accrues high burdens for park establishment, especially 
when conservation managers do not provide the desirable benefits nor even offset the costs 
from crop and livestock raiding (Vedeld et al., 2012). These conservation costs include: i) 
crop losses and livestock raiding (Fraser-Celin et al., 2018; Hill and Wallace, 2012; 
Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012; Rogan et al., 2018, 2017; Vedeld et al., 2012); ii) increased 
risk of injuries and casualties from wild animal attacks; iii) time lost in crop guarding (Hill, 
2000; Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012);  and, iv) restrictions on resource extraction 
(Dickman, 2010).  
In most PAs of DCs, local households are in general willing to support conservation 
measures if their daily livelihood needs are met (Karanth and Nepal, 2012). Understanding 
the dynamic nature of local people's perceptions about costs and benefits they accrue for 
living closer or inside PAs, provides a tool to adapt PAs management plans, prioritize 
conservation resources, and engage local communities in conservation goals (MacKenzie et 
al., 2017b).  
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1.6. The role of incentives in promoting conservation-friendly behavior in the 
NNR: money or in-kind payments? 
Conservation incentives are important to ensure the sustainable use of ecosystem 
services and offset the costs of park restrictions for those who are entirely dependent on the 
extraction of park resource to support their livelihood (Aheto et al., 2016; Amin, 2016; 
Bluwstein and Lund, 2016; Narloch et al., 2014; OECD, 2010). In DCs, the larger part of 
incentives that are given to local people is funded by international donors assistance, tourism 
activities and some local non-governmental NGO´s (Amin, 2016). The benefits arising from 
conservation can be easily allocated individually or collectively (OECD, 2010), its 
disbursement depends on the periodical assessment of the PA performance, through 
performance-based indicators (NCP, 2017).  
In the NNR, most of conservation funding, including that used to pay incentives to 
local people come from international donors (Massuque, 2013; NCP, 2015), which are either 
allocated through private organizations that operate directly in the reserve, in close 
collaboration with the governmental authorities (e.g. Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), 
NCP and others), or through government institutions (Ministry of Environment, Agriculture 
and Tourism). The funds are mostly used to run the reserve, including, payment of 
administrative costs; building and improving infrastructures, capacity-building, range patrol 
and improving the local communities’ wellbeing. This dependency from international 
donors constraints conservation activities, as currently tourism activities do not generate 
enough funds, despite its enormous potential, including its vast extension (Booth, Vernon 
R.; Dunham, 2014). For instance, the NNR has double-fold extension of the Kruger National 
Park, which is considered the most profitable PA in Africa (Michel et al., 2006).  
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For sustainable conservation of NNR ecosystem services, it is first important to 
ensure the self-sufficiency of park activities through e.g. tourism services, which might 
cover in the future a significant share of the conservation costs, because there are so many 
uncertainties about the future, such as the possibility of other emerging humanitarian 
priorities (e.g. refugees in Syria and Iraq and hunger in South Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Chad 
and Myanmar), as well as the unpredictable behavior of most large donors (E.g.  American 
first in the US and the emerging of populist parties in Europe).  
Non-monetary incentives can either be generated locally by the ecosystem itself (e.g. 
resource harvesting, landscape enjoyment and welfare increase), or by converting the 
received funds into in-kind incentives (e.g. providing scholarships, capacity-building in 
conservation agriculture or business management) that will be allocated to local people. 
Whether monetary or in-kind, incentives may be allocated collectively or individually. The 
right choice among these two options still generates a vibrant debate and depends on several 
factors including local culture, religion and education, social ties, motivation for 
conservation, trustiness among different conservation actors, corruption and the way that 
population is spatially-disposed inside or around a PA, among others.  For example, Narloch 
et al. (2014) found that in Bolivian and Peruvian Andes conservation project the collective 
payments seem to provide stronger conservation incentives than individual payments. 
According to the Mozambican legislation, conservation incentives are mostly 
allocated collectively once a year. They are manly a share (usually 20%) of the revenue 
earned through taxes payed by the operators of hunting concession and other touristic 
activities (Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., 2014). The governmental authorities are responsible 
for collecting the money for later distribution to local people (Massuque, 2013). However, 
this procedure still constrains conservation, as the majority of local beneficiaries would like 
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to directly receive the 20% from the concession operators, because conservation transaction 
costs and lack of transparency dilutes most of the money.  The money is mainly used to 
support community development initiatives (SRN, 2008).    
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Abstract  
Implementation of new conservation measures without consistent consultation with key 
stakeholders has resulted in multiple failures that have been replicated elsewhere. In this 
study, we propose and test an improved method to identify: (i) the role of conservation actors 
(including local people), in major threats to conservation in a particular Protected Area (PA); 
(ii) the underlying drivers for the involvement of local people in conservation-threatening 
practices; and, (iii)  appropriate policies to address those drivers. The method was developed 
and tested in the context of the Niassa National Reserve (NNR), the third major PA for the 
conservation of Miombo woodlands, savannah keystones and umbrella species in Africa. 
Experts’ answers were grouped according to opinions related to threats for conservation and 
current and proposed compensation schemes to improve conservation in the NNR.  
 
1 Corresponding author. Universidade Lúrio, Faculty of Agricultural Science (FCA), Sanga University Campus, Niassa 
Province, Mozambique; E-mail addresses: ambanze@unilurio.ac.mz, aires.banze@gmail.com (A.A. Mbanze). 
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The results show a high degree of consensus among experts in relation to the current 
practices that threaten conservation in the reserve (poaching, illegal logging and mining). 
Local people were held responsible for activities that they carry out to meet their daily needs. 
While, outsiders carrying out illegal activities, were also responsible for practices that 
represent the top threats to conservation. The proposed new incentives, such as assisting 
local people with conservation agriculture, providing alternative sources of animal protein 
and providing scholarships for their children, may greatly improve the support of local 
people for biodiversity conservation in the reserve.  
Keywords: Conservation incentives, Protected areas, Conservation threats, Local people,  
                   Legal and illegal outsiders  
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Protected Areas (PAs) of Developing Countries (DCs) are the home of most of 
threatened species on earth (Macdonald et al., 2012; Wei et al., 2018). Yet, most of these 
PAs are performing poorly (Brister, 2016; Cooney et al., 2017) due to factors such as weak 
law enforcement (Sundström, 2016) and the increase of human population inside PAs, 
which contributes to farmland expansion (Snyman and Bricker, 2016), which in turn 
exacerbates  human-wildlife conflict (HWC) (Fraser-Celin et al., 2018; MacKenzie et al., 
2017). There is a growing literature that goes beyond traditional ecology-based conservation 
science and uncovers the complexity and diversity of local PA problems, which possibly 
require tailored solutions (Brister, 2016; Lute et al., 2018). This literature is mostly based 
on surveying local residents (Fraser-Celin et al., 2018; MacKenzie, 2018; Moreto, 2019). 
However, real-world conservation decisions often rely on expert advice to decision-makers, 
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rather than surveying local residents (Lute et al., 2018; Pasgaard et al., 2017). When 
conservation experts are asked to advise decision-makers, they tend to use general narratives 
about conservation in PAs of developing countries (DCs) (coming from international 
organisations and environmental NGOS), such as the general effects of poverty and lack of 
education on biodiversity loss, rather than relying on deeper knowledge (such as that 
provided by studies in the conservation research literature) about the particular PA at stake. 
Since expert views shape public opinion and conservation decisions (Lute et al., 2018; Selge 
et al., 2011), it is important to identify topics where there is consensus (vs divergence) of 
opinion among experts, because consensus can increase the probability that advice is used 
by the decision-makers; or whether expert recommendations are consistent with deeper 
knowledge about a particular PA.   
In this study conservation experts were surveyed to hear their views on the following 
themes: (i) the role of local actors in the major threats to conservation in a particular PA; 
(ii) the underlying drivers for local people’s involvement in conservation-threatening 
practices; and, (iii) appropriate policies to address these drivers. The methodology was 
applied to the Niassa National Reserve (NNR), the largest PA in Mozambique (Prin et al., 
2014; Ribeiro et al., 2008). Some specific questions to be addressed with this research were:  
• Is there consensus or diverging views among conservation experts for each of 
the abovementioned themes? 
• Are these expert’s views more related to the conservation research literature and 
the conditions in the particular PA or to general narratives about conservation in 
DCs?  
• Can differences in views be explained by the expert’s background and 
experience in conservation?  
31 
 
• Are each expert’s views on problem identification coherent with his or her 
evaluations of current or proposed conservation policies?   
 
2.1.1. Literature review 
The selection of appropriate policies to effectively shift local people’s behaviour 
towards conservation-friendly  actions requires that researchers, government agents and 
others conservation-related actors first identify the main drivers for local people’s 
involvement in practices that threaten biodiversity, since local residents living inside PAs 
represent a major threat to nature conservation in DCs (Travers et al., 2019). The drivers for 
local residents involvement with conservation threatening-practices can be classified into 
proximal and underlying (Moreto, 2019). Underlying drivers are multifaceted, systemic and 
difficult to solve (Moreto, 2019), and include demographic, economic, socio-political and 
institutional drivers (Geist and Lambin, 2002).  
The most commonly accepted  reasons why local people engage  in conservation-
threatening practises are: (1) Increasing  pressure of human population inside and around 
PA,  resulting from the immigration of people who seek arable lands (Campbell et al., 2000; 
Galvin et al., 2006), natural resources for use and employment in conservation and other 
related activities (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Baral and Heinen, 2007). This increases conflict 
between people and animals; (2) Increasing wildlife populations resulting in increased 
human wildlife conflict (HWC) and retaliation by local people (Baral and Heinen, 2007); 
(3) Lack of compensation for crop and livestock loses can increase food insecurity 
(Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012); (4) Unfair distribution of revenue sharing leads to the 
involvement of  local people in conservation-threatening practices (Moreto, 2019; Zafra-
Calvo et al., 2018); (5) Loss of trust between communities and conservation authorities as 
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a result of weak legislation and poor institutional arrangements, which do not protect the 
rights of indigenous people (Shepherd and Magnus, 2004), and the incapacity of PA 
authorities to effectively respond to crop and livestock raiding can lead to frustration from 
both parties (Moreto, 2019); (6) Inaction (or delay) of PA managers to set consistent buffer 
zones and corridors between animals and communities (Moreto, 2019); (7)  Availability of 
markets to sell goods from illegal activities (Brashares et al., 2011; Doughty et al., 2015) 
can drive illegal wildlife use; (8) Clashes between conservation objectives and social and 
cultural factors such as ethnicity group, cultural beliefs and customary practices (traditions 
and religion) (Boer and Baquete, 1998; Chang et al., 2019); (9) Environmental factors such 
as the location of agricultural edges and the palatability of crops can also increase HWC 
(Dickman, 2010) and (10) International advocacy of  protection of endangered species that 
emphasizes biodiversity conservation but neglects the rights of indigenous people  (Gaillard 
et al., 2019; Galvin et al., 2006). 
HWC is increasingly viewed through the lenses of social and political processes that 
involves local people’s livelihoods and government processes (Gaillard et al., 2019). Yet, 
formulating effective strategies to reduce HWC is hampered by the complexity of human 
needs and behaviour. Wildlife conflict is still neglected as a small-scale hazard or disaster 
event,  but results in a constant erosion of people's ability to cope with their daily needs and 
increases vulnerability for those who already stand at the margin of the society (Gaillard et 
al., 2019; Galvin et al., 2006).  
To date, most of those drivers are poorly understood in the context of Mozambican PAs, 
and particularly in the NNR. Achieving long-lasting conflict resolution will rely upon 
decision makers adopting broader and more holistic approaches to conservation based on a 
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deeper knowledge of the existing drivers for local people involvement in conservation-
threatening practices.  
2.2. Methodology 
2.2.1. Study area: the Niassa National Reserve   
The NNR is located in the Mecula district, northern Mozambique, between coordinates: 
12°38′48.67″S; 11°27′05.83″S and 36°25′21.16″E; 38°30′23.74″E. The reserve covers an 
area of 42,000 km2 (Prin et al., 2014), of which over 34,000 km2 are occupied concession 
blocks with additional block up for tender in 2019 (Sociedade de Gestão da Reserva do 
Niassa (SGRN, 2004)).   
The NNR accounts for 5.3% of the national territory and 44.9% of all designated PAs 
in Mozambique (Prin et al., 2014). The reserve encompasses one of the few remaining intact 
miombo woodland savanna (Ribeiro et al., 2013; WWF, 2012), holding one of the seven 
remaining population of lions with more than 1000 individuals (NCP, 2015; Riggio et al., 
2013). About 60,000 people live inside the reserve, a double-fold increase in just 10 years 
(NCP, 2015; SRN, 2008). People living in the reserve rely on shifting cultivation, hunting 
for bushmeat and fishing for their livelihoods. Poverty and food insecurity are a serious 
concerns inside NNR (NCP, 2016).  
The NNR is managed by the Government of Mozambique, through the National 
Administration of Conservation Areas (ANAC) in partnership with the Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WCS). There are also some non-government projects, such as the 
Niassa Carnivore Project (NCP), as well as sport hunting concessions, and tourism 
concessions who assist with conservation management and social development.  
Exploitation of firewood, medicinal plants, fish and other non-forest wood products 
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(NFWP), such as honey gathering, are allowed in small quantities for domestic purposes 
(SRN, 2008). There is a compensation scheme currently in place, which consists of sharing 
with local residents 20% of the revenue of hunting fees paid by game concessionaires (Jorge 
et al., 2013; Massuque, 2013).  
2.2.2. Survey data  
An online self-administrated questionnaire was delivered to experts that are involved in 
design and implementation of conservation management in Mozambique. For more 
information regarding the criteria used to select experts, see Mbanze et al., (2019). Surveyed 
experts were working for different conservation organizations (NGOs, governmental 
bodies, universities and research institutions) at all levels. An overview of experts’ 
institutional affiliation is presented in Mbanze et al. (2019). Potential respondents were 
identified based on governmental and private organizations reports, scientific papers, 
technical documents, and attendance in the national congresses of conservation and 
environment-related meetings.  
The questionnaire was composed of four sections. In the first section, respondents 
were requested to select the main practices that threaten conservation in NNR, responsible 
for these practices and the reasons for local people’s involvement in such practices. The 
second section was about the effectiveness and limitations of the current compensation 
measures implemented in NNR. In the third section, respondents were requested to select a 
new proposed measure that could be implemented to effectively engage local people in 
conservation to enhance the conservation state of the reserve. The last section was about the 
socio-economic profile of respondents. The survey included both compulsory and non-
compulsory questions (see Mbanze et al., 2019).  
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The conservation problems and the new compensation measures were taken from the 
literature after an in-depth review, as well as brainstorming with a selected group of experts 
who have deep knowledge about conservation in NNR. The development of the 
questionnaire was informed by published and unpublished scientific material and official 
reports mostly from Mozambique. Other possibilities for helping local people to adopt 
conservation agriculture, providing local people with alternative sources of animal proteins, 
giving collective conservation performance-based payments and providing education for 
local people (e.g., scholarships) are under implementation in a pilot phase by the Niassa 
Carnivore Project/ Mariri (NCP)2 in concession block L5 South in Mbamba Village and 
other villages since 2012. 
The questionnaire was pretested with three conservation experts working in 
Mozambique. Before being officially released, the survey was modified based on the main 
recommendations from the experts in the pretesting round. The survey was conducted 
between June and September 2017.  Response rate was 68.76% (N=57), with two non-valid 
responses dropped from the analysis.  The questionnaire is available in Mbanze et al., 
(2019).  
 
2.2.3. Data Analysis 
Experts’ answers were coded in different rating scales depending on the question. 
Respondents’ ratings were first analysed through Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for 
dimension reduction. The PCs with eigenvalue >1 were retained to detect cluster structures. 
We used the Square Euclidian Distance as a measure of dissimilarity, and ran the Ward’s 
 
2 http://www.niassalion.org 
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method on the retained scores, in order to minimize the object function error (Legendre and 
Legendre, 2003). A dendrogram was used to detect the suitable number of clusters. These 
clusters thus, represent classes of experts that assessed the questions differently in each 
theme (Q.1 to Q.4, see Table S3 in Mbanze et al., 2019). Cluster and overall median ratings 
were then computed for each alternative within the themes.  A nonparametric Kruskal-
Wallis (KW)3 test was used to investigate whether median ratings statistically differ across 
clusters. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction were used to test for 
statistical differences of medians between pairs of clusters. 
For better visualisation of the relationship between the degree of threat and the actors 
responsible for each conservation problem, conservation problems were grouped in a 
hierarchical cluster analysis based on actor responsibility. Actors were classified as: Donors 
(Do); Reserve Administration (ReAd); Non-residents (NoRe); Local People (LoPe); Private 
Sector (PrSc); and, Traditional Authorities (TrAu).  Clustering results and the degree of 
threat associated to each conservation problem were then attached to the heatmap of 
proportions of responsibility shared among different actors, to facilitate the visualization of 
the relationship between responsible actors and degree of threat in a dendrogram-heatmap.  
Relationship between different views of respondents was tested through 
crosstabulation based on Fisher’s Exact test and Asymptotic Person’s Chi-Square. The same 
technique was applied between clusters of major themes and socio-economic profile of 
respondents to understand whether their socio-economic background can also explain the 
points of view of respondents (see more on Mbanze et al., 2019).   
 
3 The Kruskal-Wallis test of median is regarded as powerful in the sense that, differently from other median 
tests, this takes into consideration the direction and magnitudes of the observations (Ica and Um, 2013). 
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2.3. Results  
2.3.1. Respondents profiles   
Most of the surveyed experts were men with higher education (M.Sc. or Ph.D. 
degrees) in agriculture, environmental, biology, social sciences and others (see Table S2 in 
Mbanze et al. 2019). More than half have been working in conservation for more than three 
years, and the majority had visited the reserve at least once. The main objective of the trip 
to the reserve was either to work or to conduct research. Among those who have been in the 
reserve, the time that they spent (sum of all the time), ranged from less than a month to more 
than one year.   
2.3.2. Conservation-threatening practices in the NNR and the responsibility of 
different actors 
Table 1 presents results from experts’ views on the degree of threat that each existing 
problem represents for conservation in the reserve. The overall and cluster medians (high 
=3 and very high = 4) and the non-significative (P-value ≥ 0.05), show that there is a high 
level of consensus among experts regarding most of  higher level conservation threats in 
NNR: poaching; illegal logging; population growth; and, illegal gold and ruby mining. 
Slash-and-burn agriculture is also perceived overall as a major threat, although there is no 
consensus. Extraction of wood fuel, commercial farming and fishing were scored overall as 
moderate threats. 
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Table 2.1. Degree of threat to conservation associated with each problem in the NNR – overall and  
                  cluster medians (values in the brackets, represent the number of experts per clusters and its 
                  respective percentage).   
 Cluster medians   
No Problems  
N1 
(24|44%) 
N2 
(19|34%) 
N3 
(12|22%) 
Overall 
median 
P-Value (α) 
1 Slash-and-burn agriculture 3ab 3a 2.5b 3 0.018* 
2 Commercial farming 2a 2a 1b 2 0.001** 
3 Sport hunting 1ab 2a 1b 1 0.018* 
4 Poaching 4 3 4 4 0.050 
5 Bushmeat 1b 3a 1.5ab 1 0.004** 
6 
Extraction of non-timber 
products 
1b 1a 2a 1 0.001** 
7 Wood fuel 2 3 2 2 0.262 
8 Illegal logging 3 2 3 3 0.195 
9 Fishing 2b 2b 3a 2 0.006** 
10 Population growth 2.5 3 3 3 0.196 
11 
Human and wildlife 
conflicts 
2c 3b 4a 3 0.000*** 
12 Illegal gold and ruby mining 3 3 3 3 0.952 
13 Projects and Infrastructures 1b 2a 1.5ab 1 0.000*** 
Note: Respondents rated the degree of threat associated to each problem in a 5-point scale from 1 (null) to 5 
(very high). The P-value corresponds to the Kruskal-Walls (KW) test, with the following levels of significance: 
*= significant at 0.05, ** = significant at 0.01 and *** = significant at 0.001. Lowercase letters in the line 
represent post hoc statistical differences between clusters resulting from pairwise comparisons - values with 
the same letter are not statistically different. 
 
All problems rated overall as minor threats (overall median =1) are non-consensual. 
For those non-consensual responses, one can see that experts in the first (N1) or second (N2) 
clusters (depending on theme) tend to perceive local people’s activities as minor threats, 
while outsiders’ legal practices are seen as significant threats.  Conversely, experts in the 
last cluster (N3) seem to have an opposite view, although some threats have intermediate 
ratings between experts in the first and second clusters.  
 Experts’ views on the actor seen as the most responsible for each conservation 
problem is presented in Figure 1, where the profile of perceived actor responsibility for each 
problem is presented in the heatmap attached to the dendrogram from the cluster analysis of 
the 13 conservation problems. In the two-cluster solution, all threats that experts associate 
with outsiders as the main responsible actor area grouped in the LHS cluster; they are carried 
out either illegally by non-residents (NoRe), or legally by the private sector (PrSc) or 
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government authorities (Go). On the other hand, all threats associated by experts to local 
people as main responsible actor are grouped in the RHS cluster.  
 The three-cluster solution is less robust than the two and four-cluster solutions. 
In the four-cluster solution, the first cluster represents the set of all illegal activities carried 
out by non-residents. All of these are seen by experts as top threats. The second cluster 
represents much fewer threatening problems associated with legal outsider activities. The 
third cluster only includes one problem, in which government authorities (Go) are 
considered as being mainly responsible. The fourth cluster groups all problems whose 
responsibility is mostly attributed to local people, although there are some problems whose 
responsibility is shared by local people and governmental authorities or reserve 
administration. Shifting cultivation, HWC and population growth are the only problems in 
this cluster that experts perceive as significant threats. 
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             Figure 2. 1. Dendrogram with thirteen data points, which represent the different conservation 
            problems. Attached to the dendrogram is the heatmap of actor’s: Do=Donors 
                                ReAd=Reserve Administration, NoRe=Non-residents, LoPe=Local People,  
                                PrSc=Private, Sector (PrSc) and TrAu=Traditional Authorities, their share of  
                                responsibility for each problem in percentage (from red to green represents the high to  
                                less gradient of responsibility shared by each actor), and degree of threat (from red to 
                                green represents very high to little degree of threat each problem represents for  
                                conservation.    
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2.3.3. Drivers of local people involvement in conservation-threatening practices 
 The views of experts on reasons for local people’s involvement with practices that 
threaten conservation are represented in Table 2. It can be observed that the lack of 
involvement of local people in decision making is the only consensual reason. Despite being 
less consensual, overall medians show that conservation-threatening behaviours are mainly 
driven by insufficient livelihoods, poor awareness of local people regarding the importance 
of conservation, outsider corruption, feeling of injustice about benefit sharing, opposition to 
the ongoing restrictions and lack of environmental education.  
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Table 2.2. Reasons for local people being involved in conservation-threatening practices in the NNR - overall and cluster medians. (values in brackets represent 
                 number of experts in each cluster and its respective percentage in the sample) 
  Cluster medians    
No    
N1 
(7|13%) 
N2 
(14|25%) 
N3 
(13|24%) 
N4 
(13|24%) 
N5 
(8|15%) 
Overall 
median   
P-Value  
1 Livelihood Insufficiency 1ab 1b 2a 1ab 2ab 1 0.018* 
2 Conservation does not bring any benefit 0ab -1b -1b -1ab 1a -1 0.000*** 
3 People don't know the importance of conservation  -1acd -1d 1abc 2a 2ab 1 0.000*** 
4 The local people are corrupt  0b 2ab 1ab 1ab 2a 1 0.044* 
5 Feeling of injustice in benefits sharing   2a 1bc 1abc -1c 1ab 1 0.000*** 
6 Conservation only creates problems  -1ab -1b -1ab -1ab -1a -1 0.012* 
7 Conservation only benefits foreigners  0ab -1b -2b -1b 1a -1 0.000*** 
8 Local people are not involved in the decision making 1 1 1 1 2 1 0.405 
9 Opposition to the restrictions  1abcd 1ab 1abc -1d 1a 1 0.010* 
10 Low education 0c 1abc 2ab 1abc 2a 1 0.001** 
11 Lack of infrastructure  2ab -1c 1abc -1c 2a 0 0.000*** 
Note: Each reason for local people being involved in conservation-threatening practices in the NNR was rated by respondents in a 5-point scale from strongly disagree (-2) 
to strongly agree (2). The P-value corresponds to the Kruskal-Walls (KW) test, with the following levels of significance: *= significant at 0.05, ** = significant at 0.01 and 
*** = significant at 0.001. Lowercase letters in the line represent post hoc statistical differences between clusters resulting from pairwise comparisons - values with the 
same letter are not statistically different. 
 
43 
 
Significant divergence among experts allowed us to group them into five clusters 
(see Table 2). The first cluster groups mostly undecided respondents. Experts in the second 
cluster seem to believe that conservation does provide benefits to local people, but they do 
not see those benefits because of current policies that hinder their engagement in 
conservation, lower education and corruption by illegal outsiders. On the other hand, experts 
in the fourth cluster believe that the single most important reason for local people 
involvement in conservation-threatening practices is ignorance.  
The third cluster groups those experts who strongly disagree that conservation only 
benefiting foreigners is a reason for local people’s involvement with conservation-
threatening behaviours. Experts in the last cluster (N5) believe the rights of local people are 
being sacrificed in the name of conservation.   
2.3.4. Effectiveness and limitations of ongoing compensation measures 
The six compensation measures currently under application in the NNR were ranked 
by experts as regards their perceived importance. The results are presented in Table 3. It can 
be observed that providing jobs for local people was consensually seen as the most important 
compensation, followed by the allocation of hunting quotas, whose importance is not 
consensual, and the delivering of 20% of revenue for local people, which was consensual. 
Promotion and respect of culture and beliefs of local communities were ranked as the fourth 
most important compensation, whereas food allowances were perceived as the least 
important. 
It can be observed that in general, experts agree with all eight limitations they have 
assessed, although there is only consensus about the limitation of the three most important 
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compensation measures: jobs are not allocated in a transparent way; hunting quotas 
allocated to local people and  the sharing of 20% of PA revenues are both not enough.   
Table 2.3. Compensation measures that are currently placed in the NNR and its limitation - overall and  
                 cluster medians (values in the brackets represents the number of experts per cluster and its 
                 respective percentage).   
                   
  Clusters medians    
No Current compensation measures  
N1 
(26|47%) 
N2 
(15|27%) 
N3 
(14|26%) 
Overall 
median 
P-value  
1 Jobs for the local people (e.g. Forest 
ranger position) 
6 6 5 6 
0.110 
2 Hunting quotes allocated to communities 4b 5a 5a 4 0.008** 
3 20% of revenues of concessions delivered 
to local people  
4 4 4 4 
0.068 
4 Food allowances for local people 1b 1ab 3a 1 0.009** 
5 50% of the revenue of the fines delivered 
to local people 
3a 2b 3ab 2 
0.038* 
6 Promotion and respect of culture and 
beliefs of local communities (e.g. sacred 
places) 
3a 3ab 2b 3 
0.001*** 
No Limitations of the current compensations            
1 Lack of transparency in the criteria of job 
allocation 
1 1 1 1 
0.584 
2 The hunting quotas allocated are 
insufficient 
1 1 1 1 
0.988 
3 The money allocated is insufficient 1 0 1 1 0.351 
4 Lack of monitoring and accountability of 
revenues (20%) 
2a 1ab 0b 1 
0.000*** 
5 In many cases, the detectors of the 
offenders aren’t awarded 
1a 0b 1a 1 
0.000*** 
6 Weak training and advice in how to use 
the compensation 
2b 1a 0a 1 
0.000*** 
7 Poor monitoring and evaluation of the 
results from the projects implemented in 
NNR 
1a 0b 1ab 1 
0.008** 
8 The above compensations are not enough 
to motivate the community 
1ab -1b 1a 1 
0.022* 
Note: Compensation measures that are currently placed in the reserve were ranked by respondents as most 
6=important and 1= least important. While limitations were rated in a 5-point scale from -2 (strongly disagree) 
to 2 (strongly agree). The P-value corresponds to the Kruskal-Walls (KW) test, with the following levels of 
significance: *= significant at 0.05, ** = significant at 0.01 and *** = significant at 0.001. Lowercase letters 
in the line represent post hoc statistical differences between clusters resulting from pairwise comparisons; 
values with same letter are not statistically different. 
 
 
Experts in the first cluster agree with all raised limitations, being the most important: 
lack of monitoring and accountability of the 20% of PA revenue shared with local people; 
and, the weak training and advice on how to use the compensations. Experts in the second 
cluster were undecided with some limitations, but they do not know whether the above-
mentioned compensation was enough to engage local people with conservation friendly 
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actions. The last cluster was assigned as an intermediate between the first and the second, 
and the most notable difference is that experts in this cluster are undecided about the lack 
of monitoring and accountability in the revenue sharing.   
2.3.5. New proposed compensation measures  
Table 4 presents the results from experts’ answers about the effectiveness of new 
compensation measures proposed to improve conservation in the NNR. The overall medians 
show that all proposed compensations have huge potential to positively improve the 
engagement of local people in conservation. Out of 11 new measures proposed, only three 
were consensual, which are, provide more jobs, promote education and improving services, 
that are expected to have a positive impact. Helping local people with practices aimed at 
enhancing the sustainable use of natural resources should also have a significant impact, 
although with no consensus among experts.  
Experts in the first and last clusters give less relevance to the increment of revenues 
and the attribution of collective performance-based payments. While experts in the second 
and third clusters, believe that an increase in the revenue distributed to local people, can 
help to improve conservation in the reserve, but they disagree with sustainable agriculture 
and forest-use practices incentives. All proposed incentives would greatly improve 
terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity and human behaviour orientation towards conservation-
friendly practices in the reserve (see Table 5). 
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Table 2.4. Compensation measures proposed to improve conservation in the NNR - overall and cluster medians (values in the brackets represents the number of 
                  experts per clusters and its respective percentage).   
                  
  Clusters medians    
No New compensations  
N1 
(14|25%) 
N2 
(19|35%) 
N3 
(11|20%) 
N4 
(11|20%) 
Overall 
median   
P-Value  
1 Create areas for cultivation of high-yield commercial crops 0c 2ab 2ab 2a 1 0.000*** 
2 Help local people to adopt conservation agriculture practices  1abc 2a 0c 2ab 1 0.012* 
3 Provide local people with alternative sources of animal proteins  1b 1ab 2ab 2a 1 0.036* 
4 Promoting certification of non-timber products  1a 1ab -2c 1abc 1 0.014* 
5 Help local people with practices to enhance the sustainable use of forest 
resources  
1ab 2a 1b 1ab 2 
0.016* 
6 Involve local people in the management and decision-making  1ab 2a -1b 1b 1 0.000*** 
7 Increase in the percentage of revenues charged to distribute to 
communities 
0b 1a 2a -1b 1 
0.000*** 
8 Increased employment in conservation and recreation activities; 2 2 2 1 2 0.525 
9 Attribution of collective conservation performance-based payments  0b 1a 1ab 0b 1 0.000*** 
10 Provide education for local people (e.g. scholarships) 1 2 2 1 1 0.797 
11 Improve services delivery for local people  1 1 2 2 1 0.142 
Note: The effectiveness of new proposed compensation measures to improve conservation in the reserve were ranked by respondents as 2 (very positive) and -2 (very 
negative). The P-value corresponds to the Kruskal-Walls (KW) test, with the following levels of significance: *= significant at 0.05, ** = significant at 0.01 and *** = 
significant at 0.001. Lower case letters in the line represent post-hoc statistical differences between clusters resulting from pairwise comparison; values with same letter are 
not statistically different.
47 
 
In relation to biodiversity, consensus was observed for: increases of biodiversity in 
general; increase of large carnivores and herbivores; and, the increase of fish stocks. While for 
human-related behaviour, consensus among respondents was observed for reduction of local 
people engaged in illegal activities; reduction of unsustainable trophy hunting and hunting for 
bushmeat. The difference between clusters is that, for non-consensual items, experts in the first 
cluster tend to be more optimistic in relation to the level of improvements. On the other hand, 
experts in the last cluster are intermediate between the first and second. The last cluster contains 
the most pessimistic experts.  
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Table 2.5. Improvement of environmental assets and human behaviour toward conservation, after the 
                 implementation of new, measures. overall and cluster medians (values in the brackets represents number 
                 of experts per clusters and its respective percentage) 
  Clusters medians    
No Level of improvement with new 
measures  
N1 
(23|41%) 
N2 
(19|35%) 
N3 
(13|24%) 
Overall 
medians P-Value  
1 Increases of the biodiversity in general 4 3 4 3 0.054 
2 Increases of forest cover 4a 2b 3a 3 0.000*** 
3 Increase of large carnivores and 
herbivores 
3 2 2 
2 0.315 
4 Increment of fish stocks 3 2 2 2 0.365 
5 Increase of large aquatic animals 3a 1b 2ab 2 0.017* 
6 Reduction of degraded area due to slash-
and-burn agriculture 
3a 2b 3b 
3 0.000*** 
7  Reduction of degraded area due to 
extraction of non-timber 
3a 2b 2ab 
3 0.002** 
 People behaviours and motivation for conservation     
1 Reduction of local people engaged in 
illegal activities 
3 3 3 
3 0.839 
2 Reduction of unsustainable trophy 
hunting  
2 3 1 
2 0.587 
3 Reduction of illegal bushmeat 3 3 2 3 0.232 
4 Knowledge of local communities 
regarding the importance of conservation 
4a 4a 2b 
3 0.000*** 
5 Motivation of local people in 
conservation 
4a 3a 2b 
3 0.000*** 
6 Disclosure of offenders  3a 3a 1b 3 0.000*** 
7 Mutual respect and trustiness amongst all 
actors 
3b 3a 2a 
3 0.000*** 
8 Increase of local people employed in the 
reserve 
3a 2ab 2b 
3 0.011* 
9 Reduction of human and wildlife 
conflicts 
3b 2a 2a 
2 0.000*** 
10 Reduction of frequency and forest fires 
intensity 
3b 2a 2a 
3 0.000*** 
Note: the level of improvement with implementation of new compensation measures were ranked by experts as 
0=0% to 4= [75 -100%] for biodiversity attributes and 0=Null to 4=Very high for human behaviour attributes. The 
P-value corresponds to the Kruskal-Walls (KW) test, with the following levels of significance: *= significant at 
0.05, ** = significant at 0.01 and *** = significant at 0.001. Lower case letters in the line represent post-hoc 
statistical differences between clusters resulting from pairwise comparison; values with same letter are not 
statistically different. 
 
 
2.3.6. Relationships between experts’ views on different topics and their socio-
demographic profile 
Results from Pearson’s and Fisher’s exact Chi-Square test from crosstabulation between 
different clustered major themes are presented in Table 6. It can be observed that experts’ views 
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on the degree of threat associated with each conservation problem in the NNR (Q.1) are 
significantly related with reasons for local people’s involvement in conservation-threatening 
practices (Q.2); experts’ assessment of compensations that are currently placed in the NNR 
(Q.3) and level of improvement of biodiversity and human-related behaviour, after the 
implementation of new measures.  
Expert’s assessments of compensation measures that are currently placed in the reserve 
(Q.3) show significant association to the reasons given for local people’s involvement in 
practices that threaten conservation (Q.2), and the levels of improvements in biodiversity and 
human-related behaviour (Q.4.1), after the implementation of new measures. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.6. Results from crosstabulation between different views of professionals who were  
                  clustered based on answers to four major themes   
 Q.1 Q.2 Q.3 Q.4        Q.4.1 
Q.1 ----- 
0.034* 
(0.014*) 
0.000*** 
(0.000***) 
0.101ns 
(0.096ns) 
0.000*** 
(0.000***) 
Q.2 ------ ------- 
0.034* 
(0.014*) 
0.095ns 
(0.117ns) 
0.226ns 
(0.155ns) 
Q.3 ------ ------- -------- 
0.101ns 
(0.117ns) 
0.000*** 
(0.000***) 
Q.4 ------ ------ ------- ------ 
0.832ns 
(0.846ns) 
Q.4.1 ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ 
Nota: Numbers into the brackets are p-value from the Fisher’s Exact Test while out of brackets are α  
           from Person Chi-square test. ns = not significant, * = significant at 0.05, ** = significant at 0.01 and 
          *** = significant at 0.001 
Q.1. Degree of threat that each of the existing problems in the reserve represents for conservation based 
        on the experts scores. 
Q.2. Reasons for local people involvement with practices that threaten conservation. 
Q.3. Compensation measures that are currently placed in the reserve and its limitations. 
Q.4. Cluster of proposed measures to improve conservation in the NNR. 
Q.4.1. Level of environmental and human-related behaviour improvements after the implementation of 
           new measures.  
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A post hoc cellwise test between experts’ answers regarding Q.1 and Q.2 (see Table S4 
in Mbanze et al.,2019) shows significant relation (Zij = 0.0038, α=0.0033), between the main 
reasons for local people’s involvement in practices threatening conservation. And results from 
post hoc tests in the cross-table between answers to theme Q.1 and Q.3 (see Table S5 in Mbanze 
et al.,2019) were significant, with adjusted alpha (α=0.0056), meaning that experts views on 
most problems that threaten conservation, in which local people are involved, are related to the 
fact that the compensation measures in place in the reserve are not enough to engage local 
people in conservation activities. 
The significance relation between theme Q.1 and Q.4.1 in the post hoc cellwise (see 
Table S6 in Mbanze et al., 2019)  can be interpreted as, although the ongoing threats to 
conservation in the reserve, with implementation of new proposed measures, it is likely to 
reduce the degraded area in the reserve due to slash-and-burn agriculture and extraction of non-
timber products. We also found a relationship between theme Q.2 and Q.3 (α = 0.0033, Zij = 
0.0038), that is represented in the Table S7 in Mbanze et al.,2019, meaning that local people 
have been engaged with practices threatening conservation because they are either corrupt or 
they don’t have enough to support their livelihoods. While the significant relation between 
themes Q.3 and Q.4 (see Table S8 in Mbanze et al., 2019) is not worthwhile to be explained, as 
both measures are mutually exclusive.  
Table 7 presents the results from Person’s and Fisher’s exact tests of crosstabulation 
between clusters of expert’s opinions and their socio-demographic characteristics. The degree 
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of education was associated with expert´s assessment of the level of improvement of different 
attributes after the implementation of new conservation measures.  
   Table 2.7. Crosstabulation between clusters of respondents and socio-demographic 
                    characteristics of respondents  
 Q.1 Q.2 Q.3 Q.4 Q.4.1 
Gender 
0.375ns 
(0.406ns) 
0.654ns 
(0.633ns) 
0.375ns 
(0.406ns) 
0.160ns 
(0.147ns) 
0.770ns 
(0.770ns) 
Field 
0.935ns 
(0.943ns) 
0.311ns 
(0.142ns) 
0.935ns 
(0.943ns) 
0.071ns 
(0.070ns) 
0.608ns 
(0.534ns) 
Education 
0.244ns 
(0.195ns) 
0.190ns 
(0.271ns) 
0.244ns 
(0.195ns) 
0.250ns 
(0.315ns) 
0.004** 
(0.010**) 
No of visit 
0.430ns 
(0.478ns) 
0.976ns 
(0.977ns) 
0.430ns 
(0.478ns) 
0.771ns 
(0.802ns) 
0.397ns 
(0.461ns) 
Time Spend 
0.110ns 
(0.074ns) 
(0.48ns) 
(0.55ns) 
0.110ns 
(0.074ns) 
0.623ns 
(0.502ns) 
0.055ns 
(0.054ns) 
Objective 
0.659ns 
(0.697ns) 
0.586ns 
(0.702ns) 
0.659ns 
(0.697ns)  
0.515ns 
(0.384ns) 
0.542ns 
(0.541ns) 
Experience 
(0.671ns) 
(0.649ns) 
0.998ns  
(0.863ns)   
0.671ns 
(0.649ns) 
0.530ns 
(0.471ns) 
0.658ns 
(0.671ns) 
Gender = Is the gender of the expert; 
Field = Is the Major field (area of education) of the expert; 
Education = Is the degree of education of the expert; 
No of visit = Is the number of time that the expert has being visit the reserve; 
Time Spend = Sum of the time that the expert spends in the reserve (sum of all trips); 
Objective = Is the objective of the trip/visit to the reserve; 
Experience = Is the years of experience in conservation. 
 
The significant relation between professionals holding the upper secondary degree and 
experts in the cluster N2 (see Table S9 in Mbanze et al., 2019), suggests that the level of 
education affects the experts forecast on the effectiveness of new measures to improve 
conservation in the reserve, with higher educated people, providing a more pessimistic forecast. 
4.4. Discussion  
2.4.1.  Conservation problems, their importance and drivers  
According to the experts, the most important threats for biodiversity conservation in the 
NNR are poaching, logging, mining, population growth, slash-and-burn agriculture and HWC. 
These findings are in accordance with a plenty of existing studies in Mozambique (Giva, 2016; 
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Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., 2014) and in the NNR in particular (Massuque, 2013; Muarapaz, 
2016). There is consensus among experts that poaching, logging, mining and population growth 
are the top threats to biodiversity in the Reserve. These findings are consistent with the 
dominant conservation narrative in developing countries (Booth, Vernon R.; Dunham, 
2014;UNEP et al., 2013), especially for non-fenced PAs (Gandiwa et al., 2013; Lindsey et al., 
2017). In the case of NNR, the first three of those threats are illegal activities that are mostly 
carried out by outsiders (Jorge et al., 2013). Local people are increasingly led to cooperate with 
outsiders (Kideghesho, 2016) because, according to the experts, poverty, insufficient 
compensations and opposition to the ongoing restriction are seen as the main reasons for 
involvement by local people with conservation-threatening practices. Those findings are in 
accordance  with current conservation narrative in the DCs (Brashares et al., 2011; MacKenzie, 
2018). 
HWC was reported as one of the top threats to conservation in the NNR. Moreto et al. 
(2019) and Dickman et al. (2015), found that HWC can induce poaching, because poaching is 
the only effective way to react to crop-raiding animals when there is a delay or no response 
from park authorities. Local people may prefer to call outsiders to poach the animals to reduce 
HWC, because they do not want to be engaged in the illegal activity themselves (Shepherd and 
Magnus, 2004). While experts seem to view HWC as a proximal driver of poaching in NNR, 
they also agree that current policy measures aimed at compensating local people for the costs 
of conservation, such as e.g. benefit sharing of the revenue from hunting concessions or the 
creation of conservation-based employment (wardens),  are not sufficient to engage local people 
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in conservation, because they are not perceived as offsetting losses from crop or livestock 
raiding in addition to all other costs of living inside the Reserve.  
The results of the cluster analysis of conservation problems according to actor’s 
responsibility (Figure 2) can help to tackle each problem focusing on the main group or 
organisation responsible. For example, government authorities were held responsible for 
project and infrastructure development, likely because the permission for those projects must 
be approved by government (Leitão et al., 2015). Local people were held responsibility for a 
significant part of the problems, probably because they are entirely dependent on ecosystem 
services (ES) to cope with their daily needs. However, most of the problems attributed to the 
local people were not considered top threats to biodiversity conservation in the NNR. In 
addition, there is no clear consensus for those that are considered top threats. For instance, 
shifting cultivation is only considered as a proximate driver of forest degradation, because it 
only implies lowering of biomass density (Herold et al., 2011).  Population growth is likely to 
be the underlying cause of most direct drivers of biodiversity loss in the reserve (Muarapaz, 
2016; NCP, 2017; Tembo et al., 2015), since it implies increased demand for ES (Wei et al., 
2018; Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., 2014). For instance, from 2003  to 2018, the population living 
inside NNR increased from 25,000 to 60,000, representing more than a double-fold increase 
(NCP, 2017).  
The presence of human settlements within African’s PAs is positively correlated with 
hunting for bushmeat, poaching and HWC (Lindsey et al., 2017). Thus, when enforcement is 
weak there is a clear tendency to increase non-compliance with the existing rules (Bragagnolo 
et al., 2017; Zafra-Calvo et al., 2018). However, the challenge is more than simply providing 
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enforcement, since there are also studies pointing out that increasing enforcement in PAs of 
developing countries does not necessarily deter poaching (Chang et al., 2019) 
2.4.2. Compensation measures and their expected effectiveness 
HWC was reported to occur with high frequency and to be an uncontested hindrance for 
conservation in the NNR. To give one example, in only two years (2017 and 2018), the NCP 
reported that their 34 community wildlife guardians, spread through 38 villages within the 
reserve, recorded 8581 HWC events in which 79% of the events were invasion of crop fields, 
mostly by baboons. These figures are still below those presented by other studies, see for 
instance Mackenzie (2018).  
There was consensus among experts that most of the compensations delivered to local 
people in the NNR are not carried out in an appropriate way. For instance, the 20% of NNR 
revenue shared with local communities is not enough and is also undermined by poor allocation. 
The share of 20% of the PA revenue is in the Mozambican legislation to improve the livelihoods 
of the poor and marginalized rural people (Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., 2014). However, it is 
also very controversial as a large portion of the incentive is diluted by transaction and other 
related costs, because the revenue must be delivered to the provincial authorities, for later 
allocation to the local people; second, the management committee who is responsible to allocate 
the funds, is not made accountable through audits; third, those committees are not clearly 
advised on how to allocate the money  (Massuque, 2013); fourth, there are no clear audits to 
verify whether the hunting concessions are declaring all revenues, and finally, it is not clear if 
the authorities are delivering the agreed amount. Experience from Tanzania Community-Based 
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Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) pointed at elite capture of conservation benefits 
aimed at the poor and marginalized majority (Zafra-Calvo et al., 2018). 
Experts agree that all 11 new proposed measures would positively improve conservation 
in the NNR. Of these, only the following three: increasing employment; providing education; 
and, improving services for local people, were consensual. It is interesting to note that those 
three consensual compensation measures are not only part of mainstream general narratives 
about conservation in developing countries (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Wei et al., 2018), but 
also the ones most widely promised by politicians. For example, the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) and now the Sustainable Developments Goals (SDGs) have prioritized the same 
measures for DCs (Kabeer, 2005; Sachs, 2012). The consensual nature of these proposals and 
their consistency with general sustainable development narrative will probably make its 
implementation easier, because, among other reasons, any expert who will be advising decision-
makers would more likely identify or support measures in that package. 
 The majority of experts have agreed that the current compensations are not sufficient to 
engage local people in conservation (Table 3), which is why they pointed out, the new measures 
needed to effectively promote conservation-friendly behaviour. Increases 20% of revenue 
sharing, was less consensual among the new compensation, while the same measure was 
superior consensual among the current compensations under implementation.  This apparent 
disparity is probable because the financial compensation (increase the 20% of revenue share), 
was presented together with other, mostly in-kind, compensation measures in the new proposed 
compensations. Providing rural residents with in-kind incentives was also found important in 
other related studies conducted in PAs of DCs similar to the NNR (Narloch et al., 2014; Travers 
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et al., 2019; Vorlaufer et al., 2017), which is probably because in-kind incentives can help local 
people to overcome some obstacles, such as: illiteracy; and, lack of training and transparency 
in the allocation of financial incentives. Payment for ES and benefit sharing, either financial or 
in-kind, are both perceived as important mechanisms to engage local people in sustainable use 
and conservation of natural resources (Irvine, K. et al., 2016; Narloch et al., 2014). Conversely, 
if local residents bear the costs of those activities, without receiving any benefit, they may be 
unsupportive (Kline, 2001; Lackey, 2006).  
2.4.3. Consistency on experts’ views across themes  
Experts were consistent in their views (Table 6). For instance, an expert’s view on what are 
the major threats to conservation is related to the (1) reasons for involvement by local people 
in conservation-threatening practices, (2) current compensation measures and their limitations, 
and (3) the improvement of environmental and behavioural change of the local people, that are 
expected after the implementation of new measures. This is an important finding, since experts 
have agreed on the relevance of delivering tangible benefits, while empowering the people in 
the decision-making process, which in turn, will increase the transparency of benefit sharing. 
Meanwhile, providing better education will reduce the level of threat for conservation as people 
will be more aware about the importance of conservation. 
The socioeconomic background of respondents did not affect their views in relation to the 
major themes surveyed, except for the level of improvement in the ES after the implementation 
of new measures (Q.4.1.), with higher educated experts (mainly from the cluster 2), providing 
more pessimistic forecast. This is probably because, answering this question required future 
projections, thus the more educated experts are in a better position to accurately provide those 
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projections. Indeed, even with new compensations in place, it is least likely that most of the 
provisioning services in the reserve will recover over 50%, since there are still other larger 
sources of uncertainties in the future, such as the effects of climate change and population 
growth on biodiversity (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Wei et al., 2018), which will add further 
pressure on Land Use Change (LUC) and ES.  
In general, experts’ feedback leads us to consider two most possible scenarios: either they 
are truly aware about the drivers of conservation-threating behaviour and possible measures 
that can be implemented to improve local people behaviour, or they may have drawn their 
answers from a common rhetoric of “one size fits all” concept. That is: PAs in developing 
countries share common features and there is a general framework that can be implemented to 
solve the problem of local people’s involvement in conservation-threatening practices. To give 
one example, there was common agreement that, if local people are provided tangible benefits, 
they will embrace conservation-friendly actions, because the root causes of the conservation-
threatening behaviour is related to poverty. Travers et al, (2019) have already advised about the 
weakness of using that approach, instead of thinking more broadly and holistically, such as 
using a mix of polices that include education and empowerment of local people. However, as a 
preliminary approach, we believe that the experts provided us with important insights that can 
be useful to triangulate with in-deep field exploratory research with communities living inside 
the NNR and other relevant actors, which will be developed in the follow up of this and other 
researches elsewhere. 
 
58 
 
2.5. Conclusion  
In this study, we improved a method to identify the role of local people in major threats to 
conservation and the underlying motives/drivers for their involvement in those practices. We 
also discussed policy options to address these drivers in the NNR. Our results show that there 
is a consensus among experts that most activities which constitute the top threats to 
conservation in the NNR are mainly carried out by outsiders. This is in accordance with 
previous studies. Direct and indirect responsibilities of locals and outsiders in those activities 
were well identified in our clusters analysis of conservation problems in the NNR; these results 
can be used to design appropriate conservation policy to tackle the identified actors, behaviours 
and their drivers. The new compensations that have been included in our questionnaire, namely 
in-kind compensations, were clearly more effective than the existing ones.  
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Abstract 
The data content of this article is related to the original article entitled “An expert-based 
approach to assess the potential for local people engagement in nature conservation: The case 
study of the Niassa National Reserve in Mozambique”(Mbanze et al., 2019), published in 
Journal for Nature Conservation. The dataset is from an online and self-administrated survey 
with 55 experts aware of conservation policies and incentives implemented at Niassa National 
Reserve (NNR), the largest protected area in the country and third-largest in Africa. The survey 
included four sections of both compulsory and non-compulsory questions, mostly in closed-
ended Likert-scale. In the first section, experts were asked about the main practices that threaten 
conservation in the NNR, the actors who are directly and indirectly responsible for each 
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practice, and the reasons for local people’s involvement with those practices. The second 
section was about the effectiveness and limitations of the current compensation measures to 
engage local residents with conservation-friendly practices. In the third section, respondents 
were asked to select new measures to enhance the current conservation status and engage local 
people more effectively in conservation. The last section was about the socio-economic profile 
of respondents. The survey was conducted from June to September 2017. The paper includes 
the survey itself, raw data in an Excel spreadsheet, descriptive analysis, crosstabulation and 
Post Hoc cellwise tests (goodness of fit). Data are provided for public use and can serve as a 
benchmark for collaboration in order to conduct more comprehensive research, comparative 
analysis as well as panel data can be derived. This data can also have applications in other fields 
such as mathematics, statistics, and computation. 
Keywords: Conservation experts, Developing countries, Perceived views and Niassa National 
Reserve 
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3.1. Specifications Table 
Subject area Environmental science  
More specific subject 
area 
Management, Monitoring, Policy, and Law 
Type of data Excel files, table and online questionnaires 
How data was acquired Online and self-administration survey 
Data format Raw, filtered and analyzed 
Experimental factors Respondents were selected based on education, number of visits, time 
spent while visiting, the objective of the visit and years of experience in 
conservation 
Experimental features Online and self-administration survey was conducted to 55 experts 
engaged in conservation in Mozambique, from June to September 2017 
Data source location Mozambique countrywide (mainly in Maputo city, Lichinga city, 
Mecula, Marrupa and Mavago districts in the Niassa Province, closer 
to the Niassa National Reserve) 
Data accessibility Data are available with this article  
Related research article  Author's name: Aires Afonso Mbanze, Natasha Sofia Ribeiro, Carina 
Vieira da Silva and José Lima Santos 
Title: “An expert-based approach to assess the potential for local 
people engagement in nature conservation: The case study of the 
Niassa National Reserve in Mozambique” 
Journal: Journal for Nature Conservation 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnc.2019.125759 
 
 
3.2. Value of the data  
• Data can be used for site comparison among different conservation areas; 
• Data can serve as a benchmark for further collaborative research; 
• The questionnaire can be replicable and improved in future studies; 
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• Data can be analyzed on different ways to come up with other possible scenarios to advise 
decision-makers and conservation experts on how to improve conservation of protected areas 
in developing countries; 
• Data can also be used in other fields, including statistics and computer sciences.  
 
3.3. Data 
The dataset of this article is related to experts’ views about conservation policies and 
incentives implemented at Niassa National Reserve (NNR). The questionnaire used to generate 
the dataset is presented in Appendix A. Raw Excel dataset is online available on mendely data 
(https://data.mendeley.com/datasets). The detailed information regarding the profile of 
respondents is presented in Table 1. Table 2 presents more detailed information about the socio-
demographic information of respondents. Table 3 presents the different rating scales used for 
each major themes; Table 4 to 8 are the post-hoc cellwise comparisons between major themes 
with meaningful explanation; and Table 9 presents a post-hoc cellwise test between experts’ 
level of education and the level of improvement of different attributes after implementation of 
new proposed measures.   
 
 
           Table 3.1. Organizations from which the surveyed respondents were selected. 
Organization  Number of respondents (%) 
Conservation NGOs  9 (16) 
Private sector (concessionaries of Hunting Blocks)  4 (7) 
Governmental institution   
National Ministry of Land, Environment and Development 5 (9) 
Provincial and district environment and conservation related 
institution  19 (35) 
Academic Institutions    
Universities and Technical Institutes  10 (18) 
Research institutions  2 (4) 
Others  6 (11) 
Total  55 (100) 
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3.4. Experimental Design, Materials and Methods 
Data were obtained from experts highly involved in the design and implementation of 
conservation measures in Mozambique. The criteria used to select the experts were the 
following: (1) have worked or still work in Mozambique in conservation-related activities, 
irrespective of being Mozambican citizens; (2) have substantial knowledge about policies and 
laws that govern protected areas in Mozambique; and (3) know the current management state 
of the NNR including threats, compensation schemes and the role of all actors involved in 
conservation. The socio-demographic profile of surveyed experts is presented in table 2. The 
questionnaire used to generate the dataset is presented in Appendix A. An online and self-
administrated survey was presented to experts engaged in conservation in the NNR, in both 
Portuguese (Mozambican National Language) and English. The survey’s main aim was to 
collect experts’ perceptions and opinions on conservation-related issues, namely: (i) main 
practices threatening conservation in the NNR and those responsible for each practice; (ii) the 
reasons for local people’s involvement with practices threatening conservation;  (iii) 
effectiveness and limitations of current compensation measures to engage local people in 
conservation; and (iv) new measures that can be proposed to enhance conservation on the 
reserve. The survey also included a section on the socio-economic profile of respondents. The 
response rate was 68.76%, with two non-valid responses, that were dropped from the analysis. 
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Table 3. 2. Socio-demographic information of respondents  
No Variables Frequency Percentage (%) 
1 Gender    
 Male  43 78.2 
 Female  12 21.8 
2 Education    
 Professional Education (basic or secondary)  15 27.3 
 Upper Secondary School 6 10.9 
 Higher Education  34 61.8 
3 Major Field    
 Agriculture  32 58.2 
 Biology 4 7.3 
 Social Sciences 9 16.4 
 Others 10 18.2 
4 How long have you stayed there? 
 Any time 12 21.8 
 less than a month 13 23.64 
 1 - 4 Months 10 18.2 
 5 - 8 months 2 3.6 
 8 - 12 months 3 5.5 
 >12  15 27.3 
5 The main objective of your trip    
 Working 29 52.7 
 Research 11 20 
 Just passing through 1 1.8 
 Tourism 4 7.3 
 Visit  1 1.8 
 Others 9 16.4 
6 Years of experience in conservation  
 
 1 - 2 16 31.37 
 3 - 5 19 37.25 
 6 - 10 12 23.53 
 > 10 4 7.84 
 
The survey was coded in different rating scales depending on the question being 
analysed, according to the Excel spreadsheet and Table 3. Most of the questions were taken 
from the literature and brainstorming with a selected group of experts who have deep 
knowledge about conservation in NNR and other related conservation areas in the country. 
More detailed information about all the topics is available in Table 3 of Mbanze et al., (2019).  
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Table 3.3. Rating scale coded for the four major themes that experts were requested to answer 
Nº Major themes  Rating scale  Source 
Q.1 Identify the degree of threat each 
of the existing problems in the 
NNR represents for conservation  
  
0=very little, 1=little, 
2=moderate, 3=high 
and 4=very high 
 (Booth, Vernon R.; Dunham, 2014; 
Jorge et al., 2013; Martins, 2015; 
MICOA, 2014; Muarapaz, 2016; 
NCP, 2016, 2015; Ribeiro et al., 
2008) 
Q.1.1 Among different actors, indicate 
the main responsible for each of 
these threats.  
 
0 = No, 1 = Yes 
 
Q.2 Several reasons for local people 
to be involved with practices that 
threaten conservation 
2=strongly agree, 
1=agree, 0=undecided, 
-1=disagree and -
2=strongly disagree 
(Aheto et al., 2016; Bluwstein and 
Lund, 2016; Giva, 2016; MICOA, 
2014; Mombo et al., 2014; NCP, 
2015) 
Q.3 Put the current compensation 
measures in order of importance 
to the local population 
6=most important to 
1=least important 
 
Q.3.1 Limitations with the way that 
current compensation measures 
are being delivered 
2=strongly agree, 
1=agree, 0=undecided, 
-1=disagree and -
2=strongly disagree 
(Muarapaz, 2016; NCP, 2015; 
Tembo et al., 2015) 
Q.4 What will be the effectiveness of 
each new measures below in 
order to promote the adoption of 
conservation-friendly practices 
2=very positive, 
1=positive, 0=no effect; 
-1=negative and -
2=very negative (NCP, 2015) 
Q.4.1 Level of improvement with 
adoption of new measures  
4=76-100%, 3=51-75%, 
2=26-50%, 1=1-25% 
and 0=0%  Authors  
Q.4.2 Level of improvement in people 
behaviours and motivation for 
conservation  
4 =very high, 3 = high, 
2= Moderate, 2= low 
and 0=Null   
 
Respondents’ ratings were first analysed through principal components for dimension 
reduction and subsequently to detect clusters structures. To understand whether there was any 
relationship between different views of respondents in all major themes, a crosstabulation 
between clusters was tested based on Fisher’s Exact test and Asymptotic Person’s Chi-Square 
(Chan, 2003; Mehta and Patel, 2011). When a significant relationship was detected, a post-hoc 
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cellwise test (goodness-of-fit)  was performed in order to find those attributes most significant 
for the association, and spell out the meaning of those relationships, based on the adjusted 
standardized residuals and adjusted alpha (α) (Beasley and Schumacker, 1995; García-Pérez 
and Núñez-Antón, 2003; Sharpe, 2015). The same technique was applied between clusters of 
major themes and socio-economic profile of respondents to understand whether their socio-
economic background can also explain the points of views of respondents concerning major 
themes. Data from the post-hoc test is available in Tables 4-9. For more detailed information 
about the methodology see Mbanze et al., (2019) (A. Mbanze et al., 2019). 
 
Table 3.4. Post-hoc cellwise tests between clusters of the degree of threat that each of the existing problems 
in 
                   the NNR represents (Q.1), and reasons for local people engagement in threatening practices (Q.2) 
   Q.1 
   N1 N2 N3 
Q
.2
 
N1 
Count 7 0 2 
Expected Count 4.3 2.5 2.3 
% within Ward Method 77.8% 0.0% 22.2% 
Adjusted Residual 2.0 -2.0 -0.2 
P (Zij) 0.0450 0.0446 0.8077 
N2 
Count 0 5 3 
Expected Count 3.8 2.2 2.0 
% within Ward Method 0.0% 62.5% 37.5% 
Adjusted Residual -2.9 2.4 0.8 
P (Zij) 0.0038 0.0155 0.3975 
N3 
Count 12 8 6 
Expected Count 12.3 7.1 6.6 
% within Ward Method 46.2% 30.8% 23.1% 
Adjusted Residual -0.2 0.6 -0.4 
P (Zij) 0.8750 0.5814 0.7015 
N4 
Count 1 1 2 
Expected Count 1.9 1.1 1.0 
% within Ward Method 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 
Adjusted Residual -0.9 -0.1 1.2 
P (Zij) 0.3542 0.9156 0.2419 
N5 
Count 6 1 1 
Expected Count 3.8 2.2 2.0 
% within Ward Method 75.0% 12.5% 12.5% 
Adjusted Residual 1.7 -1.0 -0.9 
  P (Zij) 0.0893 0.3102 0.3629 
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Table 3.5. Post-hoc cellwise tests between clusters of the degree of threat that each of the existing problems 
                   In the NNR represents (Q.1) and compensation measures currently in place at the reserve (Q.3) 
   Q.1 
      N1 N2 N3 
Q
.3
 
N1 
Count 26 0 0 
Expected Count 12.3 7.1 6.6 
% within Ward Method 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Adjusted Residual 7.4 -4.3 -4.1 
P (Zij) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N2 
Count 0 15 0 
Expected Count 7.1 4.1 3.8 
% within Ward Method 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Adjusted Residual -4.3 7.4 -2.7 
P (Zij) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0080 
N3 
Count 0 0 14 
Expected Count 6.6 3.8 3.6 
% within Ward Method 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Adjusted Residual -4.1 -2.7 7.4 
P (Zij) 0.0000 0.0080 0.0000 
 
 
 
Table 3.6. Post-hoc cellwise tests between clusters of the degree of threat that each of the existing problems 
in 
                   the NNR represents for conservation and level of improvement of different ecosystem services, after 
the 
                   implementation of new measures.  
     Q.4.1 
     C1 C2 C3 
Q
.1
 
C1 
  Count 20 0 0 
  Expected 
Count 
9.5 5.5 5.1 
  % within 
Ward 
Method 
100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
  Adjusted 
Residual 
5.9 -3.4 -3.3 
  P (Zij) 0.0000 0.0006 0.0011 
C2 
  Count 0 8 5 
  Expected 
Count 
6.1 3.5 3.3 
  % within 
Ward 
Method 
0.0% 61.5% 38.5% 
  Adjusted 
Residual 
-3.9 3.2 1.2 
  P (Zij) 0.0001 0.0015 0.2179 
C3 
  Count 6 7 9 
  Expected 
Count 
10.4 6.0 5.6 
  % within 
Ward 
Method 
27.3% 31.8% 40.9% 
  Adjusted 
Residual 
-2.4 0.6 2.1 
  P (Zij) 0.0153 0.5366 0.0317 
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Table 3. 7. Post-hoc cellwise tests between clusters of reasons for local people being involved with 
                    practices that threaten conservation, (Q.2) and compensation measures currently in place at the 
                    reserve (Q.3). 
   Q.3 
   N1 N2 N3 
Q
.2
 
N1 
Count 7 0 2 
Expected Count 4.3 2.5 2.3 
% within Ward Method 77.8% 0.0% 22.2% 
Adjusted Residual 2.0 -2.0 -0.2 
P (Zij) 0.0450 0.0446 0.8077 
N2 
Count 0 5 3 
Expected Count 3.8 2.2 2.0 
% within Ward Method 0.0% 62.5% 37.5% 
Adjusted Residual -2.9 2.4 0.8 
P (Zij) 0.0038 0.0155 0.3975 
N3 
Count 12 8 6 
Expected Count 12.3 7.1 6.6 
% within Ward Method 46.2% 30.8% 23.1% 
Adjusted Residual -0.2 0.6 -0.4 
P (Zij) 0.8750 0.5814 0.7015 
N4 
Count 1 1 2 
Expected Count 1.9 1.1 1.0 
% within Ward Method 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 
Adjusted Residual -0.9 -0.1 1.2 
P (Zij) 0.3542 0.9156 0.2419 
N5 
Count 6 1 1 
Expected Count 3.8 2.2 2.0 
% within Ward Method 75.0% 12.5% 12.5% 
Adjusted Residual 1.7 -1.0 -0.9 
P (Zij) 0.0893 0.3102 0.3629 
 
 
Table 3. 8. Post-hoc cellwise tests between compensation measures that are currently in place at the Reserve 
                    (Q.3) and level of improvement of different ecosystem services, after the implementation of new 
measures 
                    (Q.4.1) 
   Q.4.1 
   N1 N2 N3 
Q
.3
 
N1 
Count 20 0 0 
Expected Count 9.5 5.5 5.1 
% within Ward Method 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Adjusted Residual 5.9 -3.4 -3.3 
P (Zij) 0.000 0.001 0.001 
N2 
Count 0 8 5 
Expected Count 6.1 3.5 3.3 
% within Ward Method 0.0% 61.5% 38.5% 
Adjusted Residual -3.9 3.2 1.2 
P (Zij) 0.000 0.002 0.218 
N3 
Count 6 7 9 
Expected Count 10.4 6.0 5.6 
% within Ward Method 27.3% 31.8% 40.9% 
Adjusted Residual -2.4 0.6 2.1 
P (Zij) 0.015 0.537 0.032 
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Table 3.9. Post-hoc cellwise tests between the level of education and cluster of level of improvement of different 
                 attributes, after the implementation of new measures   
   Education 
   Lower & 
Intermediate  
Upper Secondary School Higher Education 
Q
.4
.1
 
N1 
Count 5 1 14 
Expected Count 5.5 2.2 12.4 
% within Ward Method 25.0% 5.0% 70.0% 
Adjusted Residual -0.3 -1.1 0.9 
P (Zij) 0.7748 0.2880 0.3451 
N2 
Count 4 5 4 
Expected Count 3.5 1.4 8.0 
% within Ward Method 30.8% 38.5% 30.8% 
Adjusted Residual 0.3 3.6 -2.6 
P (Zij) 0.7460 0.0003 0.0084 
N3 
Count 6 0 16 
Expected Count 6.0 2.4 13.6 
% within Ward Method 27.3% 0.0% 72.7% 
Adjusted Residual 0.0 -2.1 1.4 
P (Zij) 1.0000 0.0341 0.1739 
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3.A1. Supplementary material. 
The on-line survey can be downloaded from Google forms at: 
 https://goo.gl/forms/ryuvRjl4xF5KDzjm1 (portuguese) and 
https://goo.gl/forms/WUPfWwfDkW1kV0mq1 (english). 
 
 
3.A2. Survey to the professionals and volunteers involved in the design and implementation of 
conservation measures in the Niassa National Reserve 
          
 The Niassa National Reserve (NNR) is the largest conservation area in Mozambique. The Reserve was 
created for hunting propose in 1954 and later in 1997 was proclaimed a conservation area. It is one of 
the few remaining intact savannas in the world, and it’s also of global importance due to its biodiversity 
abundance, mostly endemic. Although efforts are being made to maintain the reserve, there are several 
problems that threaten biodiversity, mostly anthropogenic. 
         The present survey aims to collect the sensitivity of the professionals and volunteers involved in 
NNR conservation, in order to propose sustainable alternatives to improve the conservation. The survey 
has five sections and it is estimated that the average time to answer all questions ranges from 25 to 35 
minutes. Questions marked with asterisk (*) must be answered. If you do not answer the question, the 
system will report an error alerts (an answer is required for this question), and you will not proceed to 
the next question before answering the previous one. 
        Your response to this survey is a valuable contribution to help us to propose consistent solutions to 
the current problems that threaten the degradation of the Reserve. We appreciate all attention and time 
you will spend, in order to help us to address this problem. There aren’t right or wrong answers to this 
questionnaire; all answers are important; we just want to know you point of view. 
       We will ensure total anonymity and confidentiality of your answers in the analysis and publication 
of all information will be collected.  
       If you find questions, doubts, comments or suggestions while you fill this questionnaire, you can 
contact: aires.banze@gmail.com or 26421@novasbe.pt, you can also send this questionnaire if you 
know people that will be interest to send to them.  
We hope you will enjoy it too much 
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SECTION I - PRACTICES INTERFERING WITH COSERVATION IN THE 
RESERVE 
1. Could you please identify the degree of threat each of the existing problems in the 
Reserve represents to conservation? 
 
 
Very 
high 
Hig
h 
Moderat
e 
Little 
Very 
little 
Cut and burn agriculture  O O O O 
Commercial farming (e.g. tobacco, soy and cotton)  O O O O 
Sport hunting (Concessions / Hunting Blocks)  O O O O 
Poaching (e.g. ivory, bones, skin etc.)  O O O O 
Hunting for eat or sale meat locally (bushmeat)  O O O O 
Extraction of non-timber products (e.g. honey, fruits and 
roots) 
 O O O O 
Wood fuel (fire wood and charcoal)  O O O O 
Illegal logging  O O O O 
Fishing  O O O O 
Population growth in the reserve with increased pressure 
to the resources 
 O O O O 
Human and wildlife conflicts  O O O O 
Illegal gold and ruby mining  O O O O 
Projects and Infrastructures (roads, power poles and 
communication antennas) 
 O O O O 
 
2. Could you kindly add two more relevant problems and its respective degree of threats? 
Threat 1___________________________________________________________________ 
Threat 2___________________________________________________________________  
 
3. Indicate the main actor responsible for each problem described. In your answer, 
consider direct (action) or indirect responsibility (omission) 
 Do  Go ReAd NoRe LoPe PrSc TrAu 
 Cut and burn agriculture  O O O O O O 
 Commercial farming (e.g. tobacco, soy and cotton)  O O O O O O 
Sport hunting (Concessions / Hunting Blocks)  O O O O O O 
Poaching (e.g. ivory, bones, skin etc.  O O O O O O 
Hunting for eat or sale meat locally (bushmeat)  O O O O O O 
Extraction of non-timber products (e.g. honey, fruits 
and roots) 
 O O O O O O 
Wood fuel (fire wood and charcoal)  O O O O O O 
Illegal logging  O O O O O O 
 Fishing  O O O O O O 
Population growth in the reserve with increased 
pressure to the resources 
 O O O O O O 
Human and wildlife conflicts  O O O O O O 
Illegal gold and ruby mining  O O O O O O 
Projects and Infrastructures (roads, power poles and 
communication antennas) 
 O O O O O O 
Where: Do=Donors, ReAd=Reserve Administration, NoRe=Non-residents, LoPe=Local People, PrSc=Private,  
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              Sector (PrSc) and TrAu=Traditional Authorities, 
 
4. There are several reasons for local people to be involved on practices that threaten 
conservation. Please, indicate your degree of agreement to each of the sentences given 
below 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Livelihood Insufficiency  O O O O 
Conservation does not bring any benefit, instead of 
restrictions 
 O O O O 
People don't know the importance of conservation  O O O O 
The local people are corrupted to corroborate with 
infractors 
 O O O O 
 There are feeling of injustice in benefits sharing 
(especially 20% of the revenue) 
 O O O O 
Conservation only creates problems (e.g. human 
and wildlife conflict) 
 O O O O 
Conservation only benefits foreigners (e.g. 
visitors, government, NGOs, technicians or 
researchers) 
 O O O O 
The community are not strongly involved on the 
decision making and its implementation 
 O O O O 
Opposition to the restrictions imposed by 
conservation (e.g. hard rules and zoning) 
 O O O O 
Low education  O O O O 
Lack of infrastructure (e.g. hospitals, schools, 
transportation and communication) 
 O O O O 
 
 
SECTION II - EFFECTIVENESS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE COMPENSATION 
MEASURES 
Different compensation measures are currently in place in the Niassa Reserve, to motivate local people 
in order to participate in the conservation activities 
 
5. Put the measures listed below in order of importance to the local population, considering 
1 = most important and 6 = least important 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Jobs for the local population created under the conservation program, (e.g. Forest 
ranger position) 
 O O O O 
Hunting quotas allocated to communities  O O O O 
20% income from the concessions which are delivered to the local people  O O O O 
Food allowances which are distributed to local people  O O O O 
Delivery of 50% of the revenue of the fines from these who detected the infraction 
in the reserve 
 O O O O 
Promotion and respect of culture and beliefs of local communities by government 
authorities and other actors in conservation (e.g. sacred places) 
 O O O O 
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6. Some limitations have been referenced due to the way the compensation measures are 
being delivered. In this context, please indicate your agreement with the statements below 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Undecided Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Lack of transparency in the criteria to allocate the 
jobs position 
 
O O O O 
The hunting quotas allocated to local people are not 
enough 
 O O O O 
The money allocated to the communities is not 
enough 
 O O O O 
Lack of monitoring and accountability in the use of 
20% of concession revenues 
 O O O O 
 In many cases, the detectors of the offenders do not 
receive the award 
 O O O O 
Weak training and advice to communities in how to 
use the compensation 
 O O O O 
Poor monitoring and evaluation of the results from 
the projects implemented to the benefit of 
communities 
 O O O O 
The above compensations are not enough to 
motivate the community 
 O O O O 
 
 
SECTION III 
By improving existing measures and introducing new ones, it would be possible to encourage local 
people to participate in the conservation by adopting conservation friendly practices. Among these new 
measures, might be the introduction of individual or collectives’ incentives, in cash or in kind, (e.g. 
improved seeds, assistance in the production of certified products such honey, new techniques to keep 
away crop raids from farms and communities, as well as performance-based payments), which may lead 
to the improvement of the conservation performance. More than compensating local people, it’s a matter 
of motivating them to be more active in conservation. In the following questions, we would like to know 
your opinion regarding to the effectiveness of some of these new measures. 
 
7. In your opinion, what will be the effectiveness of each of the measures described below in 
order to promoting the adoption of conservation-friendly practices by the household’s 
heads 
 
 
Very 
positive 
Positive Neutral Negative 
Very 
negative 
Create areas for cultivation of high-yield commercial 
crops (e.g. tobacco, corn, soybeans, cotton, etc.) to 
reduce pressure on land and obtain greater profits than 
others crop like cassava, maize etc. 
 O O O O 
Assist local people to the use environmentally-friendly 
cultivation practices (e.g. minimum cultivation, crop 
rotation, green manuring etc.) 
 O O O O 
 Assist local people to produce alternative sources of 
animal proteins (e.g. chickens, pigs, poultry etc.) 
 O O O O 
Promoting certification of non-timber products (e.g. 
honey, fruit, medicinal plants etc.) in order to get higher 
 O O O O 
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market prices and encourage sustainable use of natural 
resources] 
Training the communities for sustainable use of forest 
resources (timber, non-timber and fishing resources) 
 O O O O 
Involve local people in the management and decision-
making on issues related to the reserve 
 O O O O 
Increase in the percentage of revenues charged to 
distribute to communities 
 O O O O 
Increased employment in conservation and recreation 
activities (e.g. tour guides, rangers, carpenters, hotels 
and restoration activities, etc.); 
 O O O O 
Attribution of collective conservation performance-
based payments for local people 
 O O O O 
Provide education for local people (e.g. scholarships)  O O O O 
Improve services delivery for local people (e.g. health, 
education, roads etc.) 
 O O O O 
 
 
8. If you could only choose 4 of the measures mentioned above, what measures would you 
choose in order to improve the conservation status of the Niassa Reserve? You can mark 
only those you will be chosen 
 
O Create areas for cultivation of high-yield commercial crops (e.g. tobacco, corn, soybeans, cotton, etc.) to 
reduce pressure on land and obtain greater profits than others crop like cassava, maize etc. 
O Assist local people to the use environmentally-friendly cultivation practices (e.g. minimum cultivation, crop 
rotation, green manuring etc.) 
O  Assist local people to produce alternative sources of animal proteins (e.g. chickens, pigs, poultry etc.) 
O Promoting certification of non-timber products (e.g. honey, fruit, medicinal plants etc.) in order to get higher 
market prices and encourage sustainable use of natural resources) 
O Training the communities for sustainable use of forest resources (timber, non-timber and fishing resources) 
O Involve local people in the management and decision-making on issues related to the reserve 
O Increase in the percentage of revenues charged to distribute to communities 
O Increased employment in conservation and recreation activities (e.g. tour guides, rangers, carpenters, hotels 
and restoration activities, etc.); 
O Attribution of collective conservation performance-based payments for local people 
O Provide education for local people (e.g. scholarships) 
O Improve services delivery for local people (e.g. health, education, roads etc.) 
 
9. Could you justify the reason for the choice you made above? 
 Answer__________________________________________________________________
____ 
__________________________________________________________________________________
___ 
 
10.  If these 4 measures you selected in the previous question will be adopted in the reserve. 
What would be the percentage of improvement (on a scale of 0 to 100%), that you would 
expect to get from each conservation values? 
 
 0% 1-25% 
26-
50% 51-75% 76-100% 
Increases of the biodiversity in general  O O O O 
Increases of forest cover  O O O O 
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Increase of large carnivores and herbivores (e.g. the big 
fives); 
 O O O O 
Increment of fish stocks  O O O O 
Increase of large aquatic animals (e.g. crocodiles and 
hippos) 
 O O O O 
Reduction of degraded area due to cut and burn agriculture  O O O O 
Reduction of degraded area due to extraction of non-timber 
products 
 O O O O 
Reduction of local people engaged in illegal activities  O O O O 
Reduction of unsustainable trophy hunting (sport hunting)]  O O O O 
Reduction of illegal hunting for eat and sale the meat 
(bushmeat) 
 O O O O 
 
 
11. In addition to the conservation values above, what would be the improvement that you 
would expect to see in relation to these other attributes below? 
 
 Very high High Moderate Low Null 
Knowledge of local communities regarding the importance of 
NNR conservation 
 O O O O 
Motivation of local people to participate in conservation activities  O O O O 
Disclosure of offenders  O O O O 
Mutual respect and trustiness among the different conservation 
actors 
 O O O O 
Increase of local people employed in the reserve  O O O O 
Reduction of human and wildlife conflicts  O O O O 
Reduction of frequency and forest fires intensity  O O O O 
 
 
SECTION IV - HOW TO CONCILIATE CONSERVATION, DEVELOPMENT AND 
LOCAL PEOPLE LIFESTYLE 
Currently, most of the funding to support conservation activities in the reserve, are from 
international donors and hunting concessions. 
 
12. Select at least four main sources of funding that can be explored to ensure the future 
sustainability of conservation activities in the reserve. 
 
O  Donors 
O Government authorities 
O From tourism and ecotourism in general 
O Carbon credits and other related activities 
O Revenues from what is apprehended from illegal activities 
O Hunting concessions 
 
 
13. Can you suggest at least two other sources of funding that can be explored 
 
One______________________________________________________________________________ 
Two______________________________________________________________________________ 
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14. Below are describe some factors that we believe you've pondered to select the four sources 
of funding. Could you please put order of importance these factors? In you answer, 
considers 1 = most important and 7 = least important 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Job generation  O O O O O O 
Potential to generate revenue  O O O O O O 
Attracting of investments and its viability  O O O O O O 
Sustainable conservation activities  O O O O O O 
 Empowering local communities;  O O O O O O 
Potential to improve local people intellectual and financial 
capacities 
 O O O O O O 
Potential to reduce external influence in the conservation 
policies. 
 O O O O O O 
 
 
15. Can you please mention another important factor that you took in consideration, which 
was not described above? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
______ 
 
SECTION V - SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS 
 
16. Gender  
 
O Female 
O Male 
O Prefer not to say 
 
 
17. Your major field 
 
O Anthropology 
O Biology 
O Social Sciences 
O Political Sciences 
O Conservation of Natural Resources 
O Rural development 
O Ecology 
O Economics 
O Agricultural Engineering 
O Forest Engineering 
O Environmental Engineering 
O Rural Extension 
O Geography 
O Medicine 
O Others  
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18. Degree of Education 
 
O Elementary Education 
O Lower Secondary School 
O Lower Professional Education 
O Intermediate Professional Education 
O Upper Secondary Education 
O BSc/ Graduation Degree 
O Master’s degree (M.Sc.) 
O PhD 
O Post-doctoral 
O Other (Indicate please) 
 
 
19. How many times have you been in the Niassa Reserve? 
               Never__; 1___; 2____; 3 – 5 ____; > 5 _____ 
 
20. For how long time you stayed in the reserve?  (sum of all trips) and what was the main 
objective of your trip to the reserve 
 
O Any time O Tourism 
O Less than a month O Research 
O 1 – 4 Months O Visit friend family 
O 5 – 8 Months O Just passing through 
O 8 – 12 Months O Working 
O > 12 Months O Others  
 
 
21. Years of experience in conservation (if applicable) 
Any___; 1____; 2 – 5____; 6 – 10____; >10_____ 
 
22. Your current institution 
___________________________________________________________ 
23. Position 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
24. Other institutions where you worked 
before__________________________________________ 
 
 
If you find it relevant, provide email contact from two persons who would be relevant to send this 
questionnaire. You can also send personally. Don't forget to provide full name and the respective 
institutions where the people work 
 
Thank you for your time 
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Abstract  
In this paper we argue that effective conservation can only be achieved if conservation 
policies and management decisions first target local actors who are dependent on environmental 
services. In rural areas of Developing Countries (DCs), these actors are mainly farmers who 
also rely on off-farming activities such as harvest of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) to 
complement their livelihoods. Here, we are proposing a novel approach to support decision-
makers with policy instruments for sustainable management of Protected Areas (PAs). The 
method consisted of identifying the prevalent set of Livelihood and Farming Systems (LFS) in 
a rural area, and selecting those that are conservation-friendly, and potentially easily adopted 
by local people. Data from the Niassa National Reserve (NNR), the largest PA in Mozambique 
 
5 Corresponding author. Universidade Lúrio, Faculty of Agricultural Science (FCA), Sanga University Campus, Niassa 
Province, Mozambique; E-mail addresses: ambanze@unilurio.ac.mz, aires.banze@gmail.com (A.A. Mbanze). 
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were used to frame the LFS approach. The effort of harvesting NTFPs and agriculture inputs 
and outputs were collected from 329 households through a structured survey. Cluster analysis 
was performed to assess different LFS. A Multinomial Logistic Model (MLM), was also 
applied to understand drivers of LFS. Based on the cluster results, we have identified livelihood 
systems (LS) of gatherers, hunters, farmers and employees; and three specialized farming 
systems (FS) of maize, rice and sorghum, and one mixed FS. Livelihood systems were mainly 
driven by socio-economic factors, while FS were driven by biophysical conditions. Households 
who were employed and had diversified farming and off-farming activities, were better off and 
more resilient to climate changes and crop raiding animals. Intensification appears to occur 
gradually but was lowered by rainfall availability. Based on our findings, we propose that 
conservation experts and policy-makers should use LFS approach to re-frame the conservation 
narrative in PAs of DCs and promote existing practices that can better protect biodiversity and 
improve the livelihoods and welfare of local people.     
Keywords: Developing countries, Drivers, Farming and livelihood systems, Local people 
                  and Protected Areas. 
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4.1. Introduction  
There are ongoing efforts to lower environmental degradation worldwide (Peterman et al., 
2013). However, those efforts are even more challenging in Developing Countries (DCs); (Brister, 2016; 
Cooney et al., 2017), where conservation policies and strategies are frequently focused on reducing 
biodiversity loss, especially the loss of endangered species (Gaillard et al., 2019; Galvin et al., 2006), 
rather than on human behaviours that are the core drivers of environmental and Ecosystem Services (ES) 
degradation (Jew et al., 2019). 
In uninhabited Protected Areas (PAs), management efforts toward reducing biodiversity loss 
have generated the expected results (Beale et al., 2013), unlike of many inhabited PAs where the local 
people are the core agente of ES use (Baral and Heinen, 2007; Bluwstein and Lund, 2016). In these 
areas, a significant share of the land is managed by small farmers, foresters, hunters, fishermen and 
gatherers of provisioning services such as woodfuel, bushmeat and honey (Beale et al., 2013). Thus, 
management decisions are largely driven by market, policies, and biophysical and socioeconomic 
conditions, rather than achieving conservation goals (Kramer et al., 2009). For conservation policies and 
strategies to be effective, they need to fundamentally shift their focus from directly managing 
ecosystems to managing the behaviour of economic agents, so that they can choose the available options 
that deliver both better conservation results and improved well-being. This requires acquiring 
knowledge about: (1) the management options available in the area; (2) the key drivers that lead agents 
to choose between different options (Alemayehu et al., 2018); and (3) those options that can be selected 
to promote conservation. This knowledge will enable conservation authorities and PAs managers to 
design conservation policies and strategies that act on the drivers of  people’s choices and hereby 
promote those options that have the highest conservation value. 
A promising approach to identify the existing management options available to local economic 
agents is to identify the farming systems (FS) occurring within the PA (Ribeiro et al., 2014). For this 
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purpose, a FS is seen as a group of farms that are similar regarding the way they merge inputs (land, 
labor, and means of production, e.g. fertilizers),  with a similar mix of cropping and livestock activities 
(sub-systems), to reach a similar bundle of agricultural outputs (Dixon, 2019; Ferraton and Touzard, 
2009; Reboul, 2009). A FS approach can be applied to specific farm-level data on inputs and outputs, 
to identify a local typology of FS and to select the best available options for local land managers.  
Moreover, alongside farming, there are other relevant options (e.g. hunting, fishing or gathering) 
to generate income and subsistence (Dixon, 2019). Those alternatives are sometimes be even more 
important for ecosystem management and conservation, as is the case in many PAs of DCs (Dehghani 
Pour et al., 2017). Thus, FS can be seen as a part (or subsystem) of a broader livelihood system (LS) 
category, which comprises all possible income-generating activities (Alemayehu et al., 2018; Dixon, 
2019). In this case, we should identify both a broader typology of livelihood systems, for all households 
and a more detailed typology of FS, for those who are farmers. These two typologies would provide us 
with a richer picture of the most dominant management options available for local economic agents 
within PAs. 
Defining existing Livelihood and Farming Systems (LFS) can provide us with a system-based 
approach that better captures available options for policy proposals rather than defining individual 
practices,  because households practice a specific LFS to achieve a common goal. Management decisions 
based on individual practices are then best understood as system of strongly inter-related practices that 
respond to biophysical constraints (Staal et al., 2002), and environment and socioeconomic opportunities 
(Dixon et al., 2001; Maru et al., 2018; van de Steeg et al., 2010). For example, if endemic diseases (e.g. 
animal trypanosomiasis) (Auty et al., 2016), or potential predation of livestock hinder livestock raising 
(Kuiper et al., 2015), local people will be more dependent on bushmeat to accomplish their protein 
needs; likewise, if crop raiding by wild fauna prevents households from strongly investing in crops 
(Nyhus, 2016; Seiler and Robbins, 2016), they would be expected to rationally shift their effort either 
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to less susceptible crops (Aylor et al., 2016; Lemessa et al., 2013) or to other off-farming practices such 
as gathering of NTFPs (Dickman, 2010). Second, choices on individual practices are interdependent on 
each other. For example: using a genetically improved and more productive variety of rice would entail 
using more intensive FS.  Third, the fact that practices are interdependent within the LFS (Alemayehu 
et al., 2018) may allow to infer farm-level management details with important conservation impacts (e.g. 
harvest dates, or use of pesticides). Fourth, the fact that these practices exist, means that the existing LS 
and FS are clearly real management options for local households. Thus, enhancing the existing ones will 
be much easier, rather than challenging farmers to abruptly change their secular habits. 
Four  aspects of wildlife conservation and management in PAs of DCs  are highlighted in this 
this paper: (i) PAs of DCs are a keystone for biodiversity conservation worldwide (Macdonald et al., 
2012; Saura et al., 2017; WWF, 2012) as they are crucial for sustainable development strategies, 
supporting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Snyman and Bricker, 2016); 
(ii) In the richest biodiversity hotspots, there are significant  numbers of people dependent on the ES of 
those areas (Dewees et al., 2010; Jew et al., 2016) and most of their daily practices contribute to 
biodiversity loss (Dikgang and Muchapondwa, 2012; Naidu and Kumar, 2016). For instance, the 
expansion of farmland has been pointed to as the main  driver of terrestrial biodiversity loss (Meyfroidt 
and Lambin, 2008), particularly, in tropical forests of DCs (Galvin et al., 2006; Twongyirwe et al., 
2018). A possible solution would be intensify agriculture production to avoid farmland expansion (the 
land-sparing option) (Hockings and McLennan, 2012). However, it may be blocked by biophysical 
constraints (e.g. low rainfall, nutrient-poor soils) (Staal et al., 2002) and lack of appropriate 
technologies; (iii) Farmers in PA of DCs are vulnerable to crop raiding, predation of livestock and 
endemic diseases affecting livestock, which  can be major drivers  in the choice for LFS (Aylor et al., 
2016;  Seiler and Robbins, 2016). Human-wildlife conflicts (HWC), may induce local people to become 
involved in illegal hunting of the wild animals that cause crop damages (Moreto, 2019; Rogan et al., 
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2017) or to cooperate with poachers coming from outside the PA (Dickman and Hazzah, 2015; Shepherd 
and Magnus, 2004). This usually occurs when PA authorities do not deliver a solution  or sufficient 
levels of benefit to offset uneconomical levels of agricultural output loss to crop-raiding (Moreto, 2019); 
(iv) Local economic agents in PA of DCs are among the poorest people on Earth (Bieber-Klemm et al., 
2006; Snyman and Bricker, 2016), and acute food insecurity problems persist within these PAs (den 
Braber et al., 2018; NCP, 2017). This means that no conservation policy or strategy will work without 
explicitly addressing need for development, food security, and health challenges.  
FS and LS analysis have been used to frame these problems (Dixon et al., 2001). Particular 
solutions have been put forward, such as diversification of FS into cash crops, intensification of FS 
(Alemayehu et al., 2018; Aylor et al., 2016; Seiler and Robbins, 2016), and diversification of LS to off-
farming (Alemayehu et al., 2018; Dickman, 2010; Smith et al., 2017), and non-gathering activities 
(Lindsey et al., 2017), such as promotion of eco-tourism (Snyman and Bricker, 2016) or public 
employment in PA-related activities.  
In this research, we used LFS approach to frame the existing conservation problems in the 
Niassa National Reserve (NNR), which is a typical example of the above contextualized problem in PAs 
of DCs. By identifying (1) the available management options for local economic agents; and (2) the 
factors that drive these agents’ choice of LS and FS, this approach is aimed to assist policymakers with 
appropriate measures, which can be used to design and implement more effective conservation policies 
and strategies in PAs  of DCs.  
Some specific questions addressed by this research are:  
i) Which land management options among the exiting LFS offer a higher potential for 
diversification and intensification strategies aimed at improving livelihoods and local food 
security, and which are the factors driving local agents to choose these options? 
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ii) Which LFS has the potential to mitigate crop raiding and other negative impacts on 
biodiversity conservation and local resident livelihoods and thereby reduce HWC in the 
NNR? 
 
iii) Are there any factors that contribute to agricultural intensification or land expansion in the 
NNR? What are the implications of agricultural intensification and expansion for local 
agents and biodiversity conservation?  
 
iv) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the LFS approach and implications for nature 
conservation policies in the NNR and other PAs of DCs?  
These questions were addressed through a structured survey of households in seven villages located 
inside the NNR. Householders were asked about different topics related to their LS and FS, losses from 
crop raiding and their socio-economic and demographic profile. 
  
4.2. Methodology 
4.2.1. Site location and characterization  
NNR is located in northern Mozambique, between coordinates: 12°38′48.67″S; 11°27′05.83″S and 
36°25′21.16″E; 38°30′23.74″E (see Figure 1). It is the largest PA in Mozambique and the third largest 
in Africa (Prin et al., 2014; Ribeiro et al., 2008). The reserve covers 42,200 km2 (Prin et al., 2014; 
Ribeiro et al., 2008; SRN, 2008), of which over 34,000 km2  are occupied by concession blocks with 
additional block up for tender in 2019 (Sociedade de Gestão da Reserva do Niassa (SGRN, 2004)).   
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Figure 4.1. The location of the Niassa National Reserve and the surveyed villages.  
 
The current human population is of about 60,000 residents (NCP, 2017), most of them suffering 
from chronic food insecurity and little access to basic social services. They rely primarily on subsistence 
agriculture, bushmeat hunting, harvesting of NTFPs, including fishing and honey gathering and illegal 
trade of natural resources, since there are few legal alternatives (NCP, 2017). Agriculture is practiced in 
small plots of 0.4 to 2 hectares called "machambas" (Landry and Chirwa, 2011). Soils in the reserve are 
essentially poor and poorly drained (Campbell, 1996; Dewees et al., 2010). Land preparation includes 
slash-and-burn practices that exacerbate the soil’s impoverishment and reducing productivity. These 
lands are subsequently abandoned after two to four years of cultivation due to lack of essential nutrients 
(NCP, 2017). Land preparation starts three months before the rainy season, that ranges from November 
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to April. In this  hot dry period most of the vegetation is dry and  prone to  wild fires (Mbanze et al., 
2015). Rainfall follows west-east gradient, with about 1200 mm average annually in the west and 600 
mm in the east. Temperatures are typically high, with monthly averages reaching around 300C in October 
and November, and dropping to 20-260C in the cold dry season  or  winter (SRN, 2008). Crop and 
livestock raiding  by wild animals  is relatively common (Jorge et al., 2013), and the frequency of raids 
threatens food security of local residents (NCP, 2018) 
4.2.2. Data collection 
Data were collected in seven villages within the reserve (Figure 1 and Table 1). Villages were 
selected after literature review and meeting with the NNR administration, Mecula district government, 
and the Niassa Carnivore Project. This last one, is a NGO operating in northeastern Mozambique to 
secure large carnivores across NNR in partnership with NNR administration and managing 58,000 
hectares of concession area within the NNR in partnership with a local community. In this study, a 
village is defined by the spatial extent of households associated with a village name under the leadership 
of one village chairperson (Mackenzie, 2012), which is the lowest administrative unit in Mozambique. 
A survey was conducted from July to September 2017. During this period, 339 householders were 
interviewed representing a sampling effort of 21.07% out of the total households in the seven villages 
sampled.  
Table 4.1. Number of households sampled per village  
Villages 
Number of households 
in the village 
Number of households 
sampled 
Sampling effort (%) 
Chamba 50 42 84 
Macalange 132 45 34.10 
Matondovela  77 52 67.53 
Mbamba 141 62 43.97 
Mecula 908 56 6.17 
Mucoria 131 42 32.06 
Naulala 170 40 23.53 
TOTAL  1609 339 21.07 
Source: National census (2015) available at district level. 
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4.2.2.1. Household survey 
 
The questionnaire had four sections: 1) general information, which included the location and 
size of the village; 2) socio-economic background of the household (household size, employment status, 
income and education); 3) agricultural outputs in the last season (crop harvest and losses for crop 
raiding), rank of the four top raiding species according to potential loss, proportion of the harvest of 
each crop that was sold and market prices, and 4) gathering effort related to NTFPs (frequency of 
harvesting and its final propose, either for use or sale, quantities and prices if households remembered). 
We did not measure the size of farming area to get (yield/ha) as most of agriculture fields were not closer 
to the villages, and households were not able to show their farming borders within time and logistical 
constraints. The questionnaire was pre-tested with 10 householders in the Mbamba village and 
administered to respondents in collaboration with four field assistants and two young locals, who were 
familiar with the local languages (Cyao, Emakua and Swahili). 
 
4.2.3. Data Analysis  
4.2.3.1. Agriculture production and prices  
All agricultural outputs and losses were transformed into monetary value and percentage 
to express the quantities in physical terms and thus, allow comparison between farms, LFS and 
across villages. The average price of each crop (in new metical MZN)6 was estimated based on 
figures provided by the surveyed households (see section 4 in Appendix A), by dividing the 
total revenue of crop sold to its respective quantities. This price, was subsequently used to 
derivate the Partial Expected Production (PEP) of each crop in monetary values. The PEP was 
 
6 New metical (MZN) is the Mozambican currency. One US dollar ($1), is equivalent to 63.98 MZN. One British Pound (1£) is 
equal to 82.97 MZN, while one Euro (1€) is equivalent to 71.87 MZN.  
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then summed to obtain Total Expected Agriculture Production (TEAPi). We also estimated 
Actual Crop Production (ACPi) (by removing losses from crop raiding from the TEAP), and 
the Proportion of Crop Sold (PCS), as a ration between the amount of crop sold in MZN, by the 
Actual Crop Production (PCS/ACPi).  
4.2.3.2. Typology of Livelihood Systems and Livelihood-System patterns of different villages 
Gathering effort and effort by gathering activity 
The frequency of participation of the respondent’s household in each gathering activity 
was estimated based on the selection of a specified frequency class option in the section 4 of 
the questionnaire: 365 days/year were allocated for those that selected the daily option; 52 
days/year for the weekly option; 12 days/year for the monthly option; 2 days/year for the 
semester option; and 1 day/year for the yearly option. This allocation of days/year was done for 
all 10 gathering activities included in the questionnaire, yielding 10 indicators of yearly 
gathering effort per activity. By summing frequencies across all activities, we got the total 
number of days per year in all gathering activities, which can be interpreted as a rough 
estimation of total yearly gathering effort. These indicators of gathering effort per activity 
(GEAi, where i is the activity index) and total gathering effort (TGE) were then divided by the 
total expected agricultural production of the household (TEAP, in metical/year) to express 
gathering effort in proportion to agricultural output (days/metical); that is GEAi/TEAP for each 
gathering activity and TGE/TEAP for all gathering activities. These ratios can be interpreted as 
the relative importance of gathering as compared to agriculture.  
The crop raiding index 1, which predicts the potential damage that is likely to occur at farm 
level, was based on the top four crop raiding species (elephants, buffalo, baboons and bushpigs), 
ranked by the surveyed households (Ranki, where i vary from 1 to 4). The class of potential 
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damage of each crop raiding (C), was taken from the literature (Mackenzie, 2012; Tufa et al., 
2018) and author personal experience. Elephants and buffalos were considered the most 
damaging animal (𝐶= 2), followed by baboons and bushpigs (𝐶 =1).  
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔1 = ∑ 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑖
4
𝑖=1
   (𝑒𝑞. 1) 
Crop raiding index 1 was then compared to Crop raiding index 2, which is the fauna density 
reported in the NNR management plan at blocks level (SRN, 2008). We used both indexes, 
because (i) Crop raiding index 2 is likely out of date, as the last fauna inventory in our 
possession, was conducted in 2005; (ii) the inventory was not conducted at the village level to 
cover damages reported by households, and (iii) there are  plenty of reports highlighting 
decreases of wild animal in the reserve in the lasts 10 years, especially for elephants (Booth, 
Vernon R.; Dunham, 2014; Brennan and Kalsi, 2015; Jorge et al., 2013). 
Developing a livelihood system typology 
To identify different livelihood systems, we classified all surveyed households 
according to their main sources of income and their relative weights in the total (monetary and 
in-kind) income of the household. The relative weight of these sources of income was measured 
in different ways for the different major income-generating activities, depending on data we 
had access to. First, all households that (1) employed and depended only on wages earned, (2) 
have not been involved in gathering activities, and (3) had not been running a farm were 
included in the “Employees” category. All other households were included in a cluster analysis 
based on ratios of gathering effort per activity (and total gathering effort) and, to total expected 
agricultural production, that is GEAi/TEAP for each gathering activity and TGE/TEAP for all 
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gathering activities. Only four GEAi/TEAP variables were used (i= traditional medicines, 
firewood, edible insects and bushmeat) because many other gathering activities, such as 
gathering poles, stakes, bamboos or grass for roofing are very much linked to building or 
repairing activities, which for the same household, can vary very much across years and thus, 
are not good structural indicators of the household economy.  A hierarchical cluster analysis 
was performed based on the Ward´s method and Minkowski measure of dissimilarity. 
Livelihood-system patterns across villages 
To describe the LS pattern of each village, a cross-tabulation of LS and villages was 
performed to verify whether the null hypothesis of similar patterns of LS across villages can be 
rejected. After detecting significant relationship, a Post Hoc cellwise test was performed to find 
out which livelihood systems are above/below what would be expected by chance in each 
village (García-Pérez and Núñez-Antón, 2003; Sharpe, 2015). 
4.2.3.3. Developing Farming System typology and patterns across villages 
The fraction between Partial Expected Production and Total Expected Agriculture 
Production (PEPi/TEAPi) *100, was used to develop the typology of FS, besed on the 
agriculture crops (see Appendix 1, section 3). Fish and honey were assigned in the farming 
system category, despite being NTFPs (see section 4 in the Appendix 1) because: (i) we have 
captured quantities and price at household level, since a considerable number of households 
declared to sell a part of their production; and  (ii) they are very profitable activities, with some 
households devoting a large portion of their time doing those activities, as there is a local  
market available. For instance, a litter of honey can cost up to $2 USD dollars in the local 
market (NCP, 2017). 
109 
 
 
Development of Farming System typology 
The proportion of the dominant crop in the FS was used to assign FS. By convention, 
we designated specialized FS when the proportion of the dominant crop was more or equal to 
50% of the TEAPi while mixed FS were those with no clear dominant crop in the system. FS 
were assessed through Cluster Analysis on the household data of PEPi/TEAPi performed based 
on the ward´s method and Minkowski measuring of dissimilarities.  
Farming System patterns across villages 
To describe FS pattern at village level, a cross-tabulation between FS and villages was 
assembled and tested to verify whether the null hypothesis of similar patterns of FS across 
villages can be rejected. Post Hoc cellwise test was performed to find out which FS are 
above/below of what would be expected by chance in each village (García-Pérez and Núñez-
Antón, 2003; Sharpe, 2015). 
4.2.3.4.Predictors and drivers of Livelihood and Farming Systems  
Predictors and drivers of LFS were grouped as: (i) socio-economic (size of the family, 
level of education of the household head, total population per village, distance to the nearest 
market, and crop sold by the household). Crop sold was coded as dummy variable (1= if 
household sold crop and 0 = otherwise). The Proportion of Crop Lost per Farm (PCLF) was the 
ratio between total monetary losses and Total Expected Agriculture Production (TEAPi); and 
(ii) biophysical drivers (availability of flatland for agriculture and average annual rainfall). The 
percentage of flatland suitable for rice cultivation (with slope between 0 – 2%) was derived 
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from NNR Digital Terrain Model (DTM)7, using a 4 Km buffer from the centre of each village 
(excludes mountains and rivers). Table 2 provides detailed information on all predictors and 
drivers of LFS. 
Table 4.2. Predictors and drivers of Livelihood and Farming System in the NNR 
Variable name/code  Type  
Unity of 
measuring/Class Min-Max Mean ±SE 
Livelihood system   
Household size  Numerical  NA  1 - 15 4.93±2.05 
Education Ordinal  7 classes  Illiterate (0) – BSc (6) 1±1.11 
Crop lost  Numerical   % 35 – 66.0 45.32±9.79 
Crop sold   categorical  dummy 0 -1  NA 
Farming system  
Flatland Numerical   % 5.8 - 33.40    18.87±0.45 
Distance to the market Numerical   Hours (h) 0.00 – 7.00  4.52±3.04 
Total population Numerical   NA  234 – 13173  3064.86±4804.35 
Rainfall Numerical  mm 1040.05 – 1867.0 1241.35±259.81 
 
4.2.3.4. Model of Livelihood and Farming Systems  
A Multinomial Logistic Model (MLM) was applied to investigate the importance of 
each predictor and driver of LS and FS. The importance of the variables in the fitted model was 
detected based on the log-likelihood, likelihood ratio, Nagelkerke and Cox&Snell Pseudo R-
square. Predictors were selected based on its significance in the model and possible meaningful 
interpretation. The importance of each predictor included in the modelwas assessed at p ≤ 0.05 
level of significance. 
4.2.3.5. Effect of rainfall and population in agriculture intensification  
 
7 https://www.eorc.jaxa.jp/ALOS/en/aw3d30/   
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Since it was not possible to capture the yield of each crop per unit area (hectare), an 
artifact was applied to have a broad idea regarding to the effect of population growth and rainfall 
in the agriculture intensification.  The artifact consisted on building a diagram of total 
population at village level and rainfall vs the average number of households fed per hectare of 
cropland. The agricultural intensity was measured in people/hectare, as the ratio between the 
average household size with a farm and the total cropland area. The resort of secondary data 
from National Agricultural Census (Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE, 2011)), provided 
information about the average cropland area per household head at the village level.  
4.2.3.6. Losses from crop raiding and their patterns across villages and LFS  
The percentage of crop lost was a ratio between crop lost from crop raiding and Partial 
Expected Production (PEPi). Those individual ratios were then expanded to FS and villages 
levels in order to understand whether crop raiding influence LFS strategies (e.g. what crop to 
plant or to shift to off-farming activities). To depict the interrelation among LFS, potential 
damage from crop raiding (crop raiding indexes), losses from crop raiding (actual damage), and 
the effect of protect crops with electro-fence at village level. A comparable measure was created 
by transforming potential and actual damage into ordinal indexes (lower, middle and high). 
This procedure allowed us to have a broader picture of how a set of farms within a village 
perceive the available options to overcome crop raiding. 
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4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Livelihood Systems and their village-level patterns  
Four LS have been identified in the NNR: gatherers, hunters, farmers, and employees 
(Table 3). Gatherers exhibiting the highest level of gathering effort in proportion to agricultural 
output, except for bush meat, their average expected agricultural production is relatively small. 
They represent a small fraction of households in the sample (8%), but reaching significant 
proportion (up to 20%) in Mbamba and Naulala villages. Hunters have the highest level of 
hunting effort in proportion to agriculture and levels of gathering effort higher than farmers for 
all other gathering activities. Hunters have the smallest expected agricultural output and 
household size representing overall slightly more than 1/3 of all households, but they reach 70% 
in Mucoria. Farmers have the lowest levels of effort in each and all gathering activities in 
proportion to agricultural output. They have the largest average agricultural output and 
household size. Employees, who depend mostly on wages are 10 years younger than all other 
LS types and they held the highest education level. Moreover, the employees predominantly 
live in the Mecula village and have the lowest level of both crop raiding indexes. They represent 
less than 5% of the households, except in Mecula where they reach 18%.  
All variables that have been used to describe livelihood systems (except age) are 
significantly different across livelihood types (α<0.05). However, only in the cases of the ratios 
of overall gathering effort and firewood gathering effort to agriculture, the proportion of 
variance across types is clearly higher than the variance within types (Eta2 > 0.50). 
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Table 4.3. Livelihood systems, their characteristics, and village-level patterns  
 
Gatherers  Hunters Farmers  Employees Total 
 
 
 8,0% 35.1% 52.2% 4.7% N=339  
Alf (α) Eta2 Gathering effort per activity and total gathering effort in proportion of total 
expected agricultural production (GEAi/TEAP) 
Traditional 
Medicines  
0.17 0.04 0.01 - 0.036 0.000*** 0.075 
Firewood  2.83 0.54 0.16 - 0.524 0.000*** 0.719 
Edible Insects  0.04 0.01 0.00 - 0.006 0.000*** 0.072 
Bush meat  0.01 0.04 0.01 - 0.018 0.000*** 0.051 
Total gathering 
effort (all 
activities)  
3.81 1.06 0.27 - 0.859 0.000*** 0.746 
 Description of average household per livelihood system 
Farm economic 
size (TEAP in 
metical/year) 
6777 5657 11805 - 9120 0.007** 0.031 
Household size 4.9 4.4 5.3 4.6 4.9 0.001*** 0.047 
Age 43 42 44 34 43 0.057 0.022 
Education level low low low high low 0.000*** 0.195 
Distance to the 
Market 
4.6 4.4 4.6 2.1 4.4 0.023* 0.028 
Crop riding (1) 15.6 15.2 15.3 13.9 15.2 0.000*** 0.066 
Crop riding (2) 4.4 4.0 4.3 3.5 4.17 0.001** 0.047 
Proportions of different livelihood systems in each village (%)       N   
Chamba 4.8 31.0 59.5 4.8 42   
        
Macalange 4.4 24.4 68.9 2.2 45   
        
Matondovela 0.0  30.8 65.4 3.8 52   
 -       
Mbamba 14.5 38.7 45.2 1.6 62   
 +       
Mecula 8.9 30.4 42.9 17.9 56   
    +++    
Mucoria 2.4 69.0 28.6 0.0 42   
  +++ -     
Naulala 20.0 22.5 57.5 0.0 40   
 ++       
Total Villages  8.0% 35.1% 52.2% 4.7% 339   
Note: α = ***; ** and * is significant at 0.1%, 1% and 5%, respectively. Low education is primary school, while high 
education 
           ranges from secondary to graduation school. Proportions of different livelihood systems in each village was performed 
           based on the Person’s exact Chi-Square with significance at 0.1% (α = 0. 000). Values into brackets represents the  
           percentage of household in the livelihood system per village. The signals plus (+) and minus (-) indicate relation or no 
          relation between villages and livelihood systems. +|-; ++|- - and +++|---, significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.  
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4.3.1.1. Predictors of Livelihood System choice 
 
The fact that: (1) there are significant differences across LS at household and village-
level attributes that have not been used in the cluster analysis, and (2) there is a clear geographic 
pattern of LS at the village level; suggest  that households choice of LS can be associated to 
household and village-related variables that can be interpreted as either drivers (opportunities 
and constraints) or consequences of LS choice. Thus, we use here the terms predictor or co-
variate for these variables in order to postpone this interpretation for the discussion. 
The estimated multinomial logit model of LS choice is presented in Table 4. The size 
of household and the fact that he/her sold agriculture output are negatively and significantly (P 
< 0.01) related to Hunters as compared to the Farmers. The village-level proportion of crop lost 
to wild fauna and selling agricultural output are also negative and significant (P < 0.01) 
predictors of Gatherers in comparison to the Farmers. Eventually, education is a positive and 
significant (P < 0.001) predictor of Employees livelihood.  
 
Table 4.4. Multinomial logistic regression model of livelihood system choice  
Livelihood system Drivers  
Coefficient 
B 
Std. 
Error Z-values Alf (α) Exp(B) 
H
u
n
te
r
s 
 Intercept 3.195 0.806 15.735 0.000*** 
 
Household size  -0.236 0.069 11.775 0.001** 0.790 
Education -0.096 0.120 0.639 0.424NS 0.909 
Crop lost  -0.027 0.014 3.618 0.057NS 0.973 
Crop sold = Yes  -1.995 0.282 50.146 0.000*** 0.136 
G
a
th
er
e
rs
  Intercept 3.606 1.359 7.040 0.008** 
 
Household size  -0.100 0.102 0.951 0.330NS 0.905 
Education -0.293 0.216 1.835 0.176NS 0.746 
Crop lost  -0.079 0.028 7.944 0.005** 0.924 
Crop sold = Yes  -2.242 0.479 21.955 0.000** 0.106 
E
m
p
lo
y
ee
s 
 Intercept -1.870 2.225 0.706 0.401NS 
 
Household size  -0.187 0.153 1.507 0.220NS 0.829 
Education 1.106 0.250 19.601 0.000*** 3.022 
Crop lost  -0.021 0.043 0.232 0.630NS 0.979 
Crop sold = Yes  -22.149 0.000 
  
2.403*109 
Note: Farmers is the reference category; α = *** is significant at 0.1%, ** = 1%, * = 5%, NS = not significant. 
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           Model fit (log-likelihood = 550.28); likelihood ratio test (Chi-square = 157.72, α =0.000). Number of observations =  
           339; Pseudo R-squared (Nagelkerke = 0.42, Cox and Snell = 0.37). 
 
Reading these results for the reference category in the model (farmers), we verify that increasing 
the size of the household raises the likelihood that a household chooses Farmers livelihood as opposed 
to the Hunters one. Having sold agricultural outputs increases the likelihood to be a Farmer as opposed 
to Hunter or Gatherer. Finally, a higher proportion of crop lost to crop raiding, is positively associated 
to Farmers.  
4.3.2. Farming systems and their village-level patterns  
 
Four farming systems (FS) have been identified in the NNR (Table 5): (i) the 
Specialized Maize, where maize represents nearly ¾ of the total expected production; (ii) the 
Specialized Rice, with rice representing approximately 50% of the total expected production; 
(iii) the Mixed Crops, where there is no clear dominant crop, but maize represents almost 1/3 
of the total expected production, followed by peanuts (12%) and cowpeas (11%); and (iv) the 
Specialized Sorghum FS, where sorghum represents more than half of the total expected 
production. Approximately 29% of all farms in our sample practice the Specialized Maize, a 
figure that raises to 40% in Chamba and 68% in Matondovela. About 25% are specialized in 
Rice, which raises to 43% in Chamba and 48% in Macalange. The Mixed Crops FS is the most 
frequent in the reserve (40%), which raises to 59% in Mbamba and 90% in Mucoria. And only 
7% of the farms are Specialized in Sorghum, a figure that rises to 16% in Mbamba and 23% in 
Naulala. 
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Table 4.5. Farming systems (FS), their characteristics and village-level patterns  
 
Specialized 
Maize 
Specialized 
Rice 
Mixed 
Crops 
Specialized 
Sorghum 
Total 
  
Crop 
93  
(28.8) 
80  
(24.8) 
128 
(39.6) 
22  
(6.8) 
323 
 (100.0) 
Alf (α) Eta2 
Partial Expected Production of each crop in proportion to the Total Expected Production 
(PEP/TEAP in %) 
Maize  71.2 31.6 32.0 19.9 42.4 0.000*** 0.598 
Peanut  1.2 2.0 11.7 8.0 6.0 0.000*** 0.212 
Cassava  4.0 5.7 4.6 4.6 4.7 0.702NS 0.004 
Rice  13.5 48.8 7.5 7.5 19.5 0.000*** 0.644 
Cowpea 1.9 1.4 10.5 0.7 5.1 0.000*** 0.166 
Pea 1.4 1.5 5.6 3.6 3.2 0.001** 0.047 
Sorghum  1.9 2.6 8.9 53.2 8.3 0.000*** 0.670 
Millet  0.1 0.1 3.1 0.3 1.3 0.001** 0.050 
Sesame 1.3 2.3 5.3 0.9 3.1 0.003** 0.043 
Sweet potato 1.2 1.3 2.3 0.1 1.6 0.253NS 0.013 
Vegetables  1.9 0.6 3.1 0.0 1.9 0.033* 0.027 
Tobacco 0.0 1.2 2.5 0.0 1.3 0.106NS 0.019 
Honey  0.4 0.2 2.5 1.0 1.2 0.019* 0.031 
Fish  0.2 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.558NS 0.006 
Proportions of different farming systems in each village (%) N   
Chamba  40.0 42.5 17.5 0.0 40 
 + ++ -- -  
Macalange  31.8 47.7 20.5 0.0 44 
  ++ -- -  
Matondovela  68.0 22.0 8.0 2.0 50 
 +++  ---   
Mbamba  13.1 11.5 59 16.4 61 
 -- -- ++ ++  
Mecula  30.4 30.4 39.1 0.0 46 
    -  
Mucoria  2.4 2.4 90.5 4.8 42 
 -- -- +++   
Naulala  15.0 22.5 40.0 22.5 40 
 -   ++  
Total  28.8 24.8 39.6 6.8 323 
Note: α = *** is significant at 0.1%, ** = significant at 1%, * = significant at 5%, NS = not significant. The proportion of  
          each villages and FS were performed based on the Person’s exact Chi-Square with significance at 0.1% (α = 0.  
           000). The signals plus (+) and minus (-) indicate positive or negative relation between villages and livelihood systems. 
           +|-; ++|- - and +++|---, significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.  
      
 
All main variables that characterize FS (proportions of maize, rice, and sorghum in the 
total expected production) are significantly (p < 0.001) different across FS. The proportion of 
variance across FS for all these three variables are high, represents more than half of total 
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variance (squared ETA ≥ 0.60). Maize and rice are relevant crops in others FS, in addition to 
the FS they characterize.  
4.3.2.1. Predictors of Farming System choice 
The estimated multinomial logistic model of FS choice is represented in table 6. The 
availability of flatland and rainfall were the main drivers for choosing either the Specialized 
Maize or Rice FS as opposed to the Mixed Crops FS (α = 0.000). The increases of population 
in the village, significantly (α = 0.000) reduces the likelihood of choosing the Specialized Maize 
or Rice FS in relation to the Mixed Crops, that is: population growth would press for 
diversification of activities rather than specialization.  
 
Table 4.6. Multinomial logistic regression model of farming system choice 
FS Drivers  
Coefficients 
(B) Std. Error Z-Value Sig (α) Exp(B) 
Specialized 
rice 
Intercept -32.463 5.031 41.644 0.000***   
Proportion of 
flatland  
0.270 0.044 38.426 0.000*** 1.310 
Distance to the 
market 
-0.091 0.071 1.643 0.200NS 0.913 
Total population -0.004 0.001 41.932 0.000*** 0.996 
Rainfall 0.025 0.004 41.710 0.000*** 1.026 
Specialized 
maize 
Intercept -38.552 4.891 62.131 0.000***   
Proportion of 
flatland 
0.270 0.044 37.383 0.000*** 1.310 
Distance to the 
market 
0.084 0.069 1.480 0.224NS 1.088 
Total population -0.004 0.001 59.786 0.000*** 0.996 
Rainfall 0.030 0.004 62.814 0.000*** 1.031 
Specialized 
sorghum  
Intercept 12.775 13.455 0.902 0.342   
Proportion of 
Flatland  
-0.039 0.079 0.249 0.618NS 0.961 
Distance to the 
market 
0.358 0.195 3.369 0.066NS 1.430 
Total population 0.002 0.002 0.780 0.377NS 1.002 
Rainfall -0.015 0.011 1.784 0.182NS 0.985 
Note: Mixed Farming is the models’ reference category; α = *** is significant at 0.1%, ** = significant at 1%, * =  
          significant at 5%,  NS = not significant. Model fit (log-likelihood = 481.35); likelihood ratio test (Chi-square = 167.27, 
          α =0.000) Number of observations = 323; Pseud R-square (Nagelkerke = 0.44, Cox and Snell = 0.40)   
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Distance to the market has seemingly not a significant effect on FS choice, although 
there is an almost significant positive effect on choosing for Specialized Sorghum FS. 
Increasing rainfall reduces the likelihood of choosing the Specialized Sorghum FS as opposed 
to the Mixed Crops, an effect that is not statistically significant. There is significant (α = 0.000) 
negative effect of rainfall on the likelihood of choosing the Specialized Sorghum FS as opposed 
to the Specialized Maize or Rice FS. Likewise, population size increases the likelihood of 
choosing the Specialized Sorghum FS as opposed to the Mixed crops, an effect that is not 
statistically significant. However, there is a significant (α = 0.000) positive effect of population 
on the likelihood of choosing the Specialized Sorghum FS as opposed to the Specialized maize 
or rice FS. 
4.3.3. Population size, rainfall levels and agricultural intensity  
Figure 2 represents the effects of population size and rainfall on agriculture intensity. It 
can be observed that in the four villages with higher rainfall (rainfall ≥ 1185 mm) there is a 
trend suggesting that increased population is pressing for agricultural intensification, that is, 
raising the ratio of people fed per hectare of cropland. Mecula, which is by far the largest 
population size, has also the highest agricultural intensity level which is additionally supported 
by the highest rainfall level when compared to ther villages in the studied areas. However, the 
demographic pressure for agricultural intensification seems to be also present in Matondovela 
with a much lower rainfall level. It is also relevant to note that, agricultural intensity seems to 
increase with population size in a much less than proportional way, suggesting technology is 
constraining intensification.  
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On the other hand, in the three villages with lower rainfall (rain < 1120 mm) the trend in 
agricultural intensity seems to be more constrained by insufficient water than promoted by 
population growth. 
 
Figure 4.2. Effect of population growth in agriculture intensification in the seven surveyed villages in Niassa 
                  National Reserve. Rainfall is the major limiting factor for intensification, especially for those villages  
                  where the predominant FS is specialized sorghum.  
 
 
 
 
4.3.4. Proportion of agricultural output lost to crop raiding  
Table 7 presents the proportion of agricultural output perceived to be lost to crop raiding 
at FS level. Overall losses were about 46% of the total expected production. The highest losses 
correspond to cowpea (62%) and pea (58%), and the lowest to tobacco (21%) and sweet potato 
(34%). The Specialized Rice accounted for the heaviest average level of loss, almost half of 
total expected production, while the Specialized Sorghum FS was the one with the lightest 
average losses (38%). Vegetables (81%) followed by pea (72%) were the most raided crops in 
the Specialized Rice FS. Cowpea (57%) and rice (49%) were the most raided crops in the 
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Specialized Sorghum. The Specialized Maize FS lost more cowpea (60%) and sweet potato 
(53%) than other crops, while the Mixed Crops lost more cowpea (65%) and pea (63.2%). Thus, 
the proportion of output lost varied significantly across FS for some crops such as maize and 
vegetables. 
Table 4.7. Proportion of perceived crop lost to crop raiding per crop and farming system (in percentage of total 
                  expected production) 
 Farming system    
Crops 
Specialized 
Maize  
Specialized  
Rice  
Mixed 
Crops  
Specialized  
Sorghum 
Total Alf (α) Eta2 
Maize  45.7 50.7 47.5 37.9 46.8 0.016** 0.033 
Peanut  51.3 38.3 42.5 24.0 41.1 0.352 0.026 
Cassava  49.1 36.9 40.7 41.2 42.2 0.262 0.032 
Rice  45.2 52.7 52.3 48.5 50.9 0.173 0.024 
Cowpea  59.8 46.5 64.6 57.1 62.4 0.869 0.007 
Pea  34.0 72.1 63.2 45.3 58.2 0.101 0.091 
Sorghum  45.0 31.5 45.5 37.5 40.3 0.492 0.018 
Millet  0.0 19.0 56.2 0.0 50.9 0.281 0.122 
Sesame  28.8 30.4 41.5 14.7 36.2 0.517 0.042 
Sweet potato 53.3 38.9 24.3 25.0 33.8 0.854 0.018 
Vegetables  31.5 81.2 37.5 NA 47.4 0.022* 0.156 
Tobacco NA 22.0 19.7 NA 20.6 0.290 0.123 
Mean  45.3 48.6 46.9 37.7 46.2   
 Note: α = *** is significant at 0.1%, ** = significant at 1%, * = significant at 5%, NS = not significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.5. Patterns of losses for crop raiding across villages and its relation to LFS, potential 
damage, and protective measures 
 
Table 8 presents the disposition of LFS across villages, the levels of potential and actual 
damages, average losses and the availability of electronic fence, all at village level. The highest overall 
losses occurred in Macalange (66%) and Mucoria (53%), while the lowest losses occurred in Mbamba 
(35%) and Naulala (39%).  
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Table 4.8. Patterns of losses for crop raiding across villages and its relation to LFS, potential and actual damage 
                 and Protective measures  
 SYSTEMS  
POTENTIAL 
DAMAGE     
Villages Livelihood Farming 
Crop 
raiding 
(1) 
Crop 
raiding 
(2) 
Actual 
damage 
Losses 
(%) 
Fence 
Chamba ----- Maize & Rice Medium Medium Medium 43.6 No 
Macalange ------ Rice Medium High High 66.0 No 
Matondovela  ------ Maize High High Medium 42.6 No 
Mbamba Gatherers Mixed & Sorghum High High Low 34.8 Yes 
Mecula  Employees ----- Low Medium Medium 48.2 No 
Mucoria Hunters Mixed Medium Medium High 53.1 No 
Naulala Gatherers Sorghum High High Low 39.3 Yes 
Note: Crop raiding index (1) ranges from 13 to 17 (≤13 is low; 13<medium<16, and ≥16 is high); 
           Crop raiding index (2) ranges from 3 to 5 (≤2 is low; 2<medium<4, and ≥5 is high);  
           Actual damage, ranges from 35% to 66% (≤40% is low; 40%<medium<50%, and ≥50% is high).   
 
 
Crop raiding index (1) ranged from low to high, whereas crop raiding index (2) varied from 
medium to high. Actual damage ranged from low to medium. Gatherers, which are mostly 
specialized in Sorghum are located in Mbamba and Naulala villages and they are generally 
characterized to have high potential damage for both crop raiding indices, but the actual damage 
is low, and both villages are fenced. Specialized Maize and Rice are mostly located in Chamba, 
Macalange, and Matondovela villages. In these villages, actual and potential damage varies 
from medium to high and none are fenced. In Mucoria village, where most of the households 
are hunters, mixed FS is the most predominant, and despite medium potential damage for both 
crop raiding index, the actual damage is high, and the agriculture fields are not fenced.  
It was not possible to establish multivariate models that account for the main drivers of these 
significant losses across FS and villages, despite some efforts in that direction. In the discussion 
section, we address possible causes for it in an exploratory way and identify several hypotheses 
that require more data to be tested. 
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4.4. Discussion  
The three crops that characterize Specialized FS (maize, rice and sorghum) are also reported to 
be an important component of all FS in the Mecula district, regardless of our cluster 
classification. Maize is regarded as the dominant and widespread crop, not only in this area 
(MAE, 2005) but also in all FS of northern and central Mozambique (Dixon, 2019). Likewise, 
in our FS maize is amongst the top two most important crops, accounted for 20% of agriculture 
production in the Mixed FS of sorghum, the one with lowest maize. 
Employees are by far the only LS category who do not dependent neither on agriculture 
production nor on harvesting NTFPs. Farmers held the least gathering effort, followed by 
hunters. We would expect to detect association between specialized FS and LS of farmers, but 
it was not possible probably because specialized FS does not necessarily mean not to harvest 
NTFPs. In fact, even in the specialized FS there are households that rely heavily on NTFPs to 
cope with their daily needs. This dependence is also well documented in almost all rural villages 
and PAs of DCs (Jew et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2017). For instance,  firewood and charcoal are 
the main sources of energy provision for cook and heat in African rural and urban areas 
(Baumert et al., 2016; Vollmer et al., 2017; Woollen et al., 2016). Likewise, in our LS firewood 
revealed to be the most important NTFPs, based on the harvest effort.  
Bushmeat and traditional medicines are also of huge demand in the NNR, but not in the same 
proportion as firewood. One can infer that, hunters and farmers accounted together over 90% 
of the total households because the abundance and proximity to NTFPs may lead to the 
household neglect the effort they committed to harvest NTFPs, since it also widespread and 
traditional practice to delegate this task to young people  or harvesting by their own while comes 
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back from agricultural field or water catchment. The strong communal relationships that 
characterized most of rural areas of DCs,  with open space for sharing of provisioning services, 
especially traditional medicine and firewood (Boafo et al., 2016), was not presented here in the  
respondent’s answers. However, we are confident this did not affect our results, as we were 
more interested in the time/effort that households spend to collect NTFPs, as an opportunity 
cost of agriculture activity.   
4.4.1. Drivers and Predictors of LFS choice and its effect on agriculture intensification 
Livelihood system were mostly related to socio-economic drivers at household level, whereas 
FS were driven by biophysical factors at the village level, suggesting that the collective decision 
of adopting one FS over another is more related to natural impediments, mostly out of a 
households’ control. While a choice for a LS is likely a consequence of the prevalent FS options, 
since hunters and gatherers are largely located in Mbamba and Naulala villages, where the 
dominants FS are Mixed and Specialized Sorghum. In addition, in these two villages, 
intensification is hampered by climate constraints. Thus, by adopting Mixed and Specialized 
Sorghum FS and intensify hunting and gathering effort, households appear to have developed 
strategy to overcome climate impediments. In this regarding, Mixed and Specialized Sorghum 
FS, as well as LS of hunting and gatherers are clear strategies to cope with biophysical 
constraints. In addition, intensification requires vast arable lands (Guerra et al., 2018; Ho et al., 
2017), and technology which does not exist in the reserve, not only because of its higher costs 
of acquisition, diffusion, and assimilation, but also because of its conservation-related negative 
implications. In fact, lack of technology for water catchment and land preparation are also other 
factors that hamper intensification and specialization in the NNR.  
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Increases gathering efforts are likely to decrease agriculture productivity for the same 
household (Table 3). One reason why farmer give for large household sizes is to probable 
delegate to others off-farming activities such as harvest NTFPs. Hunters and gatherers do not 
sell crop, instead, all agriculture production may be allocated for domestic consumption, and 
possible to complement their income with NTFPs (e.g. bushmeat, honey, and fish) or barter 
with neighborhoods. Losses from crop raiding are not related to hunters and gatherers, more 
likely because these systems have evolved to cope with raiding constraints. Thus, this variable 
should be interpreted as predictor, instead of driver. Contrary to what we expected, Mixed Crop 
FS was driven by population growth, more likely because market virtually does not exist in the 
NNR. In addition, biophysical conditions hinder Specialized Crops, as those FS appear to occur 
in areas with better climate and site conditions.  Although both rainfall and flatland are 
important drivers for specialized rice, increase of flatland has 100-folds more positive effect 
than rainfall, probable due to limited availability of flatland in the reserve. In fact, the proportion 
of flatland (slop <2%) in the sampled villages, ranged from 9.7% to 33.4% (average of 19%). 
This is even more challenging for traditional rice production that, in addition to flatland, 
requires wetlands (Dixon, 2019). Land availability and accessibility in the NNR will be even 
more challenge in the future, with increases population that demanding for more  arable 
agricultural land, since most of the soils in the reserve are also nutrient poor (NCP, 2017).  
4.4.2. Crop raiding, diversification of LFS and its implication for food security and 
biodiversity conservation in the NNR 
All FS in the reserve (include Specialized) are well diversified. This is typical of rural 
and remote areas of miombo where markets do not exist, hence, household needs to diversify 
its FS and embrace other off-farming practices to cope with all food needs (Jew et al., 2019).  
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In addition, losses for crop raiding are positive correlated to the expected production, except 
for vegetables which is likely to be more raided in the dry season, probable due to less 
availability of alternative palatable forage for crop raiding or even preferences of raiding 
animals (Abrahams et al., 2018; Gross et al., 2018). We have also notice that, for those “pivotal” 
crops that best describes FS (maize, rice, and sorghum), there are also a set of substitute crops 
(cassava and millet) widespread through all FS.  This accurate production plan is probable to 
diversify the risk of crop raiding and others climate and market risks. In fact, there are empirical 
evidences that  small holder farms decision to diversify agriculture production is primarily  to 
adjust for natural and market shocks (Ho et al., 2017; Sraïri and Ghabiyel, 2017). In the other 
hand, crop diversification in the NNR can also be to ensure a diverse diet for health and taste.  
Diversification in the reserve is also arguable related to potential income generation, 
since more than 50% of honey, fish and tobacco, vegetables, sweet potatoes, and sesame are for 
sell (see Table B in the Appendix). Furthermore, higher specialized systems are attached to high 
price volatility (Dixon et al., 2001). Hunters are mostly located in Mucoria village where actual 
crop raiding damage was high, despite middle potential damage for both crop raiding index 
(Table 8), this can either be interpreted as an adaptability of the system  or resulting from 
retaliatory killing of provocative crop raiding (Moreto, 2019), since the availability of wild 
animals, increases the likelihood of HWC (Baral and Heinen, 2007). Data from the NCP (2018), 
revealed 953 incidents of livestock depredation between 2017 and 2018, representing 11.11% 
of HWC events in the NNR. According to Loibooki et al. (2002), the number of livestock owned 
in the villages is inverse related to the number of bushmeat hunting incidents. Yet, that is not 
the case of NNR where livestock raising is hampered by livestock raiding (NCP, 2017, 2016) 
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and Trypanosomiasis animal diseases (Auty et al., 2016). Hunters can also be driven by market, 
since bushmeat is important source of protein and income generation in Africa rural and urban 
areas (Brashares et al., 2011), especially within PAs where people are more exposed to livestock 
depredation.  
Naulala and Mbamba villages held the least actual damage, despite high potential 
damages, for three possible reasons: (1) both are characterized by Mixed and Specialized 
Sorghum FS, and these systems may have evolved as a response to crop raiding; (2) Households 
in both villages are essentially gatherers, probable because the fenced area does not allow large 
farming size; (3) There is also two private projects, in Naulala (Chuilexi Conservancy) and 
Mbamba (Mariri Investimentos), who assists the villages with protection for crop raiding, 
including fences (electrics and beehive fence).  
Mixed and Specialized FS of Sorghum with LS of gatherers and fence the farming area, 
appear to be worthwhile combination to minimize losses, since lower losses occurred precisely 
in the fenced FS. Conversely specialized FS with neither fencing nor alternative sources of 
livelihood such as bushmeat and harvest of NTFPs, appear to worsen losses to crop raiding and 
HWC, hence contribute to food insecurity. This is not only because Mixed FS and Specialized 
Sorghum FS are less raided, but also because households in these systems can plan better for 
these cash crops that also appear to be less palatable to raiding animals, and can optimize space 
and cultivation  to grown vegetables in the permanent wetlands and devote  additional free time 
for gathering activities in the dry season, where there are less agriculture related activities. 
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4.4.3. Livelihood and Farming System approach: implications for policy instruments to 
improve nature conservation and sustainable development in PAs of developing 
countries. 
Based on the outcomes of our LFS approach, policy-makers should retain three 
important aspects that may help to re-frame a new pathway for sustainable conservation in PAs 
of DCs: (1) Train and equip local people with new skills out of dependence on farming, 
gathering and hunting  (e.g. rangers, touristic guides, teachers, etc), and invest in conservation 
activities such (tourism and eco-tourism) to employ this people. This may lower harvest of 
NTFPs and reduces agriculture expansion; (2) Diversify FS (e.g. growth  of cash crops and less 
palatable crops), in addition to off-farming activities (e.g. hunting and harvest of NTFPs), can 
proved higher income and less risk to agriculture from crop raiding, disease and climate 
unpredictability; Last, but not least (3), equipping local people with  tools and knowledge of 
better agriculture pratices and assisting them with  effective protective measures (e.g. electro 
and natural fence), may increase agriculture output, reduce poaching and retaliatory killing of 
animals. This will reduce crop raiding (ecosystem disservices), and improve pro-conservation 
behavior and ecological outputs.  
Implementation of these actions may require long standing collaboration and 
commitment between all stakeholders involved with conservation in the NNR, more important 
it will first need empowerment and transparent involvement of local people who bear the 
negative costs of conservation in the NNR. Effective involvement of local people in 
conservation requires first capacity-building and education.  
By cluster LFS and applying MLM to identify its predictors and drivers, an integrated 
framework of measures, incentives, and outcomes to improve conservation in the NNR were 
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provided. This includes, a combination of LFS that can be implemented to enhance biodiversity 
and ES conservation and increasing income and livelihood of households, while reducing 
HWC, thus enhancing conservation-friendly behavior and increase ecosystem resilience and 
adaptability to climate-change. 
Here we are bring a novel and complex evidence-based framework that can be used to 
improve conservation in the NNR and in other PAs of developing countries elsewhere. Its 
implementation depends on all stakeholders involved in conservation to understand the material 
or immaterial benefits that can be extracted from each action. In this case more mediate and 
complex consideration of satisfaction is evident, thus implying long-term perceptions and 
collective benefits beyond the individual interests, which is called K-perception (Paulo et al., 
2019). However, we believe that conservation practitioners and decision-makers have more 
power and responsibility to move toward its improvement in NNR and in other PAs elsewhere.  
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4.5. Conclusions  
Based on the NNR case study, we have identified a multitude of interacting factors, 
mostly related to LFS practices with direct and indirect implications on performance of PAs of 
DCs. Most of those factors can be used by decision-makers and conservation practitioners to 
reduce conservation problem and therefore improve the current state of NNR and other PAs 
elsewhere.  
Improving livelihoods and welfare of people living within NNR should be viewed as a starting 
point to enhance the conservation performance of NNR. This can be done through multiple and 
complementing measures. The most critical measures drawn from this research, are: to equip 
local people with relevant skills that can be useful to improve farming system activities and 
land use plan; implement mixed FS of cash crops that are  subject to less crop raiding and  are 
less sensitive to drought and other climate constraints; synchronize FS activities with other 
important off-farming occupations and train local people in effective, sustainable way to reduce 
crop raiding. The growth of the human population inside NNR will not constraint the 
implementation of such measures, since we have detected a positive effect between population 
size and the choice of the Mixed Crops and Specialized Sorghum FS as opposed to maize or 
rice specialization.  
More important, the implementation of these measures, requires long term investment in 
education and capacity-building. It also requires communities, conservation practitioners and 
decision-makers to perceive the material or immaterial benefits that can be extracted from 
long-term actions.   
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4.B.1. Survey to the household in the Niassa National Reserve 
 
1. General information 
a) Name of the interviewer _______________________________ Date: ____/_____/_____ 
b) Name of the village: _______________ Lat __________ Log __________, Alt ____________ 
c) Size of the closest river: small ____, medium ____ and bigger___ 
d) For how long are you living in the reserve?  I was born here ___; > 10 year____;  
5 – 10 years ____; < 5 years _____  
e) Have you ever lived out of the reserve before? Yes _____    No_____,  
g) If Yes, why did you decided move to the reserve? _________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________  
h) What kind of home do you live? cement____ clay ____ Roof of grass ____ or zinc____ Other______ 
Discribe it 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Socio-economic information of the respondent  
a) Name (not compulsory) _______________________________, Age_______ 
b) Gender        Male              Female   
c) Number of people in the household _____________   Number of wives _____________________ 
d) Number of workers in the household ___________________________________________________ 
No kinship degree  Age  Occupation Income School  
a) Household  ______ _____________________ ___________________ _____________ 
b) ________________ ______ _____________________ ____________________ _____________ 
c) ________________ ______ _____________________ ____________________ _____________ 
d) ________________ ______ _____________________ ____________________ _____________ 
e) ________________ ______ _____________________ ____________________ _____________ 
f) ________________ ______ _____________________ ____________________ _____________ 
g) ________________ ______ _____________________ ____________________ _____________ 
h) ________________ ______ _____________________ ____________________  
 
 
3. Farming information 
Below is the list of most common crops in the NNR. For those that you have planted in the last season, 
could you please provide total amount harvested, consumption, losses for crop raiders, quantity sold and 
its respective price  
No Crop 
Harvested 
(Kg) Lost (Kg) 
Consumption 
(Kg) Sold (Kg) 
Price 
(MZN) 
a) Maize  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
b) Peanut  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
c) Cassava  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
d) Rice  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
e) Cowpea  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
f) Pea  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
g) Sorghum  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
h) Millet  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
i) Sesame  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
j) Sweet potato __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
l) Vegetables*  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
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  m) Tobacco* __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
            Note: all products are measured in 20 litters plastic containers, except those marked to asterisks. 
                        Vegetable was measured in a big open plastic basket or sachets of 100 litter while tobacco is measures 
                        rolls of 2 Kgs. Prices a given for each unity of measurement which was converted for Kg/MZN 
 
3.1.  Could you please rank the top four most important crop raiding that have raided you farm and the most 
important crops each animal prefers 
 
4. Harvesting of non-timber products 
Mark all products and materials that you harvest from the forest, rivers, soils, etc. The frequency of 
harvest, quantities the final purpose and its price if you sell.  
No  Products  Frequency of harvesting  Propose  
Quantities  
Kg/liters  
Price 
(MZN) 
a) 
Medicines (roots, 
leaves, branches and 
fruits)  day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ 
 
 
________ 
 
 
_____ 
b) Grass   day __, week__, month__, semester __ year__ sell__, use __ ________ _____ 
c) Stakes   day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
d) Bamboos  day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
e) Firewood day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell__, use __ ________ _____ 
f) Ropes  day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
g) Honey* day__, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
h) Fish# day __, week __, month__, semester__ year_ sell__, use __ ________ _____ 
i) Insects   day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
j) Bush meat  day __, week__, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ _________ _____ 
l) Others day __, week__, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
       *Honey was measured in litters  
        #Fish in plastics containers of 20 Kg. 
 
 
Table 4.B.2. Proportion (%) of total crop harvested that was sold (PCS) In each farming System in percentage 
(%) 
 
 
Specialized 
Maize  
Specialized 
Rice  
Mixed FS Specialized 
Sorghum  
Total 
 93 (28.79) 80 (24.77) 128 (39.63) 22 (6.81) 323 (100%) 
Maize  39.8 26.6 21.0 29.3 32.7 
Peanut  25.2 25.9 34.6 25.3 32.2 
Cassava  15.9 23.8 19.2 10.0 19.5 
Rice  26.4 33.8 28.4 26.6 30.9 
Cowpea 0.0 9.1 27.3 0.0 21.4 
Pea 52.5 19.4 18.9 35.7 30.6 
Sorghum  6.7 13.7 20.3 24.2 20.7 
Millet  0.0 47.1 10.9 0.0 12.9 
Sesame 74.9 72.6 54.4 86.2 63.8 
Sweet potato 23.1 37.6 66.1 0.0 52.8 
Vegetables  74.4 62.8 72.7 0.0 72.3 
Tobacco 0.0 100.0 99.6 0.0 99.7 
Honey  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Fish  100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Total  38.5 39.7 40.2 29.2 38.6 
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Abstract  
Illegal harvesting of natural resources is a widespread practice that threatens 
biodiversity conservation in many Protected Areas (PAs) in developing countries. People who 
conduct these illegal activities are mostly poor, seeking to cope with their daily needs. In most 
cases, they are not willing to confess their participation for fear of punishment by park 
authorities. In this study, we tested a novel approach for indirectly detecting such participation 
and its spatial distribution at the village level, by asking survey respondents about the 
importance of several threats to biodiversity conservation, including the illegal harvesting in 
which they may be involved. Non-recognitin of these illegal activities as relevant threats to 
biodiversity is interpreted as the likelihood of household involvement in these activities. We 
also got evidence of respondents’ perceived costs and benefits of living within the PA, and their 
opinions about conservation measures under implementation, to support our prediction of their 
involvement in illegal resources harvesting. The research was conducted in the Niassa National 
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Reserve (NNR), the  largest PA in Mozambique, which is crucial for the conservation of 
Miombo woodland, and home to large carnivores and herbivores of African savannas. A survey 
was applied to 339 households spread through 7 villages in the reserve. The results showed that 
households who are more likely involved in illegal activities are poor, less educated, and mostly 
located closer to the PA borders; they tend to suffer high costs and less benefits of living inside 
the NNR. Respondents were more likely to admit their participation in activities they need to 
conduct to cope with their daily needs and which are not considered as serious infraction by 
park authorities, such as shifting cultivation. Our results suggest that NNR managers need to 
attract more conservation projects aimed at providing benefits for villages where households 
perceive more costs than benefits, in order to balance the perceived importance of conservation 
across villages and thus, increase pro-conservation behavior.  
Keywords: Perceived costs and benefits, Illegal harvesting, Indirect admission, Protected areas 
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5.1. Introduction  
Illegal harvesting of environmental goods is recognized as a widespread problem in 
natural resource management, imposing  several threats to biodiversity losses in Protected 
Areas (PAs) of developing countries (Chang et al., 2019; Free et al., 2015; Gavin et al., 2010; 
Massé and Lunstrum, 2016; Nelleman, 2012; Petursson et al., 2013; Rogan et al., 2018, 2017; 
Solomon et al., 2007, 2015). Indigenous people, who seek for secure livelihood are among the 
main actors of illegal activities in PAs (Loibooki et al., 2002). Shifting cultivation, bushmeat 
hunting (Rogan et al., 2017), illegal logging (Nelleman, 2012), poaching  (Moreto, 2019), and 
harvesting of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) (Lee et al., 2015) are often reported as the 
most frequent illegal activities challenging conservation efforts (MacKenzie et al., 2017). 
Moreover, poaching, bushmeat hunting and illegal logging are the most widespread illegal 
activities conducted within PAs due to its higher profitability (Booth, Vernon R.; Dunham, 
2014; Massé and Lunstrum, 2016; Rogan et al., 2017; White and Heckenberg, 2014). The 
increasing of poaching and hunting for bushmeat has  threatened  most of savannas’ large 
carnivores and herbivores (Booth, Vernon R.; Dunham, 2014; Solomon et al., 2015), while 
selective illegal logging disturbs habitat and ecosystem functioning, contributing for 
deforestation and extinction of important species (Lee et al., 2015).  In fact, 15 to 30 % of the 
volume of wood traded in the global market has been obtained illegally (Nelleman, 2012).  
Poachers, bushmeat hunters, and illegal loggers can be detected trough range 
surveillance or camera traps, but both methods can be financially prohibitive  (Free et al., 2015; 
Solomon et al., 2007), especially in Developing Countries (DCs), where the majority of PAs 
include vast inhabited areas.  Another important constraint with human surveillance is that PAs 
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rangers can be corrupted and local people paid to collaborate with illegal activities, due to their 
low wages (Gavin et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2015). In addition to direct income generation, 
poaching can also been used as a rational strategy to control the population of wild species that 
raiding crops or hunt livestock (Vedeld et al., 2012).  
Perpetrators of illegal extraction of park resources rarely identify themselves for fear of 
punishment (Solomon et al., 2007; St. John et al., 2010).  PAs residents usually blame outsiders 
for illegal activities since confessions of their involvement can also lead to penalties (Mbanze 
et al., 2019). Sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, criminologists alongside with 
conservationists have developed methods to measure the degree of participation in illegal 
harvesting of environmental resources (Solomon et al., 2007, 2015), mostly involving surveys 
or mixed methods, such as self-reporting, direct questioning and focus groups (Free et al., 2015; 
Gavin et al., 2010; Rogan et al., 2018), randomized response and nominative techniques (Chang 
et al., 2019; Solomon et al., 2007; St. John et al., 2010), forensics (Moreto, 2019), modeling, or 
even direct comparison of multiples methods. Each method has strengths and weaknesses 
(Gavin et al., 2010; Solomon et al., 2015). Understanding who are the illegal resource users, 
how many of them exist, and why they behave in such manner (Gavin et al., 2010),  is of utmost 
importance to support effective conservation decisions (Solomon et al., 2007). 
Living within a PA brings many direct and indirect benefits, including: infrastructures, 
opportunity for business and employment, benefit-sharing schemes, revenue from tourism, 
sustainable resource extraction, and enjoyment of cultural ecosystem services  (MacKenzie et 
al., 2017), but it can also harm residents through: i) crop and livestock raiding (Fraser-Celin et 
al., 2018; Hill and Wallace, 2012; Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012; Rogan et al., 2018, 2017; 
151 
 
Vedeld et al., 2012); ii) risk of injuries and casualties from animal attacks; iii) time lost in crop 
guarding (Hill, 2000; Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012);  and, iv) restrictions on resource 
extraction (Dickman, 2010). Thus, assessing benefits and losses of living inside a PA may help 
understanding local people’s engagement in illegal activities, because those who suffer higher 
losses are more willing to embrace illegal harvesting either to offset output lost or for mere 
retribution (MacKenzie, 2018). This understanding can then support the design of effective 
policies aimed at engaging local people in conservation-friendly behaviours by enhancing 
extrinsic motivation (Akers and Yasué, 2017; Mackenzie, 2012).   
Costs and benefits can be assessed through surveys and direct field observations. For 
instance, livestock ownership and the house construction standard (e.g., mud and wattle 
construction or brick construction), are important indicators of household wealth (Hartter et al., 
2015; Nube et al., 2016). Regarding costs, crop losses due to wild-animals raiding and human 
and financial efforts to guard the field crops can contribute to food insecurity. Accurate cost 
and benefit assessments can be done based on Spatially Explicit Population Modeling (Gavin 
et al., 2010; Mackenzie, 2012; MacKenzie et al., 2017) at the village level; using the village 
rather than the individual household as the measuring level. This is justified because people 
living in the same village share views and information that tend to create a common perception 
of costs and benefits, which then shape individual behaviour (MacKenzie et al., 2017). This 
shared knowledge can extend to neighboring villages. For instance, one village frequently 
raided by wild animals can learn from a neighboring village about a preventive strategy that it 
is using to reduce crop losses (Hockings and McLennan, 2012). 
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The present study aims to understand how village-level perceived costs and benefits of 
living inside a PA lead people to participate in illegal-resource harvesting by using a spatially-
based approach that uses non-sensitive and indirect ways of questioning about participation in 
illegal activities. The research was conducted in seven villages within  the Niassa National 
Reserve (NNR), the largest PA in Mozambique and the third largest in Africa (Mbanze et al., 
2019),  where people need to coexist with wild animals and most of the above-mentioned 
problems occur in a daily basis. More specifically we addressed the following questions: i) Are 
there significant spatial associations between village-level perceived costs and benefits of living 
in a PA,  opinions regarding conservation policies and incentives in the NNR, and probability 
of participation in illegal harvesting?; ii) Can local people’s undervaluation of the impact of 
illegal harvesting on conservation (when compared to expert’s views on the same subject) be 
used as an indirect indicator of their involvement in these illegal activities?  
These questions were analyzed through a survey of 339 households living in seven 
villages inside NNR. Households were asked about the following topics: perceived benefits and 
costs; opinions about the relevance of practices threatening conservation, and main actors 
responsible for such practices; effectiveness and limitations of the current incentives and the 
perceived effectiveness of new incentives.   
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5.2. Methodology 
5.2.1. Site location and characterization  
The Niassa National Reserve (NNR) (Figure 1) is the largest PA in Mozambique and 
the third largest in Africa (Mbanze et al., 2019; Prin et al., 2014). The reserve is located in 
northernmost Mozambique,  encompassing 42,200 km2 (Prin et al., 2014; Zafra-Calvo et al., 
2018), of which over 34,000 km2  are occupied by concession blocks with additional block up 
for tender in 2019. The NNR hosts the highest concentration of wildlife in the country.  
 
Figure 5.1. The location of the Niassa National Reserve and the surveyed villages.  
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The human residents in the reserve are of about 60,000 representing twice as many as 
ten years ago (NCP, 2017). Food insecurity is of huge concerning, contributing to residents' 
engagement in illegal activities. People living in the reserve rely primarily on subsistence 
agriculture, bushmeat hunting and harvesting of NTFPs (NCP, 2017). Therefore, crop raiding 
and livestock attacks, exacerbates food insecurity and human-wildlife-conflict (NCP, 2018).  
The reserve is managed by the National Administration of Conservation Areas (ANAC), 
representing the Mozambican Government in partnership with the Wildlife Conservation 
Society (WCS). There are also some non-government projects, such as the Niassa Carnivore 
Project (NCP), as well as sport hunting and tourism concessions that assist with conservation 
management and social development. There is an incentive program currently in place, which 
consists in sharing with local residents 20% of the revenue from hunting fees paid by game 
concessionaires (Jorge et al., 2013; Massuque, 2013).  
5.2.2. Data collection 
Data were collected in seven villages within NNR (Table 1 and Figure 1). In this study, 
a village is defined by the spatial extent of households associated with a village name under the 
leadership of one village chairperson (Mackenzie, 2012), which is the lowest administrative 
unit in Mozambique. Villages were intentionally selected after a literature review and meetings 
with the NNR administration, Mecula district government, and the Niassa Carnivore Project 
(NCP)8. The selection was made to cover all possible cumulative conservation costs and 
benefits, which are disproportionately distributed in space. This was done through achieving an 
 
8 The Niassa Carnivore Project is an NGO operating in northeastern Mozambique to secure large carnivores 
across NNR in partnership with NNR administration. The project manages 58,000 hectares of concession area 
within the NNR in partnership with Mbamba community. 
155 
 
even spatial sample of higher heterogeneity between villages and more homogeneity within 
village. 
A survey was conducted from July to September 2017. During this period, 339 
householders were interviewed, representing a sampling effort of 21.07% out of the total 
households in the seven selected villages.  
Table 5.1. Number of households sampled per village  
Villages 
Number of households 
in the village* 
Number of households 
sampled 
Sampling effort (%) 
Chamba 50 42 84 
Macalange 132 45 34.10 
Matondovela  77 52 67.53 
Mbamba 141 62 43.97 
Mecula 908 56 6.17 
Mucoria 131 42 32.06 
Naulala 170 40 23.53 
TOTAL  1609 339 21.07 
* Data from the national census (2015) available at the district level. 
 
5.2.2.1. Households survey 
The questionnaire had 7 sections:  
i)  general information about respondents, how long has the family lived in the reserve, 
if has ever lived outside, if he or she is happy to live within NNR,  and the house 
construction standard (brick construction with or not zinc roof), which were also 
confirmed by visual observation in the ground; 
ii)  socio-economic and demographic background of respondents (size of the family, 
employment status, income, education), possession or acquisition of each 
156 
 
good/service listed in the section 2.e in the appendix, including the cost of 
acquisition if still remember;  
iii) estimation of expected  agricultural outputs in the last season (crop harvested and 
losses for crop raiding), rank of the four top raiding species according to potential 
damaging, proportion of output sold and market prices;  
iv)  gathering effort related to NTFPs (frequency of harvesting and its final propose, 
either for use or sale, quantities and prices; v) practices that threaten conservation 
and the main responsible for such practices; vi) effectiveness and limitations of 
current incentives and, vii) effectiveness of new proposed compensation measures.  
The questionnaire was administered to respondents in close collaboration with four field 
assistants and two young locals, who were familiar with the local languages (Cyao, Emakwa 
and Swahili). The questionnaire was pre-tested with 10 householders in the Mbamba village. 
The practices threatening conservation and the new compensation measures were taken 
from a previous survey to experts engaged in conservation in Mozambique (Mbanze et al., 
2019). Only the top four conservation threats pointed by experts were used to confront with 
local respondents' answers. Other potential incentives used are under implementation in a pilot 
project of the Niassa Carnivore Project/ Mariri Environmental center (NCP)9 in Mbamba 
Village since 2012. Information about the quality, quantity and size of infrastructures available 
in the villages (e.g., schools, hospitals, electricity plants, water catchments, marketplaces, 
milling, mosques and mobile and TV signals), was provided by the Mecula admistration 
 
9 http://www.niassalion.org 
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headquarter and each village chairperson, which was also confirmed through on-ground 
observations.  
5.2.3. Data analysis 
Most of the responses were binary (yes or no) and were coded as dummy variables:  
i)  1 = if householder declared to have purchased/acquired or repaired each of 12 major 
goods or services (line e) of section 2 in the appendix), or 0 = otherwise;  
ii) 1= if householder recognized each practice as a relevant threat to conservation, or 
each actor as the main responsible for such practices, or 0 = otherwise; 
iii) 1 = if householder recognised the effectiveness of each incentive measure under 
implementation in promoting conservation-friendly practices by local people, and 0 
= otherwise;  
iv) 1 = if householder perceived limitations in the way each current incentive measure 
is applied and 0 = if otherwise, and  
v) 1 = if householder agreed with the effectiveness of each new proposed incentive, or 
0 = otherwise.  
All raw scores for each of the five-sections pointed out above were counted up to yield a 
scaled range from 0 to 𝑛𝑖, were 𝑛𝑖  is the number of items in each section coded as 1. 
 
 
 
158 
 
5.2.3.1. Agriculture production and prices  
All agricultural outputs (crop harvested and losses from crop-raiding), were transformed into 
monetary value using the same price (in new metical MZN)10 across farmers for each product, to allow 
comparisons between farms and across villages on variations of physical quantities rather than price 
variations. The average price of each crop was estimated based on figures provided by the surveyed 
households (see section 3 in Appendix A), by dividing the total revenue of crop sold to its respective 
quantities. This average price was subsequently used to derivate the Partial Expected Production (PEP 
= crop harvested + lost for crop-raiding), of each crop into monetary values. The PEP was then summed 
to obtain Total Expected Agriculture Production (TEAPi) of all crops harvested and lost by each 
surveyed household. Thereafter, we estimated Net Crop Production (NCPi) (by removing losses from 
crop-raiding from the TEAP), and the Proportion of Crop Sold (PCS), as a ratio between the amount of 
crop sold in MZN, by Net Crop Production (PCS/NCPi).  
5.2.3.2. Accounting for benefits and losses incurred by NNR residents 
All goods and services that householders declared to own or have access to were considered as 
indirect benefits of living inside the reserve. By benefits, we are considering all households wealth, 
regardless of being generated or not by park activities, because we believe that, the level of wealth or 
access to services may affect each householder’s perception of PA’s net benefits for him/her and the 
need for conservation program. Employment as a benefit was separately assessed for general 
employment and that which is directly related to conservation activities. To test the hypothesis of equal 
distribution of household wealth across villages, chi-squared and Post-Hoc cellwise tests were applied 
for binary variables. For continuous and count variables, a nonparametric test (Kruskal-Wallis11) and 
 
10 New metical (MZN) is the Mozambican currency. One US dollar ($1), is equivalent to 63.98 MZN. One British Pound (1£) is 
equal to 82.97 MZN, while one Euro (1€) is equivalent to 71.87 MZN. Exchange rate from April 2019. 
11 The Kruskal-Wallis test of median is regarded as powerful in the sense that, differently from other median 
tests, this takes into consideration the direction and magnitudes of the observations (Ica and Um, 2013). 
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post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction were applied to investigate statistical 
differences across villages, since the assumption of equal variances was not verified.  
Accounting for loss level variation across villages  
Direct losses included the percentage of expected agricultural output directly lost to 
crop-raiding. Lower levels of Net Crop Production (NCPi), Total Expected Agriculture 
Production (TEAPi) and harvest effort related to NTFPs were also considered relative losses 
because, if the reserve did not exist, local people would not suffer the existing access restrictions 
as regards resource harvest or cropland. The frequency of harvesting each NTFPs was estimated 
based on the selection of a specified frequency class option in section 3 of the questionnaire: 
365 days/year were allocated for those that selected the daily option; 52 days/year for the 
weekly option; 12 days/year for the monthly option; 2 days/year for the semester option; and 1 
day/year for the yearly option. This allocation of days/year was done for all 10 gathering 
activities considered in the survey.  
Potential losses were estimated based on the crop-raiding index 1, which predicts the 
potential damage that is likely to occur at the farm level, based on the top four most relevant 
crop raiding species (elephants, buffalo, baboons and bush pigs), ranked by the surveyed 
households (Ranki, where i vary from 1 to 4). The class of potential damage of each crop raiding 
species (C) was then taken from the literature (Mackenzie, 2012; Tufa et al., 2018) and author 
personal experience. Crop raiding index 1 was then, compared to Crop raiding index 2, which 
is the fauna density reported in the NNR management plan at blocks level (SRN, 2008). Since 
all the variables were continue and count, a nonparametric test (Kruskal-Wallis) and post-hoc 
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pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction were used to investigate statistical differences 
across villages.   
5.2.3.3. Assessing the likelihood of participation in illegal harvesting and identifying the drivers for 
such participation  
An indirect approach to estimate the (direct or indirect) likelihood of respondents’ 
participation in illegal activities was developed. This is based on the assumption that people 
that are involved in these illegal activities will be less willing to recognize these activities as 
significant threats to conservation. So, we used reluctance to recognize that an illegal harvesting 
activity constitutes a threat as a proxy for direct or indirect participation in this activity. The 
validity of this association can be tested by cross-tabulating the recognition of shifting 
cultivation as a threat with the participation in this activity where denial is unlikely. A 
significant negative deviation of recognition for farmers is required by our assumption. The 
identification of farmers from this survey data was based on previous research (Mbanze et al., 
2019, under review) about Farming and Livelihood system types within the NNR.  
Because this association is only probabilistic, we used the resulting outcome as a random 
variable that was used to test the following hypotheses: 
- participation in illegal harvesting significantly varies across villages, in a way that 
reflects differentiated village-level costs and benefits of living within the reserve; 
- participation in illegal harvesting  is significantly reduced by an individual’s perception 
of the importance of current incentives received by local people to make them more 
conservation-friendly.   
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For the first type of hypotheses, an ANOVA between number of harvesting acticvities 
recognized by respondents as threats, as well as the number of such illegal practices across 
villages was carried out. When an association was detected, post hoc cellwise tests were 
performed to find those villages in which households were involved in illegal activities. A 
nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test and post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni 
correction were used to investigate the differences in average recognition levels across villages. 
To test the second hypothesis, a Spearman’s rank correlation between the number of illegal 
harvesting activities (poaching, illegal logging and illegal mining), and the number of current 
incentives that the respondent perceives as effective in promoting conservation-friendly 
attitudes. The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s rho) was used because both 
variables are counts and the hypothesis of normal distribution was rejected (Kumar and 
Abirami, 2018).  
To better visualize, the relationship between threats to conservation and the actors who were 
pointed out by respondents as the main responsible for each conservation-threat, a hierarchical 
cluster analysis was performed. Actors were classified as: Donors (Do), Reserve Administration 
(ReAd), Non-residents (NoRe), Local People (LoPe), Private Sector (PrSc) and Traditional 
Authorities (TrAu).  Clustering results were then attached to the heatmap of the proportion of 
responsibility shared among different actors. A chi-squared and post-hoc cellwise tests between 
villages and local people as responsible for each threat to conservation were also used to check 
if the villages where illegal activities are more present will not assume local people 
responsibility for those activities, since accepting local people as responsible for illegal 
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activities implies also admit involvement with illegal extraction. This responses from household 
head was compared to experts´ response12.  
5.2.3.4. Limitations of current incentives and the need for new proposed incentives as a pretext for 
involvement in illegal activities 
Respondents were questioned about perceived limitations of current incentives and the 
effectiveness of the new proposed ones, to test the following hypotheses:  
i) in villages where the majority of surveyed households are likely engaged in illegal 
activities, they will protest about the way current incentives are delivered; 
ii) in general respondents will be more receptive for the new incentives, if they claim 
not to receive enough benefits from those under implementation; and  
iii) As most of the new proposed incentives are in-kind, and in-kind incentives have 
proved be more effective to engage local people with conservation friendly-
practices in previous studies (Akers and Yasué, 2017; Mbanze et al., 2019; Narloch 
et al., 2014), we would expect that the new proposed incentives would have higher 
acceptance by most of the households, that is, a weak relation will be expected 
between the limitation of the current incentives and new proposed ones.  
The three hypotheses were tested through chi-square test and Post Hoc cellwise 
comparison between villages level and respondents' answers for each item related to the 
limitations of the current incentives and the new proposed incentives. And Kruskal-Wallis 
 
12 In relation to experts´ response, see more in Mbanze et al., (2019): An expert-based approach to assess the 
potential for local people engagement in nature conservation: The case study of the Niassa National Reserve in 
Mozambique - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnc.2019.125759 
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(KW) test and Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction were also used, 
to test differences between villages for the count of current limitations and new proposed 
incentives.  
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Distribution of cumulative costs and benefits across villages 
Benefits are unevenly distributed across villages (p < 0.05), except for poultry (p = 0.27) and 
livestock (p = 0.085), that are more uniformly distributed (Table 2). Most of the wealthier household 
heads are located in Mecula, Macalange and Matondovela villages. Radio, transportation means 
(motorcycle or bike), mobile phone, and education for dependents, are amongst the few goods/services 
that most respondents (> 50%) declared to have access to. On the contrary, the most important benefits, 
such as payments for agricultural labor, bank account, improved house, electricity, and infrastructures, 
were less reported by respondents and, most of them were only reported in Mecula. Mbamba and Naulala 
also receive important benefits such as electric fencing and employment in conservation activities. 
Macalange on average, accrues more benefits from payments for agricultural labor, investments in small 
businesses and acquisition of transport means. Poultry is the only benefit that is on average higher in 
Chamba and Mucoria than in other villages.  
Costs are also unevenly distributed across villages. Overall, Macalange and Mucoria suffered 
higher crop losses and record the lowest values of agriculture and gathering effort. Potential losses from 
crop-raiding, are more evident in Matondovela, Mbamba and Naulala, but paradoxically the same 
villages yield more net agriculture output and have more gathering activities during the year.  The 
justification for this result will be postponed for the discussion section. 
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Table 5.2. Village-level indicators of diverse types of benefits and costs reported by the surveyed households 
 Villages  
  
 Chamba Macalange Matondovela Mbamba Mecula Mucoria Naulala Total Sig. 
 N=42 N=45 N=52 N=62 N=56 N=42 N=40 N=339 
 Benefits Percentage of the households who declared to have acquired each good or service  
Payment for agricultural labor  14.29 37.78 21.15 35.48 39.29 9.52 47.50 29.79 0.000***  
- 
 
- 
 
+ -- ++ 
  
Investing for small business or 
buying merchandises  
9.52 35.56 32.69 25.81 21.43 14.29 27.50 24.19 0.044* 
 
- + + 
  
- 
   
Motorcycle or bike 38.1 68.89 50 59.68 35.71 52.38 80 54.28 0.000***  
- + 
  
-- 
 
++ 
  
Radio  47.62 62.22 55.77 87.1 50 52.38 85 63.42 0.000***  
- 
  
+++ - - +++ 
  
Television  7.1 13.3 7.7 11.3 53.6 0 2.5 15 0.000***  
- 
 
- 
 
+++ -- - 
  
Mobile phone  33.3 64.4 53.8 51.6 76.4 57.1 47.5 55.6 0.002**  
-- 
   
++ 
    
Bank Account  2.4 11.1 9.6 8.1 48.2 4.8 5.0 13.9 0.000***  
- 
  
- +++ - - 
  
Education for dependents  11.9 66.7 38.5 64.5 76.8 35.7 57.5 51.9 0.000***  
--- + - + +++ - 
   
Poultry 16.7 15.6 28.8 25.8 14.3 31 22.5 22.1 0.269      
- + 
   
Livestock  0 0 0 1.6 5.4 0 0 1.2 0.085      
++ 
    
Brick construction 4.76 13.33 5.77 6.45 21.43 0 10 9.14 0.007**      
++ - 
   
Roof of zinc 4.76 22.22 11.54 14.52 37.5 4.76 15 16.52 0.000***  
- 
   
+++ - 
   
Conservation work  0 6.67 1.92 24.19 14.29 7.14 17.5 10.91 0.000***  
- 
 
- +++ 
  
+ 
  
Formal employment related or 
not to conservation  
2.4 6.7 7.7 27.4 48.2 7.1 22.5 18.9 0.000*** 
 -- - - + +++ -     
          
Electricity or solar panel   26.2 26.7 17.3 27.4% 60.7 9.5 22.5 28.3 0.000*** 
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 Villages  
  
 Chamba Macalange Matondovela Mbamba Mecula Mucoria Naulala Total Sig. 
 N=42 N=45 N=52 N=62 N=56 N=42 N=40 N=339    
- 
 
+++ -- 
   
Wealth accumulation  3.90C 6.16AB 5.02BC 5.69AB 6.88A 4.12C 5.75AB 5.44 0.000*** 
          
Infrastructure  2 7 7 10 26.00 11.00 6.00 10.45 NA 
Electric fencing  No No No Yes No No Yes NA NA 
Gross farming output sold  19.07 
ABC 
17.53 AB 33.07 C 21.57 ABC 11.48 A 15.23 AB 28.68 BC 20.87 0.000*** 
 Costs  Direct and potential (lower agricultural production and gathering are interpreted as costs)  
Percentage of agricultural 
output lost  
43.57 D 65.93 G 42.56 C 33.01 A 48.2 E 49.2 F 39.31 B 39.74 0.000*** 
          
Crop raiding index 1 15 15 16 16 13 15 17 15.24 NA           
Crop raiding index 2 3 5 5 5 3 3 5 4.17 NA 
Net agriculture production in 
MZN per household 
12989 A 12439 A 27290 C  15680 AB 10458 A 7293 A 24604 BC 15848 0.000*** 
Total gathering effort (days of 
the year) per household 
94.12 
AB 
78.60 A 123.79 AB 139.89 BC 102.05 AB 116.19 
AB 
185.50 C 119.81 0.000*** 
          
Note: α = *** is significant at 0.1%, ** = significant at 1%, * = significant at 5%, NS = not significant. The proportion of households at village level was performed based on 
the  
           Person’s exact Chi-Square with significance at 0.1% (α = 0. 000). The signals plus (+) and minus (-) indicate positive or negative relation between villages and different 
           questions that household were requested to answer systems. +|-; ++|- - and +++|---, significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively. 
 
Socioeconomic characteristics of respondents is presented in the Table 3. It can be observed that, households living in Mecula 
are in average more educated, younger and with larger family size compared to the rest of the villages. Only 20.4% of respondents 
declared to have already lived outside the reserve. Most respondents who have lived outside the reserve are in Mucoria, Mbamba and 
Mecula. The overall number of households who declared to have lived outside the reserve for more than 2 years was even smaller, 
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with only Mbamba (17.7%) and Mecula (10.7%) being above the overall average of 7.1%. More than half of the households (61.7%) 
declared to feel happy about living inside the reserve. Chamba was the village with the highest rate of happy people, followed by 
Mucoria and Matondovela.   
Table 5.3. Socioeconomic characteristics of the surveyed respondents 
 Villages    
 Chamba Macalange Matondovela Mbamba Mecula Mucoria Naulala Total 
Sig. 
 N=42 N=45 N=52 N=62 N=56 N=42 N=40 N=339 
Total population in the village 234 669 340 682 4958 642 855 1294.13 NA 
Average education 0.81 A 1.29 A 1.23 A 1.21 A 2.50 B 1.19 A 1.25 A 1.39 0.000*** 
Age 43.29 44.64 43.56 43.24 39.21 42.86 46.63 43.17 0.500 
Size of family  4.67 5.07 4.42 4.82 5.48 4.90 5.03 4.92 0.229 
          
Households who have lived 
outside the reserve for ≥ 2 
2.4 0 3.8 17.7 10.7 9.5 0 7.1 0.000*** 
 - -  ++ +  -    
Households who have ever lived 
outside the reserve 
11.9 4.4 19.2 29 26.8 35.7 10 20.4 0.001** 
 - --  +  ++ -   
Households who are happy to 
live inside the reserve  
83.3 48.9 63.5 53.2 55.4 64.3 70 61.7 0.000*** 
  ++ -  -        
Note: α = *** is significant at 0.1%, ** = significant at 1%, * = significant at 5%, NS = not significant. The proportion of households at village level was performed based on 
the  
           Person’s exact Chi-Square with significance at 0.1% (α = 0. 000). The signals plus (+) and minus (-) indicate positive or negative relation between villages and different 
           questions that household were requested to answer systems. +|-; ++|- - and +++|---, significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively. 
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5.3.2. Involvement of households in illegal harvesting of natural resources 
Table 4 presents the proportion of people who are likely involved in each illegal activity 
at the village level. The proportion of households who perceive these activities as not 
threatening conservation significantly differ across villages (p < 0.05), except for illegal logging 
(p = 0.127). The overall percentage of households who recognize that each practice represents 
a threat to conservation in the NNR is above 60%. The likelihood of not being involved in 
conservation-threatening practices is higher in Mecula, Mbamba and Naulala. On the other 
hand, respondents in Chamba and Mucoria are more likely involved in illegal activities, 
followed by Matondovela. Poaching is undoubtedly the most recognized threat to conservation 
(81.6%), with less divergence across villages (p = 0.021). Most of households who are more 
likely involved in poaching are in Chamba and Matondovela, while people in Mucoria are more 
likely involved in illegal mining.  
Overall, more than half of the households agree with current compensations 
implemented in the reserve. Only in the case of delivering 50% of the revenue of the fines, the 
proportion of respondents is below 50%. The proportion of agreement with current 
compensations significantly varies across villages for all compensation types. This level of 
agreement is the lowest in Macalange for all compensation types except for jobs and promotion 
and respect of culture and beliefs; and the highest in Naulala. There are also higher levels of 
agreement for providing employment for local people in Mbamba and Mecula, whereas in 
Mucoria and Matondovela there is high agreement regarding delivery of 20% of revenues from 
concessions to local people. In Mbamba,  there is high agreement for promotion and respect of 
culture and beliefs of local communities.  
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The correlation between the number of illegal practices recognized as threats to 
conservation and agreement with current conservation incentives is positive (𝑟𝑠 = 0.121) and 
significant at p=0.05. This positive correlation, while weak, suggests that individuals who agree 
with current incentives are less likely to participate in illegal harvesting of natural resources.  
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Table 5.4. Proportion of respondents who recognized different practices as threats to conservation; and percentage of respondents that agree 
                  that current incentives are important to engage local people in conservation. 
                 The village-level average number of practices recognized as threats and the average number of incentives that are seen as contributing 
                 to engage people in conservation are in the last lines of each half of the table. Lower levels of recognition of illegal practices (all but 
                 shifting cultivation) as threats, are interpreted as indirect evidence of household involvement in these illegal practices. 
                The association between Farming and Livelihood Systems and shifting cultivation as a threat is presented at the bottom.  
 Villages  
  
 Chamba Macalange Matondovela Mbamba Mecula Mucoria Naulala Total Sig. 
 N=42 N=45 N=52 N=62 N=56 N=42 N=40 N=339 
 Practices Percentage of respondents who selected each practice as a threat to conservation  
Shifting cultivation  69 73.3 59.6 53.2 80.4 73.8 52.5 65.8 0.013* 
    - + 
 
- 
 
 
Poaching 67.5 83.7 72 83.9 94.2 80.5 86.8 81.6 0.021* 
 - 
 
- 
 
++ 
   
 
Illegal logging 53.8 61 56 62.9 80.8 58.5 60.5 62.5 0.127 
     ++   
 
 
Illegal mining 66.7 61.4 64 71 87.3 42.9 72.5 67.5 0.001*** 
     ++ -- 
  
 
Average number of illegal practices 
recognized by respondents as relevant 
threats  
2.5B 2.69AB 2.44B 2.71AB 3.29A 2.52B 2.65AB 2.71 0.004** 
 Current incentives  Percentage of respondents who selected each incentive as relevant to engage local people in conservation 
Jobs 57.1 73.3 67.3 85.5 89.3 71.4 90 77 0.000*** 
 -- 
 
- + + 
 
+ 
 
 
Hunting quotes allocated to communities 73.8 52.3 80.8 56.5 76.8 54.8 92.5 69.2 0.000*** 
 
 
-- + - 
 
- ++ 
 
 
20% of revenues of concessions 
delivered  
83.3 62.2 92.3 72.6 71.4 90.5 97.5 80.5 0.000*** 
 
 
-- + - - + ++ 
 
 
Food allowances 39 32.6 42.3 83.9 36.4 70.7 60 53 0.000*** 
 - -- - +++ -- + 
  
 
50% of the revenue of the fines 40.5 34.9 41.2 63.9 38.2 47.6 40 44.6 0.046* 
 
 
- 
 
++ 
    
 
Promotion and respect of culture and 
beliefs  
83.3 82.2 80.8 96.8 78.6 88.1 97.5 86.7 0.016** 
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 Villages  
  
 Chamba Macalange Matondovela Mbamba Mecula Mucoria Naulala Total Sig. 
 N=42 N=45 N=52 N=62 N=56 N=42 N=40 N=339 
   - ++ - 
 
+ 
 
 
Average number of incentives that 
respondents perceive as important   
3.76AB 3.33B 4.03AB 4.58A 3.89AB 4.21AB 4.78A 4.09 0.000*** 
Association between Farming and Livelihood Systems and shifting cultivation as a threat 
Livelihood System ____ ____ _____ gatherers employees hunters gatherers 65.8 0.244 
          
Farming system  
Maize & 
Rice 
Rice Maize Mixed & 
Sorghum 
----- Mixed Sorghum 65.8 0.082 
     +  --   
 Note: α = *** is significant at 0.1%, ** = significant at 1%, * = significant at 5%, NS = not significant. The proportion of households at village level was performed based on 
the  
           Person’s exact Chi-Square with significance at 0.1% (α = 0. 000). The signals plus (+) and minus (-) indicate positive or negative relation between villages and different 
          questions that household were requested to answer systems. +|-; ++|- - and +++|---, significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.  
 
Results from cross-tabulation between recognition of shifting cultivation as a threat to conservation and farming and 
livelihood system at the village level suggested that overall, 65.8% of respondents recognize shifting cultivation as a threat. Mecula, 
is the only village above the expected proportion of respondents, with significant positive deviation. This result suggests that 
employees mostly living in Mecula, are more willing to view shifting cultivation as a threat. Thus, this result validates the hypothesis 
that individuals who are not involved in a particular conservation-threatening practice more willing recognizing this practice as a 
threat.  Mecula is the village where the level of participation in illegal harvesting is the lowest, while the highest rate is observed in 
Chamba, Matondovela and Mucoria.  
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5.3.3.  Main actor and its proportion of responsibility for each practice that threatens 
conservation  
 The perceptions of respondents about the main responsible for each practice 
threatening conservation in the reserve, is presented in Figure 2. Here, the profile of perceived 
actor vs. responsibility for each threat, is presented in heatmap attached to the dendrogram from 
the cluster analysis of the six conservation problems.  
Figure 5.2. Dendrogram with six data points, which represent threats to conservation in the NNR. Attached to  
                   the dendrogram is the heatmap of actors’ (Do=Donors, ReAd=Reserve Administration, NoRe= 
                   Non-residents, LoPe=Local People, PrSc=Private Sector and TrAu=Traditional Authorities), and their 
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                 share of responsibility in percentage (red to green represents the high to less gradient of share of  
                 responsibility by each actor), represents very high to little degree of threat each problem represents for 
                 conservation.    
 
In the LHS of the two-cluster solution are those threats that the non-residents (NoRe) 
are the main responsible (poaching, illegal logging, and illegal gold and ruby mining), holding 
more than 95% of all responsibility. The governmental authorities (Go); local people (LoPe); 
and the reserve administration (ReAd), share the rest of responsibility in the RHS. The  Go 
share 82% of responsibility for population growth; The ReAd share 56% of responsibility for 
HWC, followed by LoPe, and  the Go. Local people held also 96% of responsibility for shifting-
cultivation.  
Local people only accept responsibility for threats that they are directly involved in 
(Table 5), mainly:  shifting-cultivation (95,9%), HWC (26.5%) and population growth (13.6%). 
In addition, there is no consensus among respondents regarding the responsibility of local 
people for those three threats. All of respondents in Chamba, Mecula, and Mucoria believe that 
local people are the main responsible for shifting cultivation. For the rest of illegal activities 
that threats conservation in the reserve, they don´t accept to share not even 4% of culpability. 
5.3.4. Limitations of the current incentives as a need for new proposed incentives.  
More than 64% of respondents complained about the current incentives under 
implementation (Table A in the appendix). There is more consensus among respondents at the 
village level concerning the limitations of the current incentives. Respondents consensually 
perceived allocation of hunting quotes (81.6%), and lack of award for the detector of the 
offender (73.3%), as the strongest limitations for conservation. Chamba and Mucoria are the 
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villages where the majority of respondents agree with the limitations. While Matondovela held 
least proportion of respondents who agree with current limitations.  
The new proposed incentives are clearly better than the exists ones with an acceptance 
rate between 95 to 100%, with clear consensus among village level respondents. In average, the 
proportion of respondents who perceive the new incentives as important are also those who 
perceive more limitations in the way that the current incentives are delivered to local people. 
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Table 5.5. Share of responsibility of local people for each threat to conservation in the NNR according to respondents’ views.  
  Villages  
  
  
Chamb
a 
Macalange Matond
ovela 
Mbamba Mecula Mucori
a 
Naulala Total 
Sig. 
Threats  
Main 
Responsible  
N=42 N=45 N=52 N=62 N=56 N=42 N=40 
N=339 
Shifting cultivation  LoPe 100 95.6 96.2 85.5 100 100 97.5 95.9 0.002** 
         + 
  
--- + + 
  
 
Poaching  LoPe 0 2.2 0 3.2 1.8 0 0 1.2 0.554 
  
   
+ 
   
  
 
Illegal logging  LoPe 0 0 0 3.2 0 0 0 0.6 0.174 
     ++       
Population growth LoPe 11.9 22.2 11.5 14.5 5.4 2.4 30 13.6 0.003** 
  
 
+ 
  
- - ++   
 
Human and wildlife 
conflicts LoPe 
42.9 33.3 34.6 17.7 21.4 26.2 12.5 26.5 0.015* 
  ++   -  - -    
Illegal mining LoPe 2.4 6.7 0 3.2 3.6 0 5 2.9 0.451 
     +         
Note: LoPe=Local People, α = *** is significant at 0.1%, ** = significant at 1%, * = significant at 5%, NS = not significant. The proportion of households at village level was  
           performed based on the Person’s exact Chi-Square with significance at 0.1% (α = 0. 000). The signals plus (+) and minus (-) indicate a positive or negative relation 
between 
           villages and responsibility of households with each practice threatening conservation. +|-; ++|- - and +++|---, significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.
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5.4.Discussion   
 Costs and benefits are unevenly distributed across villages possible because: i) the 
spatial distribution of villages in relation to the road network, which affects market access for 
selling agriculture crops and NTFPs products and buying other basic needs, (e.g. Macalange, 
Mecula and Mucoria has good roads accessibility, compared to the rest of the villages); ii) the 
distribution of crop-raiding and potential damages, which lead to very different crop loss levels; 
as well as different biophysical conditions that hinder agriculture production in same villages 
(NCP, 2017; SGRN, 2004); iii) better infrastructures and investment projects in some areas, 
which attract more skilled and educated people, while creating market and business 
opportunities and iv) uneven distribution of governmental institutions and conservation 
projects, which concentrate conservation-related jobs, business opportunities, environmental 
education and electronic fences (to protect against crop and livestock raiders), in some villages 
rather than others. 
 The proportion of respondents who own livestock and poultry in the reserve is very 
small compared to others regions in the country (Dixon, 2019). Likely because, as in most 
African PAs, livestock raising is hampered by livestock raiding, wild predators and endemic 
diseases (Mackenzie, 2012). Most of the respondents who raise poultry are located in Mucoria, 
more likely because they struggle to find other means of income such as agriculture production, 
due to higher crops losses for crop-raiding, but also because they take advantage of their 
strategic  location in the main road that connects two larger villages (Mecula and Marrupa) to 
profit from selling poultry. Respondents in Naulala, Mbamba, and Macalange, seem to invest 
in the acquisition of transportation means, because they live in remote and isolated villages with 
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poor road accessibility, thus requiring transportation to sell their products in Mecula, where 
significant market opportunities exist.  
 Despite the higher agricultural production and its remote location, people in 
Matondovela buy fewer bikes and motorbikes, because they have invested part of 20% of the 
revenue to buy one collective car to carry the agriculture products to the nearest market, while 
they are also constructing a new market in the village. Radio and mobile phones are related to 
the villages with higher purchasing power, but also with the possibility to recharge them 
(villages with electricity or solar panels), except for Mecula where television seems to substitute 
radio devices. Besides the availability of electricity and purchase power, respondents in Mecula 
own more TVs because Mecula is the only village with a free national television signal. 
Contrarily, in the other villages, the few respondents who own television uses to watch only 
DVDs movies, because satellite TV is prohibitively expensive. The same as mobile phone, 
which are more frequent in villages where people have connectivity (Mecula and Mucoria) or 
at least can have a hotspot signal (Macalange, Naulala, and Mbamba). In Chamba, there are 
fewer respondents owning mobile phones, not only because they are poorer, but also because 
they only have the signal from Tanzania, which is not possible to use in Mozambique.  
5.4.1. Costs and benefits and its relation to conservation incentives and the likelihood of 
involvement in illegal harvesting 
 Respondents who live in villages that receive more benefits tend to recognize the 
illegal harvesting of natural resources as a more relevant threat to conservation than those who 
live in villages with lower benefits; the same happens with the perceived effectiveness of 
current incentives in engaging local people in more conservation-friendly practices. These more 
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pro-conservation attitudes are clearer in Mecula, followed by Naulala and Mantondovela, while 
opposite attitudes seem to be present in Chamba and Mucoria villages. Those who appear to be 
more pro-conservation tend not only to receive more benefits but are also, in average, better 
educated and have access to all or at least one means of information (radio, television or mobile 
phone), which suggests that, in addition to perceived benefits, education and information are 
also important for better understanding the importance of conservation (Espinosa and Jacobson, 
2012). In fact, even the opportunity to get actual benefits from conservation is also related to 
education, as most households living from conservation or related employments are the ones 
who receive more conservation benefits. Promotion and respect of culture and beliefs is 
perceived as an important conservation incentive in almost every village, except in Mecula 
which is below the average proportion, probably because most people in Mecula are from 
outside the reserve, and they do not identify themselves with the local culture. 
 Respondents who do not recognize illegal harvesting activities as significant 
conservation threats receive fewer conservation benefits and higher costs; they are in average 
less educated, with poor or no information access, and are mostly located in villages closer to 
the reserve borders. For instance, Chamba lies close to the border with Tanzania, in the north, 
while Mucoria lies close to the border with Marrupa, a densely populated village outside the 
reserve in the southeast. The likelihood of indirect involvement of local people in illegal 
harvesting, is also higher in these two villages, because both are strategical for outsiders 
poachers who seek local assistance to conduct illegal incursions; its border position also 
facilitates escaping from range surveillance with the support of locals. Thus, the incentives for 
households to engage in illegal activities are higher in Chamba and Mucoria, especially if 
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conservation does not provide the expected benefits. In this regard, it is worthwhile to suggest 
the reserve to allocate more benefits for people who are located in the border villages (including 
improved education and assess to information), while increasing rangers surveillance, as 
Tanzanian poachers prefer to  conduct such illegal incursions in NNR, because the penalties are 
less severe than in Tanzania, although there is a Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania which is 
adjacent to NNR (Zafra-Calvo et al., 2017).  
 Despite some studies suggesting  that households engaged in illegal activities are 
sometimes better-off than those who are not (Chang et al., 2019; Rogan et al., 2018), our results 
show, that is not the case in the NNR, where poorer people are more likely to be involved in 
such activities, although not in a leading role. According to Jorge et al., (2013), local households 
who are involved with illegal activities in the NNR do not earn decent rewards for such 
involvement, since they act as intermediates with no direct access to the black market. Poaching 
can also be related to the following factors: i) lack of alternative source of animal protein (in 
Chamba); ii) higher potential damages (in Matondovela) and iii) higher actual losses from crop-
raiding (in Chamba and Matondovela). There are different studies demonstrating the 
importance of the previous factors. For instance, Loibooki et al. (2002) found a positive 
correlation between poverty, lack of alternative sources of protein and hunting for bushmeat, 
while the opposite relation was claimed by Rogan et al. (2018). The retaliatory killing of crop-
raiding and availability of wild animals for hunting can also induce poaching (Rogan et al., 
2018). 
 
179 
 
5.4.2. Threats to conservation, the main responsible and illegal harvesting   
 Respondents only significantly (> 13%) recognized their participation in 
conservation-threatening activities in which they were directly involved (population growth, 
human-animal conflict and shifting cultivation), namely in villages where their involvement in 
illegal harvesting activities is more likely, as assessed through non-recognition of their negative 
conservation impacts. This happens because not only they need to be directly involved in such 
activities to cope with their daily need, but also because, in many PAs (including the NNR), 
such activities are not considered illegal or are only considered minor infractions. Identifying 
local people as responsible for HWC was proved to be highly controversial for many reasons 
that were already deeply explored in the literature (Fraser-Celin et al., 2018; Gaillard et al., 
2019; Marker and Boast, 2015).  For instance, one can argue that “I killed the same buffalo or 
lion who killed my mother or was trying to kill me when I tried to expel him from raiding my 
crops or attacking my livestock”.   Respondents blamed outsiders for all activities that constitute 
major threats to conservation for the following possible reasons: i) because they do not want to 
admit guilt, as penalties for infractions related to these activities are severe; ii) they can easily 
blame others, who lead and receive most of the profits, while local people are mostly indirectly 
involved and receive lower returns; iii) They are likely involved in such activities in ways that 
they try to hide by blaming outsiders; iv) or for a mix of these different reasons. The last one, 
is more likely as there was a positive correlation between disregarding threats and incentives 
under implementation in the reserve. The second hypothesis is also likely, as respondents accept 
slightly more culpability for these activities in which they are directly involved. For instance, 
HWC is perceived as an important conservation-threatening practice in villages where 
respondents perceived poaching as irrelevant. In this regard, we may inferrer that, householders 
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claim to poach the provocative raiding animals, which is also in accordance with Moreto, (2019) 
and Dickman and Hazzah, (2015).  In addition, according to experts who are engaged in 
conservation activities in Mozambique, outsiders hold on average 50% of culpability while 
local people hold only 17% (Mbanze et al., 2019). Whereas in this study, respondents do not 
accept even 4% of culpability, especially in villages where households give less relevance to 
these activities as threats. According to Kideghesho, (2016) and Brashares et al., (2011), even 
if outsiders  engage in illegal activities, they need the support from local people to show them 
the routes of the animals they search for and to hide them from rangers surveillance. 
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5.5.Conclusions  
 The aim of this research was to understand whether the perceived costs and benefits 
of living inside a PA, and the valuation of threats and incentives under implementation in the 
NNR, is likely to affect the household decision of engaging in illegal activities. The results 
showed that costs and benefits were unevenly distributed across villages, due to natural and 
political factors, including the conservation dynamic in the reserve. Householders who 
perceived less benefits and high conservation costs are less educated with no or poor access to 
information and are mostly located in villages closer to the reserve borders; all of these factors 
increase the likelihood of household involvement in illegal harvesting of natural resources.    
Based on our findings, we suggest that the NNR managers and NGO´s who are involved in 
conservation, focus more attention in attracting conservation projects that increase conservation 
benefits in those villages were households suffer the highest costs and lowest benefits of living 
with a PA, while simultaneously improving people’s access to education and information, and 
increasing range surveillance in the villages located near to the PA borders.  
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Table 5.C.1. Respondents´ answers concerning to the limitations of the current incentives under implementation and the effectiveness of the 
new 
               incentives to engage local people with conservation in the NNR.   
Villages 
  
 
Chamba Macalange Matondovela Mbamba Mecula Mucoria Naulala Total Sig.  
N=42 N=45 N=52 N=62 N=56 N=42 N=40 N=339 
 
Limitations of current incentives Proportion of respondents who pointed limitations  
Lack of transparency in the job 
attribution 
97.6 55.8 82.4 67.7 54.5 92.9 62.5 72.5 0.000*** 
 
+++ -- + 
 
-- ++ - 
  
The hunting quotas allocated are 
insufficient 
92.9 69.8 78.4 85 83.9 78 77.5 81.1 0.168 
 
+ - 
       
The money allocated is insufficient 83.3 66.7 60 67.2 78.8 85.7 77.5 73.6 0.038*  
+ 
 
- 
  
+ 
   
Lack of monitoring and accountability of 
revenues (20%) 
71.4 61.9 53.1 67.2 57.1 83.3 57.5 64.3 0.052 
 
  - 
  
++ 
   
In many cases, the detectors of the 
offenders are not awarded 
88.1 68.3 76.5 61.7 71.7 70.7 81.6 73.3 0.083 
 
+   -   
   
Weak training and advice in how to use 
the incentives  
54.8 54.8 44.9 75.8 69.4 80.5 67.5 64.3 0.002** 
   
-- + 
 
+ 
   
Poor monitoring and evaluation of the 
results from the projects implemented in 
NNR 
61.9 67.4 54 75.8 70.9 81 67.5 68.6 0.106 
 
  - 
  
+ 
   
The above compensations are not 
enough to motivate the community 
71.4 77.8 58 74.2 78.6 66.7 72.5 71.5 0.282 
 
  -      
 
Cluster of total limitations 73.8 43.2 42.6 66.7 64.4 77.5 60.5 (188)61.4 0.003**  
+ - -   + 
   
Average number of limitations  6.21AB 5.27BC 5.02C 5.75ABC 5.8ABC 6.43A 5.66ABC 5.7288 0.002** 
New incentives  Proportion of households who agrees with the effectiveness of the new proposed incentives 
Help local people to adopt conservation 
agriculture practices 
100 100 100 98 100 100 100 100 0.612 
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Villages 
  
 
Chamba Macalange Matondovela Mbamba Mecula Mucoria Naulala Total Sig.  
N=42 N=45 N=52 N=62 N=56 N=42 N=40 N=339 
 
Provide local people with alternative 
sources of animal proteins 
100 100 100 98.4 96.4 100 100 99.1 0.325 
 
    -   
  
Help local people with practices to 
enhance the sustainable use of forest 
resources 
100 100 100 96.8 100  100 100 99.4 0.335 
 
   --    
  
Involve local people in the management 
and decision-making 
100 100 100 93.5 98.2 100 97.5 98.2 0.082 
 
   --    
  
Increased employment in conservation 
and recreation activities; 
100 100 100 96.8 100 100 100 99.4 0.174 
 
   --    
  
Provide education for local people (e.g. 
scholarships) 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 a 
          
Improve services delivery for local 
people 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 a 
          
Create areas for cultivation of high-yield 
commercial crops 
100 100 98.1 98.4 98.2 100 100 99.1 0.804 
 
       
  
Promoting certification of non-timber 
products 
97.6 95.6 100 100 100 100 95 98.5 0.144 
  
-     - 
  
Increase in the percentage of revenues 
charged to distribute to communities 
97.6 95.6 90.4 95.2 96.4 97.6 92.5 95 0.632 
 
  -     
  
Attribution of collective conservation 
performance-based payments 
97.6 95.6 96.2 90.3 98.2 100 92.5 95.6 0.220 
 
   - 
 
+ 
   
Sum of all new incentives 10.93 10.87 10.85 10.68 10.88 10.98 10.78 10.84 0.11 
Note: α = *** is significant at 0.1%, ** = significant at 1%, * = significant at 5%, NS = not significant. The proportion of households at village level was performed based on 
the  
           Person’s exact Chi-Square with significance at 0.1% (α = 0. 000). The signals plus (+) and minus (-) indicate a positive or negative relation between villages and 
different 
          questions that households were requested to answer. +|-; ++|- - and +++|---, significant at 5%, 1% and 0.1%, respectively.  
          a = Test as not computed because only one group of people who agrees with the new incentives exists.
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5.C.2. Survey to the household in the Niassa National Reserve 
6. General information 
e) Name of the interviewer _______________________________ Date: ____/_____/_____ 
f) Name of the village: _______________ Lat __________ Log __________, Alt ____________ 
g) For how long are you living in the reserve?  I was born here ___; > 10 year____;  
5 – 10 years ____; < 5 years _____  
e) Have you ever lived out of the reserve before? Yes _____    No_____,  
g) If yes, why did you decided move to the reserve? _________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________  
h) What kind of home do you live? cement____ clay ____ Roof of grass ____ roof of zinc___ Other___ 
If other, could you describe it please 
______________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
7. Socio-economic information of the respondent  
a) Name (not compulsory) ___________________________________, 
Age_______________________ 
b) Gender        Male              Female   
c) Number of people in the household _____________   Number of wives 
________________________ 
d) Number of workers in the household ___________________________________________________ 
e) Could you please fill the table below which is related to the general family spend for acquisition of 
some goods and services? (you should consider the most recent from the two last years). 
No  Activities/Acquisition   Total spend (MZN*) Year   
a) Rebuilding or construction of the house   _____________________ ____________ 
b) Rebuilding or construction of the storehouse    _____________________ ____________ 
c) Acquisition of transportation (motorbike/bike)  _____________________ ____________ 
d) Acquisition of radio   _____________________ ____________ 
e) Acquisition of TV´s   _____________________ ____________ 
f) Acquisition of mobile phone   _____________________ ____________ 
g) Investing in a business (small shop) _____________________ ____________ 
h) Opening of bank account   _____________________ ____________ 
i) Pay for agricultural labour and inputs _____________________ ____________ 
j) Educations of kids  _____________________ ____________ 
l) Electricity  _____________________ ____________ 
m) Home appliances  _____________________ ____________ 
n) Clothes ____________________ ____________ 
              *Is the Mozambican currency (new family metical)  
 
8. Farming information 
Below is provided the list of most common crops that households grow in the NNR. For those that  
you have planted in the last season, could you please provide total amount harvested, consumption, 
losses for crop raiders, quantity sold and its respective price  
No Crop 
Harvested 
(Kg) Lost (Kg) 
Consumption 
(Kg) Sold (Kg) 
Price 
(MZN) 
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a) Maize  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
b) Peanut  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
c) Cassava  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
d) Rice  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
e) Cowpea  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
f) Pea  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
g) Sorghum  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
h) Millet  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
i) Sesame  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
j) Sweet potato __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
l) Vegetables*  __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
  m) Tobacco* __________ __________ __________ __________ __________ 
            Note: all products are measured in 20 litters plastic containers, except those that are in asterisks. 
                         vegetable was measured in a big open plastic basket or sachets of 100 litter while tobacco is measures 
                         rolls of 2 Kgs. Prices a given for each unity of measurement which was converted for Kg/MZN. 
 
 
8.4.  Could you please rank the top four most important crop raiding that have raided you farm and the most 
important crops each animal prefers 
 
9. Harvesting of non-timber products 
Mark all products and materials that you harvest from the forest, rivers, soils, etc. The frequency of 
harvest, quantities the final purpose and its price if applicable.  
No  Products  Frequency of harvesting  Propose  
Quantities  
Kg/liters  
Price 
(MZN) 
a) 
Medicines (roots, 
leaves, branches and 
fruits)  day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ 
 
 
________ 
 
 
_____ 
b) Grass   day __, week__, month__, semester __ year__ sell__, use __ ________ _____ 
c) Stakes   day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
d) Bamboos  day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
e) Firewood day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell__, use __ ________ _____ 
f) Ropes  day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
g) Honey* day__, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
h) Fish# day __, week __, month__, semester__ year_ sell__, use __ ________ _____ 
i) Insects   day __, week __, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
j) Bush meat  day __, week__, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ _________ _____ 
l) Others day __, week__, month__, semester__ year__ sell __, use __ ________ _____ 
       *Honey was measured in litters  
        #Fish in plastics containers of 20 Kg. 
 
10. Practices Interfering with Conservation in the Niassa National Reserve  
 
a) Could you please tell if each of the existing problems threaten conservation in the NNR? 
 Yes  No I don´t kwon  
Slash-and-burn agriculture   O O 
Poaching (e.g. ivory, bones, skin etc.)  O O 
Illegal logging  O O 
Population growth in the reserve with increased 
pressure to the resources 
 O O 
Human and wildlife conflicts  O O 
196 
 
Illegal gold and ruby mining  O O 
 
b) Could you please indicate the main actor that is responsible for each threat described 
below? In your answer, consider direct (action) or indirect responsibility (omission) 
 Do  Go ReAd NoRe LoPe PrSc TrAu 
Slash-and-burn agriculture   O O O O O O 
Poaching (e.g. ivory, bones, skin etc.  O O O O O O 
Illegal logging  O O O O O O 
Population growth in the reserve with increased 
pressure to the resources 
 O O O O O O 
Human and wildlife conflicts  O O O O O O 
Illegal gold and ruby mining  O O O O O O 
          Where: Do=Donors, ReAd=Reserve Administration, NoRe=Non-residents, LoPe=Local People, 
PrSc=Private,  
                        Sector (PrSc) and TrAu=Traditional Authorities, 
 
 
11.  Effectiveness and limitations of the current incentives that are placed in the Niassa National 
Reserve 
 
a) Could you please tell if each incentive that are currently under implementation in the reserve 
are effective to engage local people with conservation-friendly practices in the reserve.  
 Yes  No  
I don´t 
Know  
Jobs for the local population created under the conservation program, (e.g. 
Forest ranger position) 
 O O 
Hunting quotas that are allocated to local people  O O 
20% of concessions revenues that are delivered to the local people  O O 
Food allowances which are distributed to local people  O O 
Delivery of 50% of the revenue of the fines from these who detected the 
infraction in the reserve 
 O O 
Promotion and respect of culture and beliefs of local communities by 
government authorities and other actors in conservation (e.g. sacred places) 
 O O 
 
 
 
 
b) Some limitations have been referenced due to the way that the compensation measures are being 
delivered to the local people. Do you agree or disagree?  
 
 Agree I don´t know   Disagree 
Lack of transparency in the criteria that has being used to allocate 
the jobs position 
 
O O 
The hunting quotas allocated to local people are not enough  O O 
The money allocated to the communities is not enough  O O 
Lack of monitoring and accountability in the use of 20% of 
concession revenues 
 O O 
 In many cases, the detectors of the offenders do not receive the 
award 
 O O 
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Weak training and advice to communities in how to use the 
compensation 
 O O 
Poor monitoring and evaluation of the results from the projects 
implemented to the benefit of communities 
 O O 
The above compensations are not enough to motivate the 
community 
 O O 
 
 
12. New proposed compensation measures.  
 
a) In your opinion, what will be the effectiveness of each of the measures described below in order 
to promoting the adoption of conservation-friendly practices by the household’s heads 
 
Positive 
I don´t 
know  
Negative 
Create areas for cultivation of high-yield commercial crops (e.g. tobacco, corn, 
soybeans, cotton, etc.) to reduce pressure on land and obtain greater profits than 
others crop like cassava, maize etc. 
O O O 
Assist local people to the use environmentally friendly cultivation practices (e.g. 
minimum cultivation, crop rotation, green manuring etc.) 
O O O 
 Assist local people to produce alternative sources of animal proteins (e.g. 
chickens, pigs, poultry etc.) 
O O O 
Promoting certification of non-timber products (e.g. honey, fruit, medicinal 
plants etc.) in order to get higher market prices and encourage sustainable use of 
natural resources] 
O O O 
Training the communities for sustainable use of forest resources (timber, non-
timber and fishing resources) 
O O O 
Involve local people in the management and decision-making on issues related 
to the reserve 
O O O 
Increase in the percentage of revenues charged to distribute to communities O O O 
Increased employment in conservation and recreation activities (e.g. tour 
guides, rangers, carpenters, hotels and restoration activities, etc.); 
O O O 
Attribution of collective conservation performance-based payments for local 
people 
O O O 
Provide education for local people (e.g. scholarships) O O O 
Improve services delivery for local people (e.g. health, education, roads etc.) O O O 
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6.1. General conclusions 
This research aimed to propose policies to improve the conservation status of NNR by 
investigating: i) the practices that threaten biodiversity conservation; ii) the drivers for local 
people involvement in such practices and, iii) possible incentives and compensations that can 
be used to promote conservation-friendly behaviors. The main objective was divided into three 
specific objectives, addressed in four chapters (chapter 2 to 5 of this thesis).  
The first objective was to understand the role of local people in major threats to 
conservation and the underlying drivers for their involvement in conservation-threatening 
practices. This objective was addressed based on surveying of experts engaged in conservation 
in the NNR. The results showed high degree of agreement among experts as regards the 
practices that mostly threaten biodiversity conservation in the reserve: poaching, illegal logging 
and mining. Most of these practices are carried out by illegal outsiders, acting with support of 
local people. According to the experts, local people cooperate with outsiders who conduct 
illegal activities due to the following possible reasons: i) insufficient livelihoods, which are 
possibly related to weak compensation schemes and higher levels of crop-raiding and, ii) local 
rural people do not have the skills and minimum investment required to conduct such illegal 
activities, so they can only collaborate with outsiders that have those resources and lead the 
activities. The results also showed that most answers of the expert were related to the general 
narrative of PAs in DCs and that most of their views in relation to conservation-threatening 
practices were also in accordance many existing studies conducted in protected areas of 
developing countries in general and some in Mozambique in particular.  
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In order to identify the available possible management options for economic agents in 
the reserve and the factors that drive their choices among different LFS, a household survey 
was applied in seven villages within the NNR. Based on the cluster results of 339 surveyed 
households, we have identified livelihood systems of gatherers, hunters, farmers and 
employees, and three specialized farming systems (FS) of maize, rice and sorghum, and one 
mixed FS. A Multinomial Logistic Model was used to investigate the drivers of Livelihood and 
Farming System choice, and it was possible to understand that livelihood system choice was 
mainly driven by socio-economic factors, while farming system choice was mostly driven by 
biophysical conditions. People who had diversified farming and off-farming activities were 
better off and more resilient to meteorological events and crop-raiding animals and 
intensification was constrained by biophysical conditions, namely rainfall. 
A more in-depth household survey was conducted with the same 399 households in the 
NNR to understand how perceived costs and benefits of living inside a PA at the village-level 
can lead people to participate in illegal-resource harvesting by using a spatially-based approach, 
that uses non-sensitive and indirect questioning of local residents about participation in illegal 
activities. The results showed that costs and benefits were unevenly distributed across villages, 
due to biophysical and socio-political factors, including the conservation dynamic in the reserve 
(e.g. the location of most conservation NGO´s, the size of population in villages within the 
reserve and location of some villages closer to the PA borders). Most of the households who 
receive more conservation benefits were less likely involved in conservation-threatening 
practices. These households were located in villages with higher agriculture outputs (mixed 
farming system or farming system of sorghum), and more conservation-related employments 
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(Mecula, Mbamba and Naulala). Households who were more likely involved in illegal activities 
were poor, less educated, and mostly located closer to the PA borders. These villages tend to 
perceive higher costs and lower benefits of living inside the NNR. Respondents were more 
likely to admit their participation in activities not considered as serious infraction by park 
authorities, such as shifting cultivation, to conduct to cope with their daily needs and which are.  
6.2. Management implications for PAs of developing countries 
Management decisions in most PAs of DCs are based on general information from other 
PA cases of success, often locked within specific spatial and temporal contexts, and localized 
network of conservation experts´ and PA managers, resulting in some mistakes replicated 
elsewhere in other PAs (Beale et al., 2013), since conduct research that provides more detailed 
and accurate information for a specific PA is time and resource-consuming. Such inconsistent 
decision often do not provide the desired results due to the peculiarities of each PA, that can 
only be captured using more specific information obtained through ground surveys. These 
differences among PAs, include fauna and flora, different local cultures and identities and hard 
or soft borders (Beale et al., 2013; Wegmann et al., 2014). Even in Mozambique, the existing 
networks of PA from south to north cover different ecosystems (e.g. Miombo and Mopane) 
(MICOA, 2014), where residents show distinct cultures and identities. Thus, accurate and 
consistent conservation policies and decisions require more context-specific field information. 
As we have demonstrated, relying on expert advice, without triangulating with ground 
information, can sometimes lead to management mistakes, since experts seem to draw their 
views based on the general narrative of conservation in DCs, as most of the PAs in developing 
countries appear to share the same problems by far. Even if we assume similar problems, 
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digging deeper, the right solutions may not be necessarily the same. In the case of the NNR, we 
observed that both experts and local people appear to agree that outsiders are the main 
responsible for the major conservation-threatening practices, and local people may cooperate 
with them due to poverty and lack of livelihoods. The livelihood constraint can be addressed 
by improving and promoting the adoption of the existing environmental-friendly and more 
sustainable livelihood systems (of gatherer and employees), as well as the mixed and sorghum 
farming systems. At the same time, the reserve managers and all relevant actors need to monitor 
and set strategies to control the unsustainable growth rate of human-population, because no 
conservation policies can deal with the needs of the projected population of approximately 200, 
000 inside the NNR in 2050 under a growth ratio of “business as usual scenario”. If the 
population continues to grow in an unsustainable way, poaching and illegal logging by outsiders 
may no longer be considered priority problems, because all lions and elephants may be extinct 
in the reserve. Poaching and illegal logging will be replaced by shifting cultivation and 
harvesting of NTFPs as the top conservation-threatening practices, as the densely populated 
villages will struggle for land for agriculture and harvesting. In fact, there are studies showing 
that most of non-fenced PAs in Africa are challenged whit high population density which 
increase pressure on ecosystem services, imposing significant challenges for decision-makers 
and conservation managers (Wegmann et al., 2014). 
Providing local residents with in-kind incentives such the adoption of highly productive 
cash crops and environmentally friendly agriculture practices, conservation related 
employment, capacity-building to discover and secure business and other opportunities, and 
providing their kids with scholarships seems to have  significant potential to improve 
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conservation in the NNR. To accomplish this goal, considering that the reserve suffers for lack 
of financial resources, part of 20% of funding from concession taxes, already under 
implementation, could be allocated as in-kind payments. In addition to in-kind payments, the 
Reserve also needs to set consistent buffer zones to avoid human-wildlife-conflicts and work 
in closer collaboration with the local households to prevent crop and livestock incursions, 
because compensations for crop-raiding and livestock deprivation are not easy to implement 
and highly subject to fraudulent claims and purposeful induced conflict to claim compensation 
(Mackenzie and Ahabyona, 2012), especially when offsets are too high.  
The research also shows that the conservation problem of in the NNR is too complex 
and multifaceted, so no single compensation scheme can address all problems. As already noted 
by Travers et al. (2019), a broader, holistic and sustainable approach should be used instead. 
This includes the use of a policies mix including: education and empowerment of local people 
in conservation (improving community relationships); sustainable use of common pool 
resources, especially in the context of meteorological adversities; increasing law enforcement, 
especially closer to the park borders; consistent buffer zones and wildlife corridors 
implementation to reduce HWC; improving the quality of infrastructures and services in the 
reserve (e.g. good road quality and planning); and improving communication between 
conservation researchers and practitioners.  
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6.3. Limitations for the present study and recommendations for further research 
The lack of basic socio-economic data related to PAs in Mozambique, especially in the 
NNR, was the great gap we used as an opportunity to conduct a relevant research that provided 
valuable information related to conservation in Mozambique and other PA in DCs. However, 
to carry out credible and high-quality research, one needs a starting point, which includes, at 
least, the availability of basic and indispensable data which will help to delineate the problem. 
In this specific study, most of required data was unavailable. So, we started by questioning 
experts to help framing our approach by understanding whether what we considered relevant 
problems were really relevant or not. We devoted one year of the Ph.D. project doing this 
exercise. This procedure was relevant and indispensable for the quality of the research. 
Although Mozambique has been putting a lot of effort to catch up with international standards 
of information collection and availability in the last years. This is not reflected in many 
important sectors. This is why we suggest that the Mozambican National Direction of 
Conservation Areas (DNAC) and the Niassa National Reserve need to put some effort to create 
a digital and accessible database where researchers and any other ordinary citizen can view and 
download basic information. This information should include: number and size of PAs in 
Mozambique, their location; data from the census of fauna and flora over annual or 5-years 
periods; human resident census; basic shapefiles to be used to develop GIS data bases; annual 
budget and allocation of compensation schemes for local communities, infrastructures 
including tourism operators and accommodations. This information is important to attract 
donors, investors, researchers and other relevant stakeholders.  The Niassa Carnivore13 project 
 
13 http://niassalion.org/ 
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is an example in terms of data collection and accessibility which should be followed by other 
conservation agencies in Mozambique. And it is impressing to see how they devote efforts to 
improve their data collection process and reports ever year. 
As future research, we aim to select those compensations and commitments options that 
both experts and local people agreed as relevant to improve conservation in the reserve and 
conduct a choice-experiment (a stated preference technique to assess individual preferences), 
to come up with a more refined set of policies that can be easily implemented in the reserve, 
due to the resources constraints (time and money), this task, which was initially in our plans, 
will be postponed as our next priority for the upcoming research. 
By using an indirect and non-sensitive approach to assess the likelihood of household 
participation in illegal activities and relating this with village-level variables, it was possible to 
find out that most people engaged in illegal activities were located in villages closer to the PA 
boarders (Chamba and Mucoria). The validation procedure of association between the 
recognition of shifting cultivation as a threat with the participation in the same activity, did 
somewhat not showed the desired results. This is because both methods are indirect. The easiest 
way to validate the results would be the use of a registration database of illegal activities in each 
village in the reserve. Unfortunately, so far as we are aware, the Reserve does not have this 
information and the improvement of this method in the future study is required. One way to 
validate the results, would be the use of more in-depth interviews with reliable informants in 
each village where the survey was conducted, but this would be possible only in future research. 
It is also important to highlight that this methodology of assessing the likelihood of direct or 
indirect participation in illegal harvesting was not in the priorities of this research, and we only 
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found it relevant in the middle way of the research, and so its full validation still requires further 
research work.  
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